ISLAM, IQBAL AND PHILOSOPHY

MAJLIS BYAD-E-KHAWAJA GHULAM SADIQ
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PREFACE

"Islam, Iqbal and Philisophy" is a collection of articles written by late Prof. K.G.Sadiq. Most of these articles were read out by him at international conferences within and outside Pakistan and published in various journals of established reputation. Though apparently diverse in character, they fall into a system. Their primary objective is to bring out a philosophical interpretation of Islam: Allama Muhammad Iqbal gave such an interpretation in a language which the 20th century man can understand.

Karl Marx, introducing his revolutionary philosophy, had said : 'Until now philosophers have only interpreted the world differently; the point is to change it'. Prof.Sadiq is firmly of the opinion that the direct and immediate function of philosophy is neither to interpret the world nor to change it. A philosopher, he holds, is essentially one who 'seeks an understanding of man and his world, discloses the significant possibilities of human experience and projects a vision of life and values'. This vision, this consistent cosmic attitude, of course, does have an impact on the temperament and attitude of its incumbent, his morality and value-preferences, his ideology and metaphysics and so on. These personal equipments gradually get disseminated among the people around and in the last analysis become very strong instruments of social change. Thus philosophy, though basically a theoretical study, has a recognizable earthly reference. It provides an interpretation to the actual problems and


needs of a society which, in turn, serve as its entire content and raw material. From all this, Prof. Sadiq concludes that the kind of philosophy that ought to, and in fact possibly can, prosper in the freshly liberated third world countries in general and Pakistan in particular is the one that is wedded to their characteristic psychological, sociological and ideological problems. The most basic of these evidently is the problem of identity. 'Who am I ?' is the question that is posed by every Pakistani. What does it mean 'to be a Pakistani'? What are the implications of this concept? What are our duties and responsibilities as Pakistanis? These are the questions that are posed by everyone of us and that need urgent and well-defined answers. Thus, instead of explaining, interpreting and advocating linguistic Analysis, Existentialism, Marxim, Pragmatism etc which are foreign to the soil of Pakistan and so cannot take roots here, our philosophers should rather address themselves to the task of tracing the development of national sentiment in Pakistan or discovering the dynamics of a Pakistani character or highlighting the ideology of Pakistan etc.

Pakistan is strongly committed to Islamic Ideology, so the vision that Pakistani philosophical studies are supposed to generate must be an Islamic vision. 'To be Muslim' and 'to be Islamic', it must be noted, are different concepts. Difference between the two corresponds to the more basic distinction generally made between 'having a religion' and 'living religiously'. The former is a pragmatic and workable notion. A person may proclaim the religion of Islam in the conventional sense of the term and may justificably be treated as a member of the Islamic *ummah*. To be religious, on the other hand, is to accept religion as a matter of commitment. It is only the state of living religiously that amounts to having an Islamic vision and that makes religion indistinguishable from, and identical with, one's personality

Prof. Sadiq has time and again emphasized the need that Pakistani philosophers should grapple with their indigenous problems with a deeply religious and therefore the most authentic point of view.

14th April, 1986.

Justice Dr. Javid Iqbal
Chief Justice
Lahore High Court, Lahore.



PROF. KHAWAJA GHULAM SADIQ

GOD AND VALUES

Historically speaking philosophers, moralists and theologians have advanced in various periods different proofs of the existence of God. But as is known to the students of philosophy, none of these proofs can be accepted for one reason or another. The question arises: Can one furnish a valid proof of God's existence? Even if you answer in the affirmative, it will not imply that you have established God's existence. An argument that makes strong appeal to the theologians could be expressed in classical syllogism and a valid conclusion drawn but a valid conclusion may not be a true proposition. Mere validity does not establish truth. The argument is :

If Moses is trustworthy, God exists.
Moses is trustworthy.
∴God exists.

Does the argument establish God's existence? Does it fulfil the constitutive and epistemic conditions of inference? Granted that Moses is trustworthy but does his trustworthiness permit us to accept his recommendation for a belief in a transempirical reality? The epistemic condition of inference is not fulfilled here. The gulf between the empirical and the transempirical cannot be bridged over by logical reasoning nor is the constitutive condition met. The relation between the constituents of the major premise is not that of implication.

I believe that God's existence has to be intuited. How do I know myself? Certainly not by an inference. Descartes' cogito ergo sum is a fallacious dictum. He inferred thinker

from thinking but the inference is not warranted by the data. Hume, too, wanted to have a perception of 'I' or Self but could not get behind the passing states of consciousness to an enduring self. He was thus led to deny the reality of self. Truly speaking I do not need any proof to know that I exist. In *Payam-i–Mashriq* (Ruba' i 54, p. 38), Iqbal beautifully brings out this point :

I am silent on the question of my being and non-being.
If I say 'I am,' I commit myself to "a worship of myself.'
But whose voice is this simple note?
Some one in my bosom says that I exist.

I intuit myself and there the matter ends. I also intuit the external world. Unless this is granted, no transition can be made from thought or states of consciousness to the objective situation. Berkeley wanted to prove the existence of the external world but was led to his subjective idealism. Leibniz's reasoning about the unity of force led him to conclude that monads or metaphysical points had no windows yet he knew that there were infinite number of monads each reflecting the same universe from its special point of view. Berkeley in fact believed in the existence of the external world but his presuppositions that ideas are passive and spirits alone active and that passive ideas cannot act upon spirits, the active substances, forced him to make his ideas (things) exist in the mind of God. Descartes' reasoning that because the senses sometimes deceive us, therefore they have to be distrusted completely, is hard to understand. His inquiry should have been directed towards sifting true perceptions from illusions and hallucinations. He was not justified in doubting the existence of the external world from the fact of illusions. His reasoning about the reality of the external world, on the basis of the veracity of God, is quite illogical. Kant intuits the existence of the external world and of the self but declares them unknowable. He held that all knowledge is through categories and the latter are applied not to things but to our thinking of them. Kant's follo-

wers made things only thoughts (the identity of thought and being) and were thus committed to objective idealism. This destroyed the distinction between the subject and the object and reduced the individual, in the words of Kierkegaard, to a mere paragraph in a system.

We, thus, find that in the history of modern thought the attempt to prove the existence of self or the external world has landed philosophers in great difficulties. The attempt to prove the existence of the self and the external world presupposes a belief in the reality of the two. The real problem of the self and the external world belongs to the field of description. Logical positivists are, I think, justified in stressing this aspect of philosophical inquiry.

We thus intuit our own existence and also intuit the existence of the external world. God has also to be intuited. The most authentic form of intuition which yields knowledge of God is technically called religious experience. But religious experience is not readily available to an individual. It presupposes certain qualities of head and heart in the recipient. The whole history of mysticism points to this fact. A novice has always been tested by the preceptor and subjected to a strict moral discipline and self-examination before he is fit to enter the various "states" and "stations" of the sufi path. The preceptor helps his disciple from falling a victim to illusions and hallucinations. Thus the recipient of religious expereince is cautious and takes great care to distinguish genuine from spurious experience. The Quran too lays emphasis on the possibility of religious experience being vitiated by Satan. The following verse (xxii.52) will make the point clear :

"We have not sent an Apostle or Prophet before thee among whose desires Satan injected not some wrong desire, but God shall bring to naught that which Satan had suggested. Thus shall God affirm His revelations, for God is knowing and wise".

The next step in religious experience is that of communication and that constitutes the crux of the difficulty. Language is the medium through which communication can take place. But language pertains to sensory experience, whereas religious experience refers to transempirical reality. Hence the language of religion is vague, full of similies, metaphors, allusions and symbols. The content of the experience is not communicable. The interpretation which a mystic puts on his experience is communicated in the form of propositions. "Since the quality of mystic experience is to be directly experienced, it is obvious that it cannot be communicated. Mystic states are more like feeling than thought," says Iqbal[1] The result is that the account of the religionists regarding the nature of reality differs. This fact has been emphasized by the Sufis. Rumi, for instance, said that if animals were to imagine God, every animal would see in Him his own magnified image. Muhammad ibn Zakariya al-Razi, a Muslim thinker of the 9th century of the Christian era, condemned religious experience on the basis of contradictions in various religions. He had overlooked the fact that religious experience in its essence is a synthetic experience and does not easily render itself to expression in words. It is the unanalysable wholeness of the religious experience which makes its linguistic rendering an extremely difficult task., Sciences deal with static facts, with abstractions and thus can capture their data in concepts and categories. Religion deals with life in all its wholeness. Life is dynamic and not static. Hence the language difficulty. But this does not mean that the language of religion has no meaning or that the verification of religious discourse is not possible. The criterion for establishing the truth of religious discourse is different from the criterion used in verifying descriptive statements of empirical sciences. The contributions which religious propositions have made to the moral and intellectual fund of the world make it abundantly clear that religious propositions cannot

be brushed aside as untrue. You judge the truth of religious experience by *its fruits* and not by *its roots*, observed William James. Again, as has been pointed out by Professor C. A. Qadir in his article "God and Logic," the religious proposition pertains to eternity and its rejection is not possible on the basis of experience which spreads over a small period of time.

Thus, for our knowledge of God we have to depend primarily on revelation as expressed in religious propositions. Of course, there are other sources too, e.g. the study of nature and history. Ibn Tufail showed in his romance, *Hayy bin Yaqzan* the possibility of knowing God through a study of nature. These sources involve a purely intellectual approach and the Absolute thus arrived at, appears more akin to thought and reason and hence static. It is for this reason that we have to depend primarily on revelation for our knowledge of God. The facts of religion are genuine facts. Ghazali was justified in stressing this fact in his *Tahafut al-Falasifah*. In what follows, I accept the hypothesis of God as stated in the Quran. I shall not try to harmonize religion with science or philosophy as has been the universal practice of almost all Muslim philosophers from Al-Kindi to Iqbal, Hakim and Sharif. I shall only bring out the implications of the unity of God and in this connection my conclusion is that the true import of Divine unity is difficult to grasp. There is an element of agnosticism in religion. I further contend that the Quranic concept of the attributes of God as ultimate values provides a sound basis to morality and lends meaning and significance to moral effort.

The Quran conceives of God as an individual. He is one. All things depend on Him. He neither begets nor is begotten. He is the bearer of beautiful names (attributes) and is nearer to man than his neck-vein. He has direct contact with His creatures. There are no two but He is their third, no three but He is their fourth. He is the Creator and comprehends

all creation. "My mercy encompasses all things" (vii.156). He is powerful and wise. He is not limited by anything. "He is the First and the Last and the manifest and the hidden and He is knower of all things" (1vii. 3).

The unity of God has been of special interest to Muslim thinkers. The Quran lays major emphasis on it.

(i) "And your God is one God; there is no God but He! He is Beneficent, the Merciful"(ii.163).

(ii) "Say, He is only one God" (vi.19).

(iii) "Your God is one God: so those who believe not in the Hereafter, their hearts refuse to know and they are proud" (xvi.22).

(iv) "And Allah has said: Take not two Gods. He is only one God: So Me alone should you fear" (xvi.51).

It is for this emphasis that the unity of God has been the cornerstone of Muslim religious and philosophic thought. It was a cardinal principle with(i) the various schools of Muslim theology particularly the Mu'tazilites and the Ash-'arites, (ii) Muslim rationalists (philosophers) and (iii) the Sufis. Some of the Sufis conceived God as the only reality and were led to the doctrine of the Unity of Being, *Wahdat al-Wujud*, a pantheistic interpretation of reality.

The Quranic emphasis on the unity of God is primarily directed against polytheism. The Mu'tazilites argued that the unity of God required the denial of His attributes. They called themselves the people of unity and justice (Ahl al-Tawhid wal 'adl) and feared that admission of attributes would lead to a plurality of eternals and hence polytheism. They reduced the attributes either to relations or negations or made them God's essence. Abu Hudhay Muhammad al-'Allaf (748-840 A. C.), a disciple of the second generation from Wasil bin 'Ata, the founder of Mu'tazilism, taught that God's attributes were not in His essence but were His essence. The Mu'tazilites reduced God to an abstract unity. The

Ash'arites, in conformity with the orthodox view, accepted God's attributes as distinct from God's essence but at the same time warned that they were to be accepted *bila kaifa,* without asking 'How' and *bila tashbih,* without drawing any comparison. The Quran says,"Nothing is like Him, and He is the Hearing, the Seeing" (x1ii.11). The Philosophers (al-Farabi, Ibn Sina) made the unity of God a basis for their emanationistic account of Being. The universe, which is a unity, was conceived by the Muslim rationalists as an eternal, i.e. non-temporal, emanation from God. God being the Necessary Being, His essence and existence coincided while the possible beings depended on the Necessary Being for their existence. Thus Ibn Sina, despite his emanationistic account of Being, avoided committing himself to a pantheistic interpretation of reality by making the universe dependent on God for existence.

Iqbal explains the unity of God and the multiplicity of His attributes on the pattern of human personality. Despite the multiplicity of selves human personality is a unity. This unity or integration of ego is, of course, a matter of degree. For Iqbal the moral ideal is the attainment of a perfectly integrated ego. The moral worth of an action is determined by its tendency to promote integration of personality, "there are no pleasure-giving and pain-giving acts; there are only ego-sustaining and ego-dissolving acts. It is the deed that prepares the ego for dissolution or disciplines him for a future career."[2] With God the unity achieves perfection. This attempt to understand unity of God in terms of perfected integration of ego is not to fashion God after the image of man, warns Iqbal; it is only to affirm that Divine Life is not a chaos but an organised principle. It is our habit of pictorial thinking which lends anthropomorphic colouring to our concept of God.

Eversince the time of Hume, the sciences have tended more to restrict their field to the observable, to phenomena.

The scientist believes in the unity of the universe, regards it a cosmos and does not consider it justified to step beyond the phenomenal to transempirical reality. Idealist thinkers lay emphasis on the unity of intellet or reason but cannot go beyond reason. But for religion the unity of the universe and the unity of reason point to an ultimate unity which alone could explain the two opposing unities of matter and mind. In the words of the Quran the experience within and without is symbolic of reality described by it as 'The First and the last, the visible and the invisible (lvii. 3). God is, therefore, both immanent and transcendent. He is immanent in that the universe is a visible expression of His creative activity. He is transcendent in that the universe does not exhaust the creative activity of God.

A complete comprehension of the unity of God is a difficult task. The degree of unity depends on the degree of individuality. With man individuality is a relative affair. We become conscious of our own self in opposition to the not-self. God can afford to dispense with all the worlds, says the Quran. This implies that the universe is not to be conceived as confronting God as His other. The Quran is careful to state that all things depend on God. There is no spatial notion involved in the concept of dependence. A conclusion depends on its premise, a work of art depends on the artist, and an idea depends on the mind which conceives it, and these objects in one way limit their subjects. To form a complete notion of the unity of God is beset with difficulties. We can only have an approximation to it. I fully endorse the view of Dr. K. A. Hakim that "there is an element of agnosticism in all true religion and even in the deepest religious experience."

II

The Quranic attributes of God represent ultimat values. These constitute the ideal and control and guide tl process of social evolution. The unity of God implies t

unity of Moral Law or the interrelatedness of values. Social progress is a fact. Man today is wiser by his past experience. In all ages man has been gradually moving towards a fuller realization of a social order calculated to secure well-being. At no time in the recorded history of man, any group took upon itself the promotion of evil as its end. It is true that social progress has not been uniform. There have been periods when social order was greatly upset but man emerged from every ordeal with greater determination to promote peace and harmony. The Quran too takes a teleological view of the universe and the man. Let me quote a few verses relevant to the point.

And we did not create the heavens and the earth and that which is between them in sport. We created them not but for a serious end, but most of them understand it not (xliv. 38, 39).

Do you then think that we have created you in vain, and that you will not be returned to us (xiii. 115).

And everyone has a goal to which he turns, so vie with one another in good works (ii. 148).

That the attributes constitute ideals is clear from the following verses:

And that to thy Lord is the goal (liii. 42)

God desires the perfection of His Light (ix. 32).

(We take) Allah's colour, and who is better than Allah at colouring (ii. 138).

Some of the attributes of God which the Quran describes are Life, Power, Wisdom, Truth, Beauty, Goodness, Love and Justice. "He is Allah the Creator, the Maker, the Fashioner. His are the most beautiful names" (lix 24). In philosophical terminology the verse implies that God is the locus of all ultimate and intrinsic values. His Being guarantees the objectivity of values. But as God is nearer to man than his neck-vein, one carries value-consciousness with him. It is the "Moral law within" and not "the starry heaven above" that

bestows on the individual his true status and prepares him to be deputy of God on earth. It is this development of the ethical personality that the Prophet of Islam, peace be upon him, signified when he enjoined on Muslims to assimilate Divine attributes. With God as the locus of all values it follows that there is no distinction in Islam between the spiritual and the mundane, the religious and the secular. Material prosperity is a condition of spiritual growth of a people. Islam recommends a positive seeking attitude towards life in all its manifestations.

The objectivity of values does not rule out difference of opinion in moral matters. The content-range of a value widens with experience. Kant was wrong when he recommended complete divorce between morality and experience. He held that the moral law needed no content to be filled in by experience. His moral system remains formal and barren. The true significance of values in the ever-changing social set-up is discovered gradually by the advancing consciousness of man. Ultimate values or formal ideals of value need a content to be filled in by experience.

With God as the locus of all instrinsic values the requirements of morality are fully met with. It implies that moral effort is in tune with reality. A morally developed individual or society is more truly real. Further, the Quranic emphasis on the continuity of life after death, makes moral effort all the more meaningful. In this moral effort, according to the Quran, God becomes a co-worker with man.

The existentialist thinkers deny objectivity of values. When Nietzsche killed God, he thought that he had made the individual bold and courageous. Man had been working, thought Nietzsche, from the dawn of history, under the fear of gods or God, mighty and revengeful but now man had become mature enough to walk fearlessly without the support of God or gods. This loss of faith in God led to anguish, anxiety, dread, feeling of being forsaken and so

forth. These concepts are the prize possession of existentialist thinkers. There is no purpose in life, says an existentialist, but you can make it meaningful by making a certain commitment. Man is just wedged between life and death, merely a freakish accident. But if absurdity, irrationality and purposelessness be the key-note of existence,why should one try to make it meaningful by having commitments? Why to endure the non-authentic or the authentic existence at all? Existentialism is the philosophy of pessimism, frustration and failure. It had stepped in to save the individual, to plead for him, but only succeeds in bringing home to him that he is a mere supernumerary, something superfluous. The symbol of man, for Camus, is Sisyphus who was condemned by gods to perform a meaningless task. He was to take a rock to the top of a mountain and when he scaled the mountain,the rock was dropped down and Sisyphus set to the same task again and found a certain happiness in that meaningless routine. The cycle of existence is very much like the routine performance of Sisyphus. Individual life history is nothing but a series of contingent happenings. The schools and colleges you get education in, the teachers you meet and the friends you make with or the person you marry and even one's birth are all mere contingent happenings. These philosophers forget that the contingency is the result of mobility and freedom that man enjoys. Let all persons be earth-rooted like mountains or trees and most of the happenings will disappear. Choice presupposes a variety and multiplicitys of possible events or courses. Contingent happenings is the price we pay for our freedon and choice. Willaim James was right when he asserted that the mere fact that one continued to live is sufficient proof that one regards life as worth living. It is the meaningfulness of life that sustains you to live it. Your commitments yield you a richness of experience and an increase in the depth and fullness of life.

Life is not meaningless. It is directed towards ends and goals. It becomes obvious when we reflect on the working

of our own minds. It is true that a well-planned action may not meet with success but that is no basis for condemning life as meaningless. Failure sometimes goads you on to greater effort. The existentialist thinkers forget that the values one finds in society at one time are the operative values. These are the choices made by persons who were here before us. These are their interpretations of the formal ideals of values. Values which are the same for all human beings, values which the Quran describes as the beautiful names of Allah. We start our life by adhering to the operative values of the group. But it is open to us to reflect on these values and see if they agree with the formal ideals of values. This implies that we have to check if the operative values continue to guide life adequately. "Virtue without imagination is a constant danger in civilization," says F. Mayer. Changes in operative values are brought about by thinkers who, by active participation in and reflective withdrawal from social life of the community, reinterpret them by pressing them back to the principles on which they rest. Thus operative values undergo a steady process of change in the individual and the race. But the formal ideals of value remain the same. It is these which give universal character to morality and the unity of the moral law follows from the unity of God. We do not talk in terms of American or Chinese or Russian moral law. Societies differ in operative values only. But the formal ideals of values are the same for all. According to Islam these values have their locus in God. "And to thy Lord is the goal" (liii 42). Belief in God guarantees objectivity of values and the objectivity of values gives all meaning and significance to moral effort.

THE CONCEPTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ISLAM TODAY

Let me assert at the outset that the source material for any account of human rights in Islam is to be found primarily in the Quran and the traditions of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him). The second half of the inquiry concerns the account of human rights in the context of present day advancement in science and technology. What interpretations could be put afresh on the ideals enunciated by Islam, what guarantees, if any, could be furnished for the free exercise of human rights. These are the two main aspects of the subject which need consideration.

We know that Human Rights is a twentieth century expression for what was previously called natural rights or the rights of man, i.e. these are rights to which one is entitled by the mere fact of being man. These, therefore, differ from positive rights which are conceded and enforced by the law of the land. Positive rights are the rights which are allowed by a government and the government comes to the aid of its members if anyone is deprived of these rights. Positive rights, therefore, differ from country to country and have a limited application whereas human rights are universal. In the words of Jacques Maritain: "The human person possesses rights because of the very fact that it is a person, a whole, master of itself and of its acts, and which consequently is not merely a means to an end, but an end which must be treated as such. The dignity of the human person? The expression means nothing if it does not signify that by virture of natural law,

the human person has the right to be respected, is the subject of rights. These are things which are owed to man because of the very fact that he is man"[1].

This view of human rights is disputed by some philosophers. It is held in some quarters that human rights are not imprescriptible and inherent in the nature of man.[2] Nor are they antecedent to society. To regard human rights as absolute, inalienable and inherent in the nature of man is a myth and gives a misleading conception of the meaning of human rights.

Human rights are based, according to this view, upon human needs and are claimed when during the course of social development a section of the community finds its needs curtailed by the restrictions and constraints imposed by a privileged class. These rights are asserted in relation to these restrictions and the satisfaction of these needs. The real origin of the rights claimed are these practical needs rather than an imaginary state of nature and that is also their only validity. Human rights arise out of society and broaden with the development of society. They keep constantly changing with human needs and widening opportunity.

Bentham wrote in Anarchical Fallacies "Rights is a child of law, from real laws come real rights, but from imaginary law, from 'laws of nature' come imaginary rights. Natural rights is simply nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights rhetorical nonsense, nonsense upon stilts."[3]

Bentham's criticism is highly emotive. It is true that positive law differs from natural law. Positive law is a collection of enactments, with definite sanctions attached. This is not the case with natural law. It has no specific sanctions. But this does not render it imaginary, unreal or meaningless. Each of these laws carries its peculiar authority. Natural law has the authority *of conscience* while positive law carries the authority *of force.* When positive law coincides with natural law, it carries the authority both of force and conscience.

The test of validity or authenticity is different in the two cases. Regarding positive right, the answer to the question 'is such and such a right? depends on whether it is enforced. If the question is about human right or natural right, the answer depends on whether it is demanded by justice. Further, legal positivism has encouraged the belief that positive law being the only genuine law has alone to be obeyed. Such a position will rule out the possibility of protesting against the enactment of a law which does not fulfil the requirements of justice. In the words of Maunce Cranston "A human right by definition is a universal moral right, something which all men, everywhere, at all times, ought to have, something of which no one is deprived without a grave affront to justice, something which is owing to every human being simply because he is human."[4]

The Islamic point of view regarding human rights favours natural law view-point. Some of the fundamental human rights find expression in Quranic text. The latter provides ground-work for producing a more precise statement of these rights.[5] Interpretation and justification of these rights and an impartial agency to ensure the uninterrupted exercise of them are the problems which jurists, philosophers, and statesmen have been facing and attempting to tackle. A truly Islamic state requires allegiance to *God* and not to *thrones.* Since God is the ultimate spiritual basis of all life, allegiance to God is, in fact, allegiance to ideal human nature. The Quranic injunctions regarding universal human rights thus, in a way, belong both to law of God and Natural Law.

In the western world, we find a concern for human rights taking hold of human consciousness in the closing decades of the seventeenth century and efforts have since been made to provide constitutional safeguards to fundamental human rights of the Lockian or Hegelian type. In the world of Islam, a charter of human rights was given to the world by the Prophet of Islam (peace be upon him) in his sermon on the

occasion of *Hajja tul Wida.* The address sums up the rights which Islam grants to each and every member of the human race. The sermon lays emphasis on the unity, fraternity and freedom of man, on righteousness for determining which among men are superior. It denounces distinctions of race, colour or sex as providing any basis for superior consideration or merit. Right to life, property and social security is stressed. Equality of man and woman before law, the rights of men over women and women over men are asserted in unequivocal terms. The English Bill of Rights (1689), the United States Constitution of 1789 with its amendments, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the citizen issued by the Constituent Assembly in France and the efforts of other European nations at incorporating the concept of natural rights into their consitutions are all modern attempts at defining, protecting and promoting human rights. Islam, almost one thousand years before the enactment of the English Bill of Rights, had made a universal declaration of human rights and had made it obligatory on its followers to respect these rights and secure their free exercise. Unfortunately, in practice, this has not been done. Muslim countries disregarded the concept of state and society which Islam advocates. Moreover, the principle of movement in the structure of Islam, known as Ijtihad, has remained dormant with the result that, in the words of Khalifa Abdul Hakim, "Islam is buried under heaps of retrogade legalism and life-thwarting practices and centuries of despotism and clericalism have smothered the spirit of Islam."[6] The question of the conception of human rights in Islam today, therefore, is very relevant.

II

The account of human rights in Islam can be considered against the background of metaphysics of Quran. Islam has

a definite view regarding the nature of reality and man's place in it. The Quran regards Reality as spirtual and "its life consists in temporal activity. The spirit finds opportunities in the natural, the material, the secular. All that is secular is, therefore, sacred in the roots of its being"[7], says Iqbal in his Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam. In Islam, state and church are not two separate entities.[8] Isalm believes in the indivisibility of life which has to be viewed and organised as a whole. Islam does not encourage theocracy as it ever existed outside Islam. There is no priesthood in Islam nor is there any priestly hierarchy with an infallible head at the top. The state in Islam is only an attempt to realise the spiritual in human organization. It may be observed here that as a cultural movement Islam made the principle of Tauhid the basis of world unity. It discarded blood relationship or ethnic affinity as providing any strong basis for the unification of man. "Islam, as a polity", says Iqbal, "is only a practical means of making this principle(Tauhid) a living factor in the intellectual and emotional life of mankind. It demands *loyalty to God* not *to thrones.* And since God is the ultimate spiritual basis of all life, loyalty to God virtually amounts to man's loyalty to his own ideal nature."[9] From God as ultimate basis of all life follows the *Equality, Solidarity* and *Freedom* of man. This is the implication of 'Tauhid' as a working principle. State in Islam is only an organised attempt to realise these ideals in a human set up. These principles constitute the cornerstone of any charter of human rights.

III

Natural rights or fundamental human rights get a constitutional safeguard in an Islamic State. The Quranic ideal of manhood includes development of ethical personality.

"He is indeed successful who causeth
it(soul) to grow. And he is indeed

a failure who stunteth it (soul)"

(XCI, 9-10)

It enjoins exercise of all universal rights. Islam is a *Din* a complete code of life, giving detailed guidance in all affairs and since in an Islamic state real allegiance is to *God* and not to *thrones*, the positive and the natural rights almost coincide. It is presumed here that in an Islamic state, no law will be enacted which is contrary to the tenets of Islam. The fundamental rights have a constitutional protection, they have an authority both of *force* and *conscience*. All legislation is to be done within the limits set by the Quran.

". . . . . These are the limits imposed
by Allah, so approach them not".
"(Triumphant) are those who turn
repentant (to Allah), those who
serve (Him), those who praise(Him),
those who fast, those who
bow down, those who fall prostrate
(in worship), those who enjoin the
right and who forbid the wrong
and those who keep the limits
(ordained) of Allah."

Fundamental rights are the same for all sections of society in spite of their differences in faith. It is only in case of the positive rights that difference in faith, in an Islamic state, will put some limitations on the privileges of those who do not adhere to the ideology of the state. A truly Islamic state is an ideological state and persons who do not subscribe to the ideology of the state, cannot claim, as a matter of right, an access to posts and positions which may give them power enough to work against the security and stability of the state. All this is plain logic. They will otherwise enjoy all the civil, economic and social rights.

Fundamental human rights are to be distinguished from rights which, though desirable, are fantastic and impractic-

able considering the means available with a state. Islam is a religion which lays emphasis on austerity and would not permit squandering of wealth. Some kind of criteria are needed for the authenticity of fundamental rights. The criteria will also show the area within which the rights can operate. Maurice Cranston has advocated the two criteria of (i) practicability and (ii) paramount importance for establishing the authenticity of human rights.[10] There is a great parallel between rights and duties. What is true of duties is also true of rights. It cannot be my duty to do what is physically not possible for me to do. Kant was right when he said that Ought implies Can. Similarly it cannot be a fundamental right to ask the government to give, in this period of ever-rising inflation, to every employee quarterly bonus equal to 2-month salary. If the government has not the means, it cannot fulfil the demand of its people. Economic rights can rarely be secured by legislation alone. Political rights normally do not pose much of a problem for the government to legislate. They only restrict the government in interfering with individual liberties. Thus economic rights and political rights cannot be treated alike.

Fundamental rights have a certain urgency and paramount importance about them. It is certainly my paramount duty to relieve distress, but it cannot be my paramount duty to bestow pleasure. Utilitariansim with its philosophy of greatest happiness of the greatest number fails to take note of this fact. It is my paramount duty to save the drowning child but it is not my paramount duty to give costly birthday present to him. Further, fundamental rights are grounded on justice. The exercise of a natural right imposes a corresponding duty on the agent which in turn imposes limitations with in which the right operates. Or, to put it differently all rights can be exercised within the framework of public welfare. The rights are, therefore, not absolute. When the welfare of state demands it, there is hardly any rights, including the

right to life or the freedom of conscience which cannot be restricted or even abrogated.[11] But it is a double-edged weapon and can be misused for achieving certain political ends. In countries where political democracy has not been developed or where institutions have not been allowed to grow democratically, human rights have been suspended under the cloak of emergency or threat to the security of the state. Any government can take such measures to retain itself in office. There is thus a tendency on the part of the governments to exercise arbitrary powers to suspend human rights. The more strong a country is in traditions of true democracy, the more chances are for its people to enjoy their rights. Phrases like "limitations on rights necessary in a democratic society" or "reasonable restrictions on liberties" are vague and do not ensure free exercise of rights. An analysis of limitation imposed on rights is needed as much as the analysis of rights themselves.

In any account of human rights, the question of authority is bound to crop up. Who is to decide whether the restrictions imposed, for example, on freedoms in a certain society are valid? Every state is its own judge. There is no international agency to which individuals can turn for restoration of their rights. The International Court of Justice at Hague admits petitions from states and not from individuals. And one cannot expect from a state to pass any verdict against its own self. Granting that the judiciary is independent, its powers can be curtailed through amendments in the constitution. Even in an Islamic state, no full proof remedy is available. The assertion that the concept of accountability to God, which is an ingredient of Islamic faith, provides a safeguard against the suppression of human, rights by a government is neither cogent as an argument, nor correct in fact.[12] The belief has not in fact stopped rulers from suppressing rights. Further, the statement has been made without taking into consideration the psychology of beliefs.

Most of us only profess religion. There is a world of difference between having religion and living religiously. In the former case, we pay only a lip service to religion. Religion is taken as a matter of social convenience. To live religiously is to live creatively. Belief in accountability to the Almighty can help only if we have risen to the level of living religiously.

IV

In his recent publication on *Fundamental Rights*, Mr. SalahudDin, an eminent journalist, has made a thorough study of fundamental rights in Islam. Basing his thesis on the Quran, he has made a comparative study of fundamental rights as developed in the West, in the communist countries and in the world of Islam. He has ended his account with a list of fundamental human rights quoting copiously from the Quran. Some of the rights discussed with relevant verses from the Quran are:

(i) Right of Life
V 32, XVII 33, IV 29, 93, VI 151.

(ii) Right to Property II, 188.

(iii) Right to Self-respect.
IXL 11, 12, IV 148, XXXV-13

(iv) Right to Privacy
XXIV 27-29, XXIII 53,IXL 13.

(v) Right to Personal Freedom
III 79, VIII L 15, 21, IV 58.

(vi) Right to Social Security
VI 64, II 193, XXXV 18.

(vii) Right to Protest Against Tyranny
IV 148, XXVI 151.

(viii) Freedom of Expression
III 110, IX 67, V 179, IV 135.

(ix) Freedom of Faith
II 256, X 99, 108, XIII 21,22

XVIII 29, VI 107, XXIX 46, L 45
XXXIX 41, XXXVI 17.

(x) Equality of Treatment
IXL 10, 13, V 8.

(xi) Redress of Wrong Done
VIIIL 15, 40-43, LVII 25, IV 58, 135
V 8, 42, 44, 45, 47, VI 45, 152, XVI 90.

(xii) Economic Security
CVII 1-8, II 177, 219, 261, 265, 272, 274,
LXXIII 20, LIX 7, LXXVI 8-11, IX 33-35,
III 18, CIV 2-4, VII 31, 32 LIII 39.

(xiii) Freedom to Organize Assembly
III 11, 104.

(xiv) Freedom to Participate in Political Activity
IXI 38, III 159

(xv) Freedom to Leave or Settle in a Country
II 85, IV 97, 100, V 33.

(xvi) Right to Just Reward
XXVIII 26 Traditions of the Holy Prophet.

(xvii) Right to Undo What is Against Piety and Righteousness XVIII 28, XXVI 151, LXXVI 24, LXVIII 10-15[13].

The treatment of the subject is orthodox and traditional and does not take into consideration the requirements of present-day complex and multi-dimensional society. The rights are, therefore, regarded as *absolute, irrevocable* and *inalienable.* Such a concept of human rights emerges when we consider them in abstraction, i.e. without reference to the concrete situation in which we are placed. Life is a complex phenomenon and we are exposed to new situations at individual, group, national and international levels. As we meet these situations, we become aware of our obligations and rights which had not previously appeared in our consciousnes. No declaration of human rights will ever be ex-

haustive and final. It will move hand in hand with the growth of moral consciousness and the state of civilization at a particular juncture in history. The universal declaration of human rights, for example, had no reference to the right of a group as it appeared in 1948. But in 1952 the General Assembly added, by a resolution, another right which referred to the group instead of the individual, viz., the right of a people to self-determination. The events in the State of Jammu and Kashmir and in Palestine put in clear focus, in the consciousness of man, the right of a people to self-determination.

The world has also become aware of the emerging human right of individuals to be guaranteed a pure, healthful, and decent environment. In his 1974 Hague Academy lecture. Noble Prize winner Rene Cassin, advocated that existing concept of human rights protection be extended to include the right to be free from pollution of environments, i.e. right to pure air and water. It is only through experience that we become increasingly aware of new rights and obligations. Unfortunately, the law lags behind social change. Opportunities to which men have a right must, therefore, be secured by legal action. The principle of movement in the law of Islam too has remained dormant. Life moves forward. It never turns back. But it moves forward with the load of its past. It, thus, keeps within its fold both the categories of permanence and change. Connections with the past give you your sense of identity and a sense of direction. But for keeping pace with the present, change and adaptability within the framework of identity and the historical past become necessary.

> "To insist on sticking to the old ways
> and fear adopting a new mode of life, is
> the real Gordian Knot in the life of nations".[14]

The admission that fundamental human rights are not absolute, takes us to a consideration of the socio-economic conditions under which the rights operate and the duties which they generate. The latter put an *internal limit* on the

range, extent or degree of fulfilment of rights. The socio-economic conditions influence externally the free exercise of human rights and put some restrictions on their operation. The question which arises in the mind is if the material conditions for the operation of a right undergo change, will the right continue to operate as before ? What has the logic of rights to say on this point ? The issue needs looking into.

FOOTNOTES

1. *The Rights of Man,* p. 37.
2. *Human Rights,* A symposium edited by UNESCO,p.54.
3. Quoted by Maurice Cranston in *The Rights of Man,* p. 24.
4. *Ibid.*,p. 40.
5. *Fundamental Rights,* Salahud Din, pp.241-315.
6. *Fundamental Human Rights, p.* 4.
7. *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (reprinted 1951), p. 156.
8. *Ibid.,* P. 154.
9. *Ibid.,* p. 147.
10. *Fundamental Human Rights,* pp. 40-42.
11. *Fundamental Human Rights,* K. A. Hakim, pp 12-13.
12. *Fundamental Rights,* Salahud Din, p. 222.
13. *Fundamental Rights,* pp. 47-186 and 241-315.
14. *Bang-e-Dara,* Iqbal *(reprinted 1950),* p. 191.

THE CONCEPTUAL BASIS OF ISLAMIC RESURGENCE

The subject of this symposium tacitly presumes that resurgence in the Muslim world has in fact taken place or is taking place and the question which it raises limits itself to a study of conceptual basis of this resurgence. It excludes the study of other factors, sociological, political and economic which might have operated, presuming the underlying assumption to be true, in the re-emergence of Islam as an effective historical force in the present day world situation. The issue raised pertains to the basic concepts of Muslim culture and conceptual foundations of Islamic polity which constitute a distinctive feature of Islam as a major world religion, and which have been exercising their influence during the last three hundred years of our intellectual stupor and have facilitated the resurgence of the Muslim world as a force to be reckoned with. One should remember that religious truths are existential truths and are thus tinged with an element of subjectivity which distinguishes them from empirical or scientific truths on the one hand, and logical or mathematical truths on the other. What I mean to say is that agreement in religious matters is very difficult to obtain and any attempt at analysing conceptual basis of some aspects of religious phenomena will not cut much ice with thinkers who limit their inquiry to the empirical and the presently verifiable or at least verifiable-in-principle data. This limitation is intrinsic to the subject of this symposium.

I have replaced the phrase 'Islamic resurgence' in the caption with 'resurgence of the Muslim World' for religious truths have a certain timeless character and it is only in implementing the directives enjoined by these truths that a certain measure of deviation and distortion creeps in. Religious truths, as enunciated by Islam, despite their existential character, shine in eternal glory and resurgence, and therefore, are to be taken with regard to the world which owns and practices Islam.

Since I have modified the title of the symposium from 'Islamic resurgence' to 'resurgence of the Muslim World', the factors responsible for the resurgence are many and some of them are socio-political, historical, economic but these fall outside the scope of this symposium. I am simply concentrating on the conceptual basis provided by Islam for the Muslim polity and a study of the elements which tend to put in bold relief Islam as one of the major world religions. Personally, I do not accept the statement that resurgence of the Muslim world has in fact taken place for it is an empirical statement which can easily be verified. The evidence for the proposition is not forthcoming. What we find is an urge in the Muslim world to unite and to remould their lives in accordance with the tenets of Islam. This could be described as a necessary prelude to the resurgence of the Muslim world. With these reservations I have tried to express my views on the subject of today's symposium.

I have stated above that religious truths differ from scientific and logical truths. Scientific truths are statements of observed regularities in nature i.e. statements about laws of nature. The scientific enterprise comprises a discovery of laws of nature together with a theory to explain these laws. Scientific generalizations are true, universal, empirical propositions, not limited to a definite area in space and time. These are not merely casual statements but are quantitative statements i.e. statements grounded on quantitative measurements.

Scientific truths are thus propositions which are universal, emipirical, verifiable and tentative. Logical truths are analytical propositions, not needing any verfication in experience. Logical truths are propositions which are formal and necessary. Religious truths are statements based on peculiar kind of experience called religious experience/revelation which has a definite cognitive content. Unlike logical truths these are synthetic propositions but do not stand in need of external verification. 'The heart lied not (in seeing) what it saw' (VIII:XI) My experience of toothache is direct and immediate and does not stand in need of verification. It is my doctor who needs evidence to verify my statement. The experience, if the stakes are very high, generates faith in the reality of its contents. Religious experience does generate an abiding faith in the Unseen. It is this experience which becomes the basis of 'I believe that p' statement. The gulf between 'believe in' and 'believe that' is very great. 'I believe that p' statement needs evidence to support it while 'believe in' is rooted in direct experience and hence is steeped in subjectivity but has an in-built verification. Revelation is a universal phenomenon; yet everyone is not a recipient of revelation. Most of us remain stuck up at 'I believe that p' stage but treat it with a degree of reverence which 'believe in' alone enjoys. That is to say 'I believe that p' has to be supported with evidence but if you do away with evidence you will end up with stagnation of religious beliefs. At this stage religion ceases to goad its followers on to any creative enterprise, to reshaping the contours of collective life. You start paying only lip-service to your religion. True resurgence of any faith pre-supposes a proper grasp of the distinction between 'believe in' and 'believe that', 'I believe that p' statements need constant rechecking in the light of new facts and discoveries if they have not to lose their hold on the minds of the people. Quran makes repeated appeals to people to think and ponder for this excercise lends unfailing support to 'I believe that p' statements.

In fact, one ninth of the Quranic Verses are about observation of, and reflection on the phenomena of, nature. A religion which lays so great an emphasis on the study of nature and history provides a rational basis for coordinating revelation with all other sources of knowledge—sense - experience, reason and testimony. The search for knowledge and the injunction to seek knowledge in all its wholeness provides a conceptual basis for resurgence. The rise and fall of a civilization is a very complex phenomenon and no single factor can be held responsible for its recurrence. Turn to Ibn Khaldun, Spengler, Tonybee, Hitti and others and the truth of this statement will dawn on you.

Iqbal, in his "Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam" provides evidence to 'I believe that p' statements of religion. Syed Hossein Nasr of Iran, while differing from Iqbal's approach, also did the same. Iqbal through "Ishq" and Nasr through "Zikr" emphasized the need to provide renewed vigour to faith. Resurgence of faith requires adequate evidence for 'I believe that p' statements of religion. With changing circumstances and new discoveries and advancement in knowledge the evidence has to be rechecked and recast so that 'I believe that p' statements continue to strengthen Faith in the Unseen. One of the criteria, therefore, of the resurgence of any Faith is how far its devotees are serious in providing adequate evidence for its 'I believe that p' statements in their ever-changing milieu and how far that faith reflects in the way of life of the people who own it. Religious truths when accepted sincerely overhaul personality and influence conduct considerably.

Islam is not simply a religion in the usual sense. It is a *deen,* a complete code of life, giving guidance in all affairs pertaining to individual and collective life. It also lays emphasis on Ijtihad to meet any situation for which there may not be any clear injunction in the Quran and sunnah. By keeping the door of Ijtihad open it encourages healthy, positive and

progressive attitude towards life and its problems. The individual in the community is not left in the lurch. Islam thus lays emphasis on the whole man and is not content with any single aspect of life.

Some of the 'I believe that p' statements of the religion of Islam pertain to the spiritual and, therefore, dynamic character of life and the universe. The old static view of the universe as conceived by the Greeks was rejected by Islam and as a cultural movement it contributed towards the birth of inductive method – the method of observation and experiment.

It conceived the universe as a growing and expanding one. The Quranic emphasis on Ilm and the traditions of the Holy Prophet (Peace be upon him) on acquisition of knowledge made Muslims leaders of the world in art, science and philosophy during the hey-days of their political ascendency.

The moral education of man, the emphasis on social justice and the rights and privileges of men and women, the personal relation of the individual to God, accountability of the individual to community and to God and the advocacy of psychological basis for unification of humanity are some of the leading principles of Islamic polity. For building up economy on sound basis Islam recommends neither capitalism nor socialism but a system which combines the merits of two and avoids dangers inherent in both.

> "It is the crowning glory of Islam that it eliminates all chances of clash between the rich and the poor. It confers respectability on the pious poor people and saddles the rich with the responsibility of holding their possessions as trust for the amelioration of the poor. As a matter of fact, religion has harmonized the interests of the affluent section and the indigent section. When religion is denuded of its pristine purity, socialism steps into the breach. It cannot insinuate itself in a true religion-based society. (Islam versus Socialism p. 12–M. M. Hussain).

Thus if we take Islamic point of view in its totality we are led to conclude that Islam tries to set up a society which works for the spiritual, moral and economic well being of its members. The principles which Islam introduced for securing human unity, equality and freedom and for amelioration of the poor, for providing equality of opportunity to all make Islam an advocate of an ideology, a philosophy of life, which is action-oriented through and through. Resurgence of the Muslim world may have historical, socio-political and economic factors. It has certain conceptual bases as well. The type of society which Islam tries to establish works for the promotion of all true human values. The idea of Tauhid, of moral uplift of man, of social justice and economic well-being provide strong conceptual basis for resurgence of the Muslim world.

THE SUBJACENT PHILOSOPHY IN THE CIVILIZATION OF PAKISTAN

Pakistan is a a young state but its philosophical traditions go back to the times of early Arab settlers in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent in the 8th century. It was through the Arab traders and rulers that Islam was first introduced in the sub-continent. In the words of the Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Pakistan came into being when the first hindu embraced Islam.[1] In the northern and north eastern parts of the sub-continent Islam found its roots with the conquest of the northern parts by Muslim conquerors and rulers who entered India through the Khyber Pass in the 10th century. Right from the beginning of the 8th century (711) to the middle of the 19th century (1857), the period which roughly marks the beginning, expansion and the end of Muslim rule in India, the Muslims always remained a minority. Most of the Muslim rulers had purely secular point of view in state politics. So far as the interest of the state demanded adherence to the principles of Islam, the kings tried to give religious sanctions to their otherwise purely secular laws. The total prohibition enforced by Alauddin Khalji (d.1316), for instance, was only politically motivated. The participation of rulers in religious discourses and their affiliation to great mystic saints of their times could not inspire them to remodel the state on Islamic lines.[2]

With the advent of Muslim Rule in the sub-continent

the foundation was laid for a new culture which assimilated Turkish, Persian, Afghan and Moghal elements. The Persian influence excelled to such an extent that the Persian language remained court language for almost one thousand years. Knowledge of Persian was a necessary condition for being educated and cultured. The dress, food habits, architecture, music, painting, literature of the rulers all influenced the local elements and as a result of the intermixture of the two, a new cultural synthesis gradually took definite shape. Scholars, artists, workers, poets, saints, sufis from other parts of the Muslim world flocked to the sub-continent in search of employment and also for recognition of their talent. Multan, Lahore, Delhi became great centres of intellectual, religious and artistic activity. The sufis came primarily for propagating Islam among the Indians. The social conditions and the rigid distincitions of caste in Hinduism and the freedom and equality of treatment to all in Islam provided a very productive atmosphere for the sufis to complete their mission. The sufis displayed large humanity and mixed freely with the people. The Ulama and Scholars attached to the courts served as a channel for interpreting various aspects of Shari'at for the guidance of the Kings.

The subjacent philosophy in the civilization of Pakistan has a marked religious bias. It, in fact, is religio-philosophical to a very great extent. What goes under the name of Muslim civilization in the sub-continent derived its life and blood from the world-view which Islam projected and the values which it generated.

The growth of Muslim thought is associated with the works and practices of Muslim mystics and scholars most of whom remained away from the kings and their courts. Notable among them are the Sufis of the Chishti order whose khanqahs played a great role in the growth of Muslim Religious Thought in the sub-continent.

Since the Muslims always remained a minority in the sub-continent and the Muslim rulers secular in their adminis-

tration of the state, the essence of Muslim religio-philosophical thought consisted in an exposition of the relation between man and God, the Law and the Truth, God and the universe and man. Further, Muslim scholars and Saints strove rigidly to delineate various facets of the identity of the Muslims as a community and whenever there was any move to create a unified community of Hindus, Muslims and people of other faiths, whether in the form of Bhakti Movement or Din-e Elahi of Akbar, it aroused very strong opposition from among the Muslim scholars, saints and masses. True, there has been some impact of Hindu culture and civilization on the Muslim culture in the sub-continent but the latter has maintained and developed its distinctive outlook on life and values and thwarted all attempts at secularisation of what it regarded as spiritual and divine. A community which found itself planted in an alien soil and gathered in numbers quite gradually could not hope to survive and develop its world -view and civilization without maintaining quite firmly its identity as a community. Thus the growth of Muslim thought has remained tied to the Ideology of Islam. Iqbal has put this idea very forcefully in the following verse:

گر تو می خواہی مُسلماں زیستن　　نیست ممکن جز بقرآں زیستن

If you wish to live as a Muslim you cannot hope to do so without conforming to the Quran[3]

Before proceeding further, I wish to raise a question on the legitimacy of designating as philosophical a metaphysical system which works within the framework suggested by religion. If a priori assumption or dogma is to be ruled out of court for being considered as philosophical, the case for a religion-oriented metaphysics may appear quite weak. The latter could hardly be termed as a piece of philosophical reasoning, for the spirit of free inquiry is considered as a defining characteristic of philosophical reasoning. Any piece of reasoning which lacks this characteristic cannot be termed as philosophical. In introduction to "Trends in Modern

philosophy'" (urdu)[4], I have discussed the limitations of the principle of free inquiry in philosophical reasoning in greater detail. I have held that a philosopher never relies on evidence in support of his thesis. He simply gives reasons, rather supporting reasons, to substantiate his poi t of view. His basic thesis remains beyond reason. Reason operates within the frame-work suggested by his basic assumptions. A marxist and an idealist cannot resolve their differences merely by giving reasons, however cogent, in support of thier thesis. Your metaphysics is a matter of choosing a point of view. If you choose to be an idealist you uphold the primacy of mind and the whole universe is conceived as an expression, in varying degrees,of mind. If you are a marxist you regard matter as primary and consciousness of mind only as a developed form of matter. A linguistic philosopher regards the efforts of both the idealist and the marxist as an exercise in futility. All the three of them repose great confidence in reason and yet cannot come to an understanding of the point of view of the other. What is it that exercises some sort of cramp on their thinking which hinders them from examining their own primary assumptions. Their starting point, perhaps, is not the result of any process of reasoning . It is perhaps born of a vision. Reasons only support but do not establish their thesis. History of Philosophy is replete with instances where what was regarded as self-evident and irresistable principle by one was rejected by the other. Descartes regarded the idea of God as innate while Locke could not find any innateness in the same. Kant considered synthetic a priori propositions as beyond all doubt and only wanted to inquire how was synthetic a priori possible. Hume accepted Lockean premise regarding the origin of ideas and ended in solipsism but could not question the validity of the initial premise. All great thinkers start with some vision of life and values of the possibilities of human experience. The spirit of free inquiry operates within the limits set by the initial vision or assumptions of the thinker concerned. In case of the Muslim religio-

philosophical thought in the sub-continent the greatest contributions were made by the sufis. A sufi starts not with dogma or rationalization of dogma but with an experience of direct contact with God and it is on the basis of the unitary experience that he developes his views on Man, God and Universe. Further, a sufi takes great care to ensure objectivity of his religious experience. He uses maximum care in keeping his subjective desires, inclinations and interests in abeyance. This process of sifting the personal elements from the objective contents of his experience goes on till the final stage is reached. For achieving this end he even seeks a confirmation of his experience by discussing it with his preceptor. His mystical philosophy is thus rooted in experience and has a claim to be considered on its own merit. Further, as I have observed on a previous occasion, religion does not put any censorship on creative activity. Religion is misconstrued when it is taken to imply a sort of cramp on the thoughts of a people or an individual. In its true nature religion is dynamic, it is essentially an experience, a rediscovery of the individual, a process of acquiring infinite power, power to change the contours of life and the very course of human history. Gautama left his place only to walk into history. The Holy Prophet, peace be upon him, left the cave at mount Hira to bring about a great cultural revolution in the world. The spirit of religion expresses itself in seeking newer adjustments to ever-widening horizons of human experience.[5]

The first great Sufi scholar who wrote profusely on religion is Syed Ali bin Uthman Hujwiri (d. 1071) whose Kashf al-Mahjub, the oldest extant work on sufism in Persian, is well-known for its systematic and sound exposition of tasawwuf. The hold which this great mystic had on the public mind can be judged from the fact that even 900 years after his death his Mausoleum is visited daily by thousands of devotees from all over Pakistan. Visit to the shrines of great mystics is a culture-trait which is universal in present day Pakistani society.

While elucidating the meaning of the Path of Sufism, the nature of the 'stations' of the sufis, of Divine Love and how it is manifested in human hearts, why the intellect is unable to get to its essence and why the Spirit is lulled in its purity Hujwiri makes a significant assertion regarding the relation between Shari'at and Haqiqat to emphasize harmony between the two. Shari'at is man's act while Hiqiq'at is God's keeping and preservation and protection, whence it follows that Shari'at cannot possibly be maintained without the existence of Haqiqat and Haqiqat cannot be maintained without observance of Shari'at. Their mutual relation may be compared to that of body and spirit. When the spirit departs from the body, the living body becomes a corpse and the spirit vanishes like wind, for their value depends on their conjuction with one another.[6] For the spiritual growth of personality a union of the two is essential. "The Law (Shari-at) without the Truth (Haqiqat) is ostentation, and the Truth without the Law is hypocrisy"[7]. Hujwiri rightly perceives that mere formal adherence to Shari'at without getting to the spirit behind lands a person into a situation where he simply owns a religion without being religious. There is a world of difference between having a religion and being religious. To have religion is to pay only a lip service to religion. Religion in this sense is only a varbal claim, a matter of social convenience, a system of ossified values. It is not reflected in the patterns of behaviour of its adherents. Religion thus conceived becomes a departmental affair. It is not regarded as an expression of the whole man. To claim religion in this sense is to exhibit alienation, to be torn and cut off from your roots or in the words of Iqbal to cease to live soulfully.[8] To be religious is to live creatively, to open up new possibilities of collective existence and to create new patterns of behaviour in ever changing milieu. Keeping this distinction in mind Hujwiri says regarding pilgrimage: "Anyone who is absent from God at Mecca is in the same position as if he were absent from God in his own house, and anyone who is pre-

sent with God in his own house is in the same position as if he were present with God at Mecca. .. . the true object of pilgrimage is not to visit the Ka'ba, but to obtain contemplation (mashahadat) of God''[9] The position of Hujwiri on this issue is in sharp contrast to the orthodox point of view which simply expresses itself in outward observance of Shri'at without getting to the spirit behind. The greatness of Hujwiri lies in the fact that like Imam Ghazali he presented Tasawwuf as providing sound basis to the tenets of Islam.

The sufis, who after Hujwiri contributed. for over a century to the growth of religious thought in the sub-continent are the sufis of the Chishti order. Noteworthy among them are Khawaja Muinuddin of Ajmer (d.1236) Bakhtiyar Kaki (d. 1236) Shaikh Farid Ganj Shakar (d. 1265) and Khawaja Nizam-ud-Din Auliya (d.1325). They lived and mixed with the general public and attracted people of different religious and sects to their Khanqahs. Their main creed was belief in the unity of God and equality of all men. This encouraged the Hindus whose caste system had kept the lower classes away from the Brahmans and the Kshatriyas,the two upper classes, to visit the Khanqahs where they had no fear and were treated at par with others.

Khawaja Muin-ud-Din laid emphasis on Love of God and preached humanism. For him worship of God did not imply mere formal observance of rituals. It expressed itself in love of mankind, in showing sympathy towards them and serving humanity selflessly. The broad humanity which the Chishti sufis showed to people of other religions is reflected in the observation which Nizam-ud-Din Auliya made on a certain occasion when he, alongwith Amir Khusrow, was walking on the roof of their Jama't Khana and saw the Hindus busy in worshipping their idols.

ہر قوم راست راہی دینی و قبلہ گاہی

(Every people have a way, a religion and a qiblah of their own).

This attitude of love and respect for members of other faiths was exhibited at a time when Muslim power was supreme in the sub-continent. Some Ulama were opposed to allowing Hindus freedom to perform their religious rites. Zia-ud-Din Barni in his book Fatawa-i-Jahandari, which he wrote during the reign of Feroz Tughlaq (1351-88), laments that the Muslim kings in spite of their extreme power are allowing the Hindus to perform their rites.[10]

Mysticism suffered a set-back in the reign of Mohammad Tughlaq (1325-1351) who showed greater interest in Fiqh, a discipline which could be helpful in the application of principles of Islam to the political and social life of his times. He believed in the unity of politics and religion and made a strong appeal to the contemporary Mystics, Saints and Ulama to help him in setting the state structure on purely Islamic principles. The mystics, however, were unable to provide any real guidance in the matter and thus Muhammad bin Tughlaq's effort to spiritualise the secular basis of state ended in failure.[11]

At about the same time pantheistic ideas of Shaikh al-Akbar found their way to India and were warmly received by mystics as the ground for their acceptance had been prepared by the humanism preached by mystics of the Chishti order. A number of commentaries on Ibn al-Arabi's Fasus appeared which helped the process of propagation of pantheistic ideas in the sub-continent. The doctrine of Wahdat al-Wujud as expounded by Ibn al-Arabi in Fasus assigns equality of status to all religious creeds and rejects the Muslim's claim to exclusiveness in this regard. Abdul Qaddus of Gangoh (d. 1537) expresses these ideas when he says, "What a meaningless clamour it is to say that one is a believer and another Kafir, one is obedient and another sinful, one on the right path and another astray, some Muslim, some virtuous, some heretic and some Christian."[12]

The doctrine of Wahdat al-Wujud leaves no scope for a belief in a personal transcendent God. It is true that pan-

theism can prepare, at the intellectual level, people of different faiths and creeds to sink their differences and regard themselves as members of a brotherhood. But when it was preached by sufis like Shahbaz Qalander (d. 1274), Bu Ali Qalandar (d. 1324) and Abdul Qaddus of Gangoh (d. 1537), all of whom had a large number of followers, it became a cause of concern for the Ulama and the upholders of orthodox point of view. The situation was further aggravated by the rise of Bhakti Movement in Southern India which later on spread to almost all parts of the country. Ramananda, Kabir and Gru Nank were its great champions. It was a reform movement in Hinduism in the 14th century to meet the challenge of Islam. The teachings of Ramananda were anchored on two principles:

(i) The essence of Bhakti or faith in God consists in perfect love of God;

(ii) As servants of God all men are brothers.

The founders of the movement employed the language of the masses for communicating their message . The movement removed caste barriers and admitted people of all castes to its discipleship. It stopped considerably the conversion of Hindus to Islam and helped converting Muslims back into Hinduism.

In Bengal the mission of Hindu revival was taken up by Chaitanya (d. 1533). Bengal had come under the Muslim rule early in the 13th century. The message of Islam had been propagated by a number of sufis; notable among them were Shaikh Jalal-ud-Din Tabrizi (d. 1244), Sheikh Siraj-ud-Din Uthman (d. 1537) Shaikh Ataul-Haq (d. 1398) and his son Nur Qutb Alam. Chaitanya created a great stir among the Hindu masses by his public songs in praise of Krishna.

A futher confusion was created by Akbar's promulgation of Din-e-Ilahi in 1518. The climate for this had been prepared by the preaching of the doctrine of unity of all religions by the Hindu saints and the Muslim sufis. With the sufis it was a logical result of their accepting the premises of

Wahdat al-Wajud while for the Hindu saints it followed from their doctrine of the unity of Ram and Rahim. Akbar founded his Ibadat Khana in 1575 whose doors were opened to Muslim Ulama and followers of all other religions. As a result of discussions in the Ibadat Khana Akbar appears to have accepted the doctrine of the unity of all religions as true. The regulations which Akbar issued were in direct conflict with the tenets of Islam.[13]

A well-directed move to remedy the sad state of affairs produced by Akbar's religious policy and the Bhakti movement was initiated by the renowned Naqshbandi scholar Shaikh Ahmad of Sirhind (d. 1624). He adopted the title of Mujaddid Alfi-thani (which was endorsed by the Ijma) to silence the critics who had propagated that in the second thousand years (alfi-thani) people needed a new religion which would be better adapted to the requirements of the time. He repudiated the doctrine of unity of all religions and to a Hindu questioner who wanted to elicit Shaikh's opinion on the identity of Ram and Rahim he replied firmly that Islam and Hinduism stood for two diametrically opposed points of view and that there was no basis of identifying the two. "To regard Ram and Rahim identical is the height of folly. The Creator and the creature cannot be identical– Before the Birth of Rama and Krishna no one called God by these names. How could he assume these names after their birth."[14] He clearly perceived that the doctrine of unity of Religions was calculated to undermine the solidarity of Muslim Community and there was no course open to him except to take a firm and bold stand and leao a crusade against the heresies that were eroding the very basis of Muslim Community. He wrote letters to a number of scholars and the elite of the society to uphold the orthodox point of view regarding various tenets of Islam. His polemic against, and refutation of, the doctrine of Wahdat al-Wujud which the sufi orders had assimilated into their systems shows his great philosophical vision and logical acumen. He argued

that as the doctrine of Wahdat al-Wujud negates all existence except that of God, it is in conflict with reason and religion.[15] It is to be noted, he argued, that God is existent and is unique in His Self (dhat), qualities (sifat), and actions (afa'l) and no created object can be a part of Him. Qualities and actions of His creatures whose existence has been possible because of His will cannot be compared to His qualities and actions which are unique. Therefore it is wrong to say "All is God" *(hama ust),* it is more appropriate to say "All is from Him"*(huma az ust).*

Thus the doctrine of Ontological Monism (Wahdat al-Wujud) was refuted by the Shaikh and he replaced it with the doctrine of Phenomenological Monism (Wahdat ul-Shuhud). The former makes the universe static while the later conceives of it as dynamic. The mystic relationship, which the later enjoined, between man and God was that of love and not that of union (*wasl).* In the Creator-creature relationship one was with the other. Creatureliness is the highest stage of saintliness and sufis who, in a state of ecstasy, claim to have transcended this relationship have commited excesses.[16]

Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi thus tried to bring Sufism very close to the core of Islam and to resolve whatever the conflict there was between the Sufis and the Ulama uniting them in a single synthesis of solidarity. Aziz Ahmad summing up the contribution of Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi observes: He reintegrated the formalistic dynamics of religion and the inner vitality of deep mysticism. This is perhaps the most distinct contribution of Indian Islam to the religio-mystical thought of Islam in general. But, on the other hand, his easy victory, especially the one against the rationalists, gave to Indian Islam the rigid and conservative stamp it bears today. In a way he was the pioneer of what modern Islam is today in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent—isolationist, sef-confident, conservative, deeply conscious of the need of a reformation but distrustful of innovations, accepting speculation in theory but dreading in practice, and insular in its contact with other

civilizations.[17]

The dangers which Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi alluded to inherent in the Ram and Rahim unity cult against the solidarity of the Muslims were not realized by the Muslim scholars, divines and sufis. There was no attempt to prepare Muslim masses against these dangers. Mian Mir Qadri of Lahore (d. 1636) and his disciple Mullah Shah Qadri (d.1661) were staunch upholders of the doctrine of unity of being. There is a strange indifference in their life to the teaching and practices of the Shari'at. Mullah Shah is reported to have composed the following verse:

پنجہ در پنجۂ خدا دارم   من چہ پروائے مصطفےٰ دارم

I have given my hand into the hand of God; what care have I now for Mustafa.[18]

Shah Wali Ullah (d. 1762) took up the task of welding Muslims into a well-knit unit by bringing sufism and orthodox Islam closer together . Earlier this move had been initiated by Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi. Shah Wali Ullah laid special emphasis on Ijtihad, the principle of movement in Islam for it is only through Ijtihad that progressive adjustment to environment is possible. The dynamism of religion can only be maintained if requirements of ever-changing social milieu are effectively met. Time has come, he wrote in the introduction to Hujjat Allah al Balighah that the religious law of Islam should be brought into the open fully dressed in reason and argument.[19] Shah Wali Ullah's great contribution to sufism is his reconciliation of Ibn al-Arabi's doctrine of Ontological Monism (Wahdat al-Wujud) and Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi's doctrine of Phenomenological Monsim (Wahdat al-Shuhud). The two doctrines are not antagonistic to each other, rather reflect two ways of looking at the same reality.[20] The difference between the two is one of linguistic nature. Ibn al-Arabi's Ontological Monism does not stand for the identity of Creator and creatures.

Assessing the impact of Shah Wali Ullah on later thinkers Aziz Ahmad says: "For him reason and argument had perhaps a more fundamentalist significance, but they inspired the formula of neo-Mutazilite modernism of Sayyid Ahmad Khan, who had received his early education in the seminary of Wali Ullah's successors in Delhi, of Shibli's scholasticism and of 'religious reconstruction ' in the thought of Iqbal. In his exegesis of the Quran, which raised such a storm of controversy, Sayyid Ahmad Khan leans heavily on the work of this eighteenth century Theologian. The more classical influences of Wali Ullah's concepts of Ijtihad are reflected in the work of the Ulama of Deoband whose religious ideology was directly shaped by his school.[21]

Shah Wali Ullah marks the beginning of Muslim Renaissance in the Sub-Continent. He stood for providing a sound rational basis to religion but at the same time he preserved the inner core and dynamism of Islam by channelling the streams of sufi spiritual heritage into traditional Islam.

With Sayyid Ahmad Khan (d. 1898) begins the era of modernism in the political life of the Indian Muslims. Sayyid Ahmad Khan (d. 1898), was primarily a political thinker, a social reformer and an educationist. He focussed all his energies on the welfare of the Muslims of the Sub-Continent specially after the unfortunate debacle of 1857.

During the pursuance of his primary objectives he evolved a comprehensive Philosophy of religion too. Religion, of course, was not his main concern, but he had to write extensively on this subject due to the fact that the Muslims of his times had developed the erroneous habit of quoting religious authority in favour of, or against, the performance of every sort of action. It is this "all-important" context of religion that he tried to set in order so that their behaviour and their attitudes could be reformed accordingly.

The appellation that suitably characterizes the religio-philosophical thought of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan is "Rational Supernaturalism". He was a religious man through and

through as is evident from his letters, speeches and writings of which he produced volumes. He tenaciously held on to Islam with all its supernatural components. He was equally impressed—rather awestricken—by the contemporary Western culture and sciences which were naturalistic and atheistic in outlook. In fact, the word of God, he was firmly of the opinion, could not be disharmonious with the physical nature which the sciences were investigating. No religious concept could contravence the laws of nature. "Islam is nature and nature is Islam", is the burden of all his teachings. Consequently in his Philosophy of religion he explained the allegedly other-wordly concepts of religion in a phraseology which naturalism could understand. This he did in three ways: (i) Lexicographic analysis (ii) Psychologizing and (iii) Metaphorization. Applying this triple process to the teaching of the Quran specifically, he came to such conclusions as that prayers are not accepted and answered by God: they only provide psychological satisfaction to the prayee, Mi'raj, was only an experience in dream. Adam was not specially created: it stands for the human race that evolved out of lower forms of life and existence. Angels are nothing but laws of nature, Satan stands for evil forces and all disvalues recognized by the Quran, heaven and hell are psychological states and not localities, miracles cannot happen at all, and so on. Rules of morality too, according to him, are not derivable from revelation. They are discovered independently by the natural reason of man.

Thus the concept of religion developed by Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan is deistic i. e. the one in which God has practically nothing to do with the affairs of the world here and now.

There was a lot of protest against the approach of Sayyid Ahmad to religion. But it must be said in fairness to him that it was mainly through his example, writings, and teachings that Indian Muslims were introduced to Western learning and sciences. From 1857 to 1947 is a period of great

strife and struggle for the Indian Muslim for it is the period during which the Pakistan Movement, a movement for peaceful coexistence of Hindus and Muslims and for the preservation of Muslim heritage, took a definite shape and under the dynamic leadership of the Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah the Muslims succeeded in winning their freedom and a homeland—The Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The foremost among the thinkers who revitalized the Muslims and put a new life into them in the Sub-Continent by his writings and poetical works is Allama Mohammad Iqbal (d. 1938), the poet-philosopher of Pakistan. Iqbal, in his famous Allahabad address at the Annual Session of the All India Muslim League in 1930, recommended the setting up of an independent Muslim state in the Sub-Continent as the only solution to resolving the Indian political tangle. The Quaid--e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah rallied the Muslim masses under the banner of the Muslim League and in a short period of seven years (from March 1940 to August 1947) against strong opposition from the Indian Congress and other political parties guided the nation to her cherished goal.

Iqbal's contribution to the Indian Muslim thought is very great. In his famous Madras Lectures (1929) he undertook reconstruction of religious thought in Islam and thereby developed a dynamic Philosophy of religion and metaphysical system which is vitalistic, pluralistic and monotheistic in nature and has a deep existential import. In Pakistan, all thinkers after Iqbal, as always happens after a great mind is gone, have stuck to the frame-work set by Iqbal and their works exhibit an elucidation of some aspects of the thought of Iqbal or they carry further the unfinished task left by Iqbal. It is true that the philosophical movements that have appeared in the West in the twentieth century have found ardent supporters among some of the Pakistani thinkers but such philosophies have not found roots in our soil and by and large philosophical tendencies are religion -oriented or, what is the same, are tied to the ideology which formed the

basis of the creation of Pakistan. Iqbal is the first among the Pakistani thinkers who had a thorough understanding of the Western thought and was equally acquainted with Muslim thought. He was thus in a position to communicate to the younger generation in a language which they understood. Under the long colonial rule and the consequent backwardness of the Muslims in almost all fields—political, educational and economic—they had been cut off from their cultural moorings and were fast losing their sense of national identity. Iqbal, under these distressing conditions, undertook the task of reconstruction of religious thought to restore to the Muslims their sense of identity and assure them of the great future that yawned at their feet. Considered in this context, Iqbal is regarded by some as "the voice of Muslim culture in the modern world",[22] for he combated quite effectively the challenge which the western civilization had posed to Islam. Addressing first to the Indian Muslim Iqbal soon turned to address Muslims in Bilad-i-Islamia and at a still later stage to the people of the East who had been constantly exploited by the West over the past few centuries.

Iqbal set about the task of reconstruction in two different ways. The first related to providing sound basis to the truths revealed by the religion of Islam to help the younger generation to have a proper understanding of religion. The second related to discovering the spirit of Muslim culture, to give some clear idea to his people, of their outlook on life, their pattern of thought and conduct as it expressed itself in their arts and sciences together with the type of manhood and polity which sprung out of the message of Islam. This would help, thought Iqbal, the Muslims understand how best they could meet the challenge of the new socio-economic philosophies of the West. Iqbal's "Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam" deals with this problem in a systematic way, Iqbal's Philosophy of self which is spread over a number of his Persian poetical works figures prominently in "Reconstruction of Religious Thought."

Through his analysis of conscious experience Iqbal tries to establish the spiritual character of Reality and this is in consonance with the Quranic concept of Reality. Iqbal wanted to show that in this age of empiricism together with its emphasis on naturalism, the case for religion and the world-view that it presents is strong enough to vie with any system which great philosophies in the past have put forward. The great merit of Islam is that as a polity it lays emphasis on the establishment of a social order which provides opportunities for inner expansion to the individual along with his economic well-being. Marxism lacks the former aspect while existentialism fails to contruct any social philosophy. Iqbal laments the plight of modern man in the West who by his adherence to empiricism is entirely cut off from the depths of his own being. In the East the situation is no better. The technique of medieval mysticism has failed to reintegrate the forces of the average man's inner life and thus prepare him for participation in the march of history. No wonder then that the modern Muslim in Turkey, Egypt and Persia is led to seek fresh sources of energy in the creation of new loyalties such as patriotism and nationalism.[23]

The progress of thought after the death of Iqbal has been along the lines set by Iqbal. Khalifa Abdul Hakim (d. 1959) in his Islamic Ideology, Islam and Communism, Fikr-i-Iqbal has elaborated in greater details subjects which Iqbal had just touched. Professor M. M. Sharif's (d.1965) Dialectical Monadism also lays emphasis on the spiritual character of Reality. Dr. C.A. Qadir (President, Pakistan Philosophical Congress), one time known as a Logical Positivist, leaned to existentialism and to a defence of the language of religion in the early sixties. His articles on Language and Religion, phycho-analysis and Religion, God and Logic, Question of the Pot and God and War contain the fruit of his mature thought on religion, its role in establishing peace and a defence of religion in the context of contemporary philosophic thought.

Theism continues to be a pivotal point in the thought of thinkers in Pakistan. With God as the Supreme Creator and also the locus of all values the requirements of religion-oriented society are fully met.

FOOT NOTE

1. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad: *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, Vol, II, p. 2.
2. B. A. Dar, Development of Religious Thought in India, *Iqbal*, July 1964, pp. 33–34.
3. *Iqbal, ASRAR-O-RAMOOZ*, p. 142 line 5 (Edition 1964).
4. *Falsafa-e-Jadid Ke Khado Kahl*, pp. 3–12.
5. A Message For Young Philosophers, *Sophia*, Dec. 1974.
6. *Kashf al-Mahjub*, p. 383. English Translation by Nicholson (New Edition).
7. *Ibid.*, p. 384.
8. K. G. Sadiq, *Pakistani Culture, Proceedings of the 17th Session of the Session of the Pakistan Philosophical Congress*, Lahore 1975.
9. *Kashf al-Mahjub*, p. 329. English Translation by Nicholson (New Edition).
10. K. A. Nizami, *Religious Trends of Sultans of Delhi* (pp. 76–77).
11. B, A. Dar, Development of Religious Thought in Inia, *Iqbal* July 1964, p. 38.
12. A. K. Nizami, *Religious Trends of Sultans of Delhi* p.449.
13. *Din-e-Ilahi*, pp. 143–144.
14. Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi, *Maktubat*, I, 171.
15. *Ibid.*, I, 57, 410–14.
16. *Ibid.*, I, 38, 57, 311, 316.
17. Aziz Ahmad, *Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment*, p. 189.
18. Quoted by B. A. Dar, Development of Religious Thought in India, *Iqbal*, July 1964, p. 66.
19. *Hujjat Allah al-Ballgha*, i, 4.
20. *Maktub-i-Madni*, pp. 5–6 from Urdu Translation by M. Hanif Nadvi.
21. Aziz Ahmad, *Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian En-*

vironment, p. 205.

22. Mumtaz Hassan, Foreword to B. A. Dar's *A Study in Iqbal's Philosophy*, p. x.
23. *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 188(Reprinted June 1951).

MUSLIM PHILOSOPHY

The phrase 'Islamic philosophy' is used to designate all that the Muslim thinkers and sages have contributed during the past fourteen centuries towards the growth of philosophical thought in the regions and areas which came under direct or indirect influence of Islam. It is true that the Muslim Philosophers moved within the framework of Islamic faith and rarely did anyone go against the basic tenets of Islam, yet to designate their philosophical viewpoint as Islamic is, in my opinion, going a little too far. The peripatetic configuration of early Muslim rationalists can hardly be described as 'Islamic'. Al-Ghazali's polemic against the philosophers, the basic tenets of Asharite theology framed to protect faith against the inroads made into it by the Mutazilite viewpoint indicate that right from the very inception of philosophic thought in Islam, there were controversies regarding what was Islamic and what was un-Islamic in the theories presented by various thinkers. All these controversies are a part of Islamic heritage though some of the viewpoints may not be considered strictly Islamic by some critics. Seyyed Hossein Nasr finds fault with modern thinkers in the Indo-Pak subcontinent who regard evolutionism or Islamic Socialism [1] as close to the tenets of Islam and terms their endeavours as being not in tune with Islamic tradition. Iqbal, for example, has propounded philosophy of self and a dynamic view of life, for which he finds support in evolutionism. Iqbal's thesis is quite original and it lays emphasis on change, creativity, freedom and immortality of the finite

ego. A part of what Iqbal asserts may not appear Islamic to Seyyed Hossein Nasr but it certainly is a rich contribution to Muslim thought. Sayyed Ahmad Khan (d. 1898), a great intellectual figure of 19th century Indian subcontinent, developed deistic conception of religion, a conception in which God has practically nothing to do with the affairs of the world here and now.[2] There was a lot of protest against Sayyed Ahmad Khan's 'Rational Supernaturalism' but his writings do constitute a substantial contribution to the development of Muslim thought in the Indian subcontinent. Even Seyyed Hossein Nasr, in his thought-provoking article which he contributed to the Tenth Session of the Pakistan Philosophical Congress entitled 'The Pertinence of Studying Muslim Philosophy Today',[3] preferred the phrase 'Muslim Philosophy' to Islamic Philosophy, although two years later while participating in a symposium on 'Reorientation of Muslim Philosophy' at Lahore,[4] he used the phrase Islamic philosophy in contravention of the title of the symposium. In his introduction to 'Three Muslim Sages (1964) while referring to the various intellectual perspectives which Muslims absorbed in the Islamic world-view, he feels no hestitation in terming these schools of philosophy, arts, and sciences as Muslim[5].

Professor M. Saeed is of the opinion that:—

> "Muslim philosophy is not quite the same thing as Islamic philosophy. Paradoxical and even shocking though it may seem to some of us, Muslim philosophy may possibly be quite as un-Islamic as any philosophy could be (Abu Bakr Razi's, for example). Muslim philosophy may be merely a Muslim's philosophy which like a Muslim's shop may deal in all kinds of philosophical commodties. A Muslim philosopher, much like a Muslim tailor, by the mere fate of his circumstances perhaps, may choose to prepare an embarrassingly un-Islamic dress for the professedly Islamic thought. Muslim philosophy, indeed, is philosophy in Muslim history and

as such is a factual notion; an accomplishment of the present or an achievement of the past of philosophers Muslim by profession."[6]

Since, when we talk of philosophy with reference to Islam, we usually refer to the works of Muslim philosophers and since their works are not any treatise on the Quran, it is safer to designate the efforts of Muslim Philosophers as constituting history of Muslim philosophy. Further, such a designation will allow us to study anything that Muslim thinkers considered and contributed to the intellectual fund of the world. It was for such considerations that the monumental work edited by M. M. Sharif has been called History of Muslim Philosophy. It is high time that we agree on a common phrase for designating the contributions of Muslim thinkers and sages as History of Muslim Philosophy. Any failure on the part of any particular thinker will not then be passed on as failure of Islam.

II

One thing that is conspicuous about Muslim philosophy is its close link with metaphysics, with a world-view in which God, Man and universe stand in certain relation to one another. It cannot dissociate itself from questions about Reality/Truth. It in fact gets its inspiration from intellectual intuition, a direct and immediate spiritual experience. Metaphysics, as a form of ratiocination, fell to disrepute in the Anglo-American world in early thirties. Many of the great philosophers (Spinoza, Hegel, Bradley) have believed that by pure reason, by mere thinking, world-views or systems of propositions can be constructed about the existence and nature of things. Descartes' remarks in his *De Mundo* have a close bearing on the point: 'whoever examines carefully the rules I have laid down and the truths thereby reached will be able to proceed to demonstrations a priori of everything that occurs in the world.'

This claim has little factual value.

"For no metaphysical theory, regardless of whether it refers to what transcends sense experience or to such non-transcendent things as space, time, motion, material objects, has yet been either established or confuted to the satisfaction of all metaphysicians. And it may be the case, therefore, that all metaphysical theories, those referring to non-transcendent phenomena as well as those referring to transcendent phenomena, stand to their rival theories much as a thesis stands to its antithesis in a Kantian antinomy. If this is the case, as the entire history of philosophy gives reason to think, then the philosopher's labours are indeed the labours of a Sisyphus who eternally rolls a rock up a hill only to have it roll down. His labours are heroic but his achievements, reckoned in terms of established theories, must forever be nill."[7]

The history of philosophy shows that metaphysical disputes have continued and the parties to the dispute have never found it possible to resolve their disputes. Philosophising as an intellectual activity operates within a certain frame of reference. The impact of cultural growth, advancement in various disciplines greatly affects the frame of reference within a certain philosophical point of view is developed. The parties to a metaphysical debate are not prepared to give up their initial standpoint. No amount of argumentation convinces the one to concede any ground to the other. It is for this reason that a number of divergent philosophies continue to flourish simultaneously. A Marxist and a philosophical analyst cannot resolve their dispute through logic and argumentation. There is a certain built-in limitation imposed by the initial points of view the disputants choose. It constitutes their frame of reference within which each of the disputants moves. They are seldom prepared to examine their own premises.

When we talk of Muslim Philosophy, a certain built-in limitation, determined by Islamic faith, creeps in . But that is traced back to revelation, an enduring source of knowledge. Metaphysics, as developed by the Muslim sages, derives its form and hue from revelation/intellectual intuition —a direct experience of the transcendent. It is not a mere ratiocination, a process of analysis and division but is firmly based on experience. That makes all the difference between metaphysics as a purely abstract analytical activity and a metaphysics which is founded on intellectual intuition, on experience of a world that transcends both reason and the sensible reality.

The whole of the movement of modern thought, Nasr rightly points out, is *anti-metaphysics;* thus understood, it has led to an even greater alienation of the modern man from the twin source of truth-revelation and intellectual intuition. As Mohammad Iqbal, the poet-philosopher of Pakistan, will put it, 'modern man has ceased to live soulfully.'[8] It is true that the early Muslim rationalists, the peripatetics, did not conform to the Islamic tradition of benefiting from the twin sources of knowledge alluded to above. With Suharwardi and the Sufis, the Islamic tradition became firmly ingrained and has continued in some form to the present day. The knowledge, received through intellectual intuition, transforms the entire being of the recipient. Iqbal expresses this idea in the following beautiful lines. 'It is dead or is dying, a philosophy which has not been written in one's life blood.'[9]

In the Indo-Pak subcontinent, there has been a strong tradition of sufism ever since the advent of Islam in the 8th century A. D. and that tradition has continued to the present day. Under the colonial rule, Muslims were cut off from their cultural roots and were exposed to a system of education which made them alien to their own rich intellectual heritage. Quite recently a series of books on development of Muslim thought in the Indo-Pak subcontinent have come

out which trace the growth of Muslim thought throughout the last twelve hundred years[10]. This aspect of Muslim thought has remained hidden from scholars who were educated in the universities under the British rule.

There are two objections to the position taken by Sayyed Hossein Nasr. He talks of Oriental traditions and finds great affinity in Taoism, Hinduism, Budhism and Islam, the Major intellectual traditions of the Orient in that they are always wedded to a direct experience of the spiritual world which constitutes the very basis of true philosophy. Oriental philosophy, as usually understood, "*is the doctrinal part of a total spiritual way, tied to a method of realization and inseparable from the revelation or tradition which has given birth to the way in question*"[11]. It is for this reason that, in the Eastern tradition, philosophy which does not transform one's being is considered both meaningless and dangerous. Only that form of knowledge is considered legitimate that can transform the being of the knower. Philosophy, thus understood, is thought processes wedded to spiritual experience and not (as is the case with modern West) thought processes cut off from this experience. It is this essential difference, between the two meanings of 'philosophy' which makes any comparative study between any modern Western thinker and a traditional Eastern Philosopher a very difficult task, rather a task that cannot be accomplished. Here, the question arises that if the spiritual experience, revelation or intellectual intuition is of the same Reality in all the four major oriental traditions, i.e. *if the centre is the same in every case,* why then is it that the concept of Reality as formulated in these traditions is so *widely different.* What about the validity of the experience? What criteria are to be adopted/ framed? In the 14th century, Bhagti Movement arose in southern India which later on spread to almost all parts of the country. Ramananda, Kabir and Gru Nanak were its great champions. It was aimed at establishing the unity of all religions and emphasised the identity of 'Ram'and'Rahim'

It was in fact a reform movement in Hinduism in the 14th century to meet the challenge of Islam. Shaikh Ahmad of Sirhind (d. 1624)- Mujaddid Alf-i-Thani-took up the challenge of the Bhagti Movement and met it effectively. To a questioner who wanted to get Shaikh's opinion on the identity of Ram and Rahim, he replied firmly:

> "To regard Ram and Rahim identical is the height of folly. The Creator and the creature cannot be identical— Before the birth of Rama and Krishna no one called God by these names. How could he assume these names. How could he assume these names after their brith."[12]

In establishing the uniform character of the major intellectual Oriental traditions, we may not be undermining the very basis of Islamic tradition!

Further in total agreement with Schuon, Nasr regards man's nature as unchanging. 'Man is what he is or he is nothing.'[13] And yet he laments that the Westerners try to study the traditional man in the light of their model of two-dimensional modern man (mind and body) deprived of the transcendent dimension.[14] This constitutes, according to Nasr, the greatest hinderance in the western way of studying Oriental teaching. The West has to discover the immutable nature of man. But he himself admits that the spiritual experience which is the function of transcendent dimension is accessible to a few qualified men whether of East or of West.[15] The picture of the world as drawn by a blind man and the one drawn by a normal person having all the five senses will be quite different. Similarly, knowledge of Reality as delivered by intellectual intuition is vastly different from the one that is attained by ratiocination, by analysis and division of sense experience. In the last analysis, we have to fall back on faith for the ordinary man is not qualified to be a recipient of the spiritual experience. He has to pass his life 'staying at the rim', away from 'the centre.' Philosophising as an intellectual enterprise will be a second-hand affair if the starting point, the base, is provided by an experience for

which the individual is not qualified. Any book on philosophy will only be a testament of faith. Such an approach will rule out the possibility of any development in philosophical thought.

FOOT NOTE

1. *Islam and Plight of Modern Man*, p. 134.
2. The subjacent philosophy in the Civilization of Pakistan–*proceedings of the First Afro-Asian Philosophy Conference*, 13-16th March 1978, p. 57.
3. *Proceedings of the Pakistan Philosophical Congress*, 1963, pp. 180-188.
4. *Reorientation of Muslim Philosophy*, 1965, pp. 1-5.
5. *Three Muslim Stages*, p.6.
6. *Reorientation of Muslim Philosophy*, p. 28.
7. Lazerowitze, *Philosophy and Illusion*, pp. 48-49.
8. Iqbal: *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, reprint 1977, p. 187.
9. Iqbal: *Dharb-e-Kaleem*, reprint 1947, p. 37.
10. (a) Qazi Javed Hussain, *Evolution of Muslim Thought in Indo-Pak Subcontinent* (1978); Book Traders P.B. 1854, Lahore. The book is the first of the series which traces the development of Muslim thought in South Asia. The book is an objective study of Muslim thought from Sayyed Ali Hajweri (10th century) to Shah Wali Ullah (18th century). It identifies the central idea which served as a motive force for the development of Muslim thought in the Indo-Pak subcontinent. It highlights the various philosophical movements and discusses the works of the intellectuals and the Sufis who contributed creatively to these movements. The book is fully documented and delineates in great details the controversies regarding Wahdat-ul-Wajud versus Wahdat-ul-Shuhud, orthodoxy versus liberalism and such other issues which constitute the main framework of Muslim thought in South Asia.

    (b) Qazi Javed Hussain, *Afkar-i-Shah Wali Ullah* (1978), Book Traders P. B. 1854, Lahore.

This is the second book in the series which discusses the great figure of Muslim decline in South Asia. The author projects objectively the metaphysical, religious, mystical, social and political ideas of Shah Wali Ullah as also their impact on later events. He also states in a lucid style the position which Shah Wali Ullah took vis-a-vis the *Wahdat-e-Wajud* versus *Wahdat-i-Shahud* controversy.

(c) Qazi Javed Hussain, *From Sir Sayyed to Iqbal* (1979); Book Traders P. B. 1854 Limited., Lahore.

This is the third book in the series which delineates the growth of Muslim thought under the colonial rule and depicts also the efforts at rehabilitation and gaining political ascendency of the Muslims after the debacle of 1857. The book provides a broad-based background for a study of Muslim religious thought from 1850 to 1938.

(d) Qazi Javed Hussain, *Sufi Intellectuals of Punjab* (1979); Sheikh Ghulam Ali & Sons, Lahore.

The book presents the history of Sufism in Punjab stretching from 10th to 20th century. The works of 17 sufi intellectuals have been discussed in this volume. The book throws light on Muslim culture as it developed in the Punjab.

(e) Qazi Javed Hussain, *Muslim Civilization in the Indo-Pak Subcontinent* (1983); Vanguard Books Ltd., Lahore.

This is a recent publication of Qazi Javed Hussain. The author has traced the formation and growth of Muslim psyche in South Asia in historical perspective. The book discusses system of education in Muslim India, Muslims' contribution to Music, *Tasawwuf* of Shah Abdul Latif, Bhitai, Sufi tradition in the Punjab etc.

1. *Islam & Plight of Modern Man* p. 30.
2. *Maktubat* I, p. 171.
3. F. Schuon, The Contradiction of Relativism—'*Studies in Comparative Religion;* Spring 1973, p.70.
4. *Islam & Plight of Modern Man,* p. 31.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 34.

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1. *Islam & Plight of Modern Man*, P. 30.
2. *Mabahis-I*, p. 171.
3. F. Schuon, The Contradiction of Relativism—*Studies in Comparative Religion*, Spring 1973, p.70.
4. *Islam & Plight of Modern Man*, p. 31.
5. Ibid, p. 34.

PAKISTANI CULTURE

"Man's culture is the complex of all he knows, all he possesses and all he does. His laws and religious beliefs, his art and morals, his customs and ideas are the content of his culture. The dimensions and forms these various elements take determine the nature and quality of a culture." These sentences form the opening lines of Introduction to the History of Popular Culture edited by Norman F. Cantor and Michael S. Werthman. This reference to the content of culture saves us from entering into verbal disputes about the meaning and definition of culture. It may be difficult to define a term say 'cat' yet you may be able to apply it correctly to the members of a certain species of animals. Technically such an approach to the meaning of a term is called definition by denotation. Listing the defining characteristics of a term may not be an easy process (and this is what is meant by defining a term) yet it may be easier to refer to the range of its application by stating its denotation. Philosophers, for example, do not agree on the definition of philosophy yet there is general agreement on its denotation, on issues and problems which are regarded philosophical. Krober and Kluckhohn mention 161 definitions of culture in their exhaustive study *Culture: A critical review of Concepts and Definitions.* To insist on one particular definition would be a matter of choosing a point of view or a matter of pleading a cause. You grow

emotive when you plead a case. Your definition would be an instance of persuasive definition.

This approach to the problem of culture through denotation brings you in line with the procedure an anthropologist adopts in tackling the issues relating to culture. For, an anthropologist uses culture to cover all aspects of social life of a people, i.e. customs, arts and skills, domestic and public life in peace and war, religion, science and art, values, norms and patterns of collective behaviour, modes of thinking and feeling. Cultural modes of behaviour assume the form of social sanctions which are handed down by tradition. They provide a refuge to indulge in social activities with 'a clear conscience' or without any fear of public or private censure. To defy or deviate from a recognised mode of social behaviour is to court trouble. 'The folk-ways,' wrote William Graham Summer, 'are the "right" ways' [*Man, Culture and Society*, Summer, (p. 172) Edited by H. L Shapiro]. This denotative approach clearly distinguishes culture from the areas covered by general psychology or physiology. Eating when hungry or being angry when frustrated are physiological or psychological functions and are studied by disciplines called physiology and psychology respectively. What interests a student of culture is the particular customs of eating, table manners and meal times and a particular style of expressing anger.

If we adopt the denotative approach to a study of culture, then all statements about culture become empirical propositions which need evidence, strong or weak, to claim any degree of probability. The evidence for these propositions has to be gleaned from the areas covered by anthropology, sociology, psychology and history.

A further point of interest in such an approach is the distinction which is made between personality trait and culture-trait. Personality trait is a mode of behaviour which

recurs in the life of an individual while culture-trait is a mode of behaviour which recurs in different members of a group. The latter has a marked social circulation and has the force of a recognised sanction. Marriage rituals or rituals connected with swearing-in ceremony are instances of culture-traits.

With this denotative approach, when we talk of Pakistani culture we think of the laws and religious beliefs, art and morals, customs and ideas, norms and values, modes of thinking and feeling, in short the entire panorama of social life of Pakistanis. The problem is complicated by the emphasis which persons, with different political ideologies, lay on the role of religious beliefs in the life of Pakistanis. Every religion has its own taboos, its dos and donts which ought to reflect in the cultural regularities of its adherents. But this is empirically possible only if the members of a religiously-oriented society live religiously. There is a lot of difference between having a religion and being religious. To have a religion is to pay only lip service to religion. Religion in this sense is only a verbal claim, a matter of social convenience, a system of ossified values. If I subscribe to the judgement: 'I ought to pay back my debt', but do not act on the operative clause of the statement, I am, in that event, doing only lip service to the ethical claim I am putting forward. When values become ossified they are like a factory with power cut off. They are not reflected in the patterns of behaviour, i.e. do not rise to the status of culture-trait. To have religion is to treat religion as a departmental affair. Here religion is not regarded as an expression of the whole man. You can perform religious functions and rituals and yet violate the very spirit of religion in all your dealings and transactions in daily life. To say your prayers regularly and to parctise black marketing, profiteering, evading of income tax, encroaching on your neighbour's rights, etc.; all these contradictions will go together. To claim religion in this sense is to exhibit alienation, to be torn and cut off from your roots, or in the words of Iqbal, to cease to live soulfully, or for Martain Buber, to be reduced to an it.

To be religious is to create new patterns of behaviour in ever changing milieu, to open up new possibilities of collective existence, to keep the spirit of religion in its blazing radiance, As I have said elsewhere, "Religion does not apply any brakes on creative activity. Religion is misconstrued when it is taken to imply a sort of cramp on the thoughts of a people or an individual. Religion is dynamic, it is essentially an experience, a rediscovery of the individual, a process of acquiring infinite power, power to change the contours of life and the very course of human history. Gautama left his palace only to walk into history. The Holy Prophet, peace be upon him, left the cave at mount Hira only to bring about a great cultural revolution in the world. The spirit of religion expresses itself in seeking newer adjustments in ever widening horizons of human experience." ["A Message for Young Philosophers," *Sophia*, December 1974.]

Conservatism has its cultural value, it has a great role to play in the collective life of a people, it lends continuity to the process of social growth but it cannot be permitted to put a cramp on creative activity. A living society has to move, to seek newer adjustments in ever changing milieu. This change has to operate within a frame of reference constituted by religious norms. But this is possible only if religion is a living force in a society and not a mere conventional matter, like "I ought to pay back my debt but I won't" which is both funny and conventional. Religious values are only conventional if they are not reflected in the thought and action of a people who lay claim to religion. Is religion a conventional affair in a given society? is a question which can be settled by collecting statistical data.

A further point of interest in this regard is the process of emergence of cultural regularities or cultural-traits in a people. A culturaltrait first appears in a small section of society and gradually engulfs other segments of society. It may never attain universality and some older forms of order may work against the new culture-trait. A culture

complex is not a configuration of homogeneous culture-traits but is, in the words of Adamson Hoebel, the integrated sum-total of heterogeneous culture-traits. It is the attunement of society to life as a whole. This orientation or attunement is externalised in patterns of collective behaviour. The external, the visible, the regular provides a window to peep into the mind of a people, to assess its dimensions, its greatness and maturity, its richness and depth. Culture is to a society what personality is to an individual. When Islam was introduced as a pattern of life, it recommended regularities of behaviour, both external and internal, which met a strong opposition from a very large segment of the Arabian Society. The previous patterns of collective behaviour were not abandoned completely. A new orientation, a dispositional change or what Philip Bagby describes as internal regularity of behaviour, was the culture-trait which the prophet of Islam introduced. There was no complete break with the past. To have a complete break with the past is a psychological impossibility. A number of culture traits, both external and internal, of pre-Islamic days were retained. Thus, when people talk of Islam as the cornerstone of our national identity, it is not to be taken as implying the abandonment of socio-historical heritage of the people of Pakistan. The culture-traits of Pakistanis do descend to remote past. Even if we trace the roots of Pakistani culture to the days of Indus Civilization there is no violence done from the point of view of anthropology. But we are, perhaps, emotionally not mature to look at facts dispassionately. Muslim countries all over the world are proud of their rich historical heritage of pre-Islamic days. Egypt talks of its pyramids with an air of enduring pride. Iran is proud of its rich historical heritage of the days of Cyrus. Why should a Pakistani disown his Aryan ancestors and the rich civilization which was built up in the Indus Valley? The Unconscious, both collective and individual, derives its hue and colour from the historic past and has a role to play in the collective

life of a people. Why should Pakistanis disown their entire past, the achievements of their remote ancestors? My past gives me a sense of pride, of greatness, of having contributed to the growth of human civilization long before the dawn of history. Why can't I look at myself? Why should I shun and avoid myself? The world looks at my past, i.e. the past of my ancestors with a feeling of awe and reverence but why should I disown my past, especially when it brings me credit and describes me as a descendant of a great people? What prevents me from acclaiming the ruins at Taxila, Harappa and Mohenjo Daro? My religion does not forbid me to own my past. I gave up idolatory when I embraced Isalm. I sought a new orientation, developed a new attunement to the universe. But my music and sculpture, my language and customs, my calender and nomenclature, my poetry and folk songs continued to grip me and inspire me to creative art and provide recreation of the highest order. And if I have a rich heritage of music and poetry, of language and folk songs, I must endeavour to keep it up and enrich it so that it descends to posterity with all its freshness and vigour.

Dr. Jamil Jalibi in his book *Pakistani Culture* (in Urdu) raises the following question: Can we exclude fine arts and enjoyment of beauty from culture and yet retain a highly developed form of it? Fearing an onslaught from the reactionaries he proceeds to make the following observations: "If Islam is a complete code of life it follows that no principle of Islam can go against human psyche. It futher implies that Divine commandments cannot enjoin a rule which bids the suppression of some positive element in human nature. We cannot stop composing verses because of human nature nor can we give up enjoying painting and music. Dancing certainly overwhelms us with pleasure and a good piece of painting will undoubtedly affect us. Aesthetic enjoyment is ingrained in human essence and is a basic human response. Islam has indeed proscribed lewdness, play and idle talk, obscene and vulgar expressive movements but has not imposed any censor-

ship on finer expressions of sense and sensiblity" (p.142). He further adds, "Those who regard poetry and other forms of fine arts as excluded from religion are ignorant of the cultural role of religion . . . 'Poetry too is as important an ingredient of our culture as is 'call to prayer' " (p. 148).

The patterns of collective behaviour provide you your marks of national identity–language, literature, national functions, rituals connected with marriage and burial, sports, festivals and in all these religion imposes a certain frame-work to ensure the healthy growth of the individual. It wants me to take a certain pro-attitude towards some of the past practices and a negative attitude towards the others. These attitudes I do, in fact, display both at the individual and collective levels of existence.

We suffer from a certain psychological lag if we identify our future with the efforts we have to put in for the growth and progress of our country, our society but confine our past to the achievements of Muslims in history. To say that my future is linked with the fate of my country but my past is not so linked exposes me to a strange predicament and negates the canons of anthropology and history. Let me discover my roots dispassionately and overcome my alienation. Who am I? What am I? are very relevant questions to discover my personal and national identity. I am a member of the Muslim world and am proud of it but so are millions of muslims living in far–flung areas of the world, each claiming national identity fashioned by the historical past his society has been through.

A living culture is dynamic and generates new culture-traits. The mass entertainment provided through radio, movies, television, magazines, paperbacks and sports disclose new dimensions of social living. In view of the dynamic nature of culture a cry for the revival of old values loses all appeal. The 'content range' of values change with advancement of knowledge and development of social consciousness. Social justice, for Plato, consisted in class-marriages, in keep-

ing temperance duly controlled by valour or courage and permitting wisdom to rule supreme, in short, in having a state structure with a philosopher-king at the top. For a feudal lord, social justice means keeping his tenants in appalling misery and in a state of enduring servitude. While for a capitalist, it means keeping his labour at a sub-human level of subsistence. It is your awareness of class struggle which lends new meaning to the phrase 'social justice.' Revival of values is thus seeking a new meaning of values in your socio-cultural context. It is to give them a new content consequent upon your experience and vision of social growth. Thus a dynamic society has to seek new contents for its values. In the phraseology of religion it is called *Ijtehad*.

Some culture-traits are trans-geographical but so am I. In this computer age I am a citizen of the world. My social milieu is not confined to geographical boundaries of my land. I participate in the U. N. O. debates, I share the struggle of the Vietnamese. My morning paper brings me the events of last evening from all parts of the world. My radio set brings me B.B.C. overseas News bulletins, the Voice of America and a note from Peking. I get Eastern and Western music and it follows me to my bed. The roots of an international culture are gaining ground in me. But I draw my identity from my own historical past, from my culture complex, from my histro-socio-political past.

There are internal sub-groupings in every society. Cohesiveness is an ideal towards which every living society moves. Each sub-group has its own behaviour characteristics, i.e. behaviour norms. Technically, these norms are called 'specialities'. Norms that are shared by all members are called 'universals'. 'Alternatives' are patterns of behaviour that exist where several different norms apply to the same situation. Thus a society has its 'universals', 'alternatives' and 'specialities'. 'The cohesiveness of a society is, in part, the effect of relative proportion of 'universals' and 'alternatives' to specialities" (Adamson Hoebel, *The Nature of Culture, Man, Culture*

and society, p. 173). Pakistan too has its regional cultures. The Blauchi, the Sindi, the Punjabi and Pathan elements have their due importance in national culture. These, in fact, constitute blood vessels of national culture. Just see how bhangra or Luddi or Khattak dance thrills most of the Pakistanis, what *Mela Chraghan* means to peasants in the countryside in the Punjab and watch the maddening crowd at Shahbaz Qalandar. These specialities are gradully assuming national stature. The regional languages are enriching the national language and the latter is infusing new blood into the former. We have to move forward as a nation with the load of the past and attain to the ideal of cohesiveness.

To the objection that there are only regional cultures and no Pakistani Culture, a simple answer is that 'universals' and 'alternatives' shared by most Pakistanis are the common binding and integrating elements of Pakistani Culture and society. The specialities of different regions and socio-economic classes are simply differentiating elements. We have to go a long way to attain cohesiveness. It is an enterprise in which our poets and saints, scholars and writers, artists and craftsmen, journals and newspapers, universities and colleges, radio and television have to play an important role. What Alvin Toffier describes culture consumers, i.e. persons who participate in artistic activity—painters, actors, dancers, musicians and those who listen to classical music, attend concerts, plays or visit museums or gallaries, etc. too, have a great responsibility to shoulder in delineating and cementing various facets of Pakistani Culture.

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IDEOLOGY OF PAKISTAN

Pakistan is an ideological State. It came into existence as a result of the concentrated efforts of the Indian Muslims to carve for themselves a homeland—a place where they could preserve and promote their values and ideas, their principles of social justice and corporate living. When Muslims in Madras, Bombay and Lucknow voted for Pakistan, it was not out of any selfish interest that they did so[1] : Pakistan was their only hope to preserve and promote the cultural and spiritual legacy of Muslims in India. "The greatest crime in the world," says J. D. Bernal, "is not the denial of food and shelter to the human animal, but depriving man of his inheritance of thought and the possibility of full constructive expression of it." Pakistan alone could help the Indian Muslims to preserve their history, their cultural heritage, and maintain their identity. She alone could provide a sure and stable basis for promoting a social order where economic well-being is not the be-all and end-all of State endeavour as is the case with Marxism, but an order where spiritual and moral values control and regulate the formulation and operation of various plans for economic growth and technological advancement of the country.

What made Muslims unacceptable to the Hindus was not any economic rivalry or regionalism but Islam, the religion of the Muslims. Islam is essentially a way of life, a social code, and it seeks social unity, not on the basis of social or linguis-

tic affinity as is the case with secular nationalism, but on a spiritual principle which makes God both the source and goal of all creation. God as the source of all life and creativity provides a spiritual basis of human unity. This also vouchsafes a personal contact of each individual with his God. The feeling of being alienated, of being a supernumerary, which overtakes a modern atheistic man and which figures so prominently in existentialism finds no place in Islamic concept of relationship between man and God. True, the way to develop this relationship is not an easy one, but that is no reason to reject the relationship as illusory, as psychoanlysts will have us believe. The fear of dark death heightens anguish and produces feeling of loneliness. The Qur'anic emphasis on man's return to God not only gives man a hope of life to come but provides added strength to the continuation of moral effort. God is the light of the heavens and the earth (xxiv. 35). This verse points to the character of the universe and gives ample scope to man for inner expansion and hence authentic existence. Further, the spiritual basis of life and universe guarantees what the charter of Medina so explicitly states, viz. the peaceful co-existence of all communities, of the majority and minority communities within a State and tolerance and acceptance of the right of other States to a peaceful existence.

It was the principle of peaceful co-existence which prompted leaders of the Muslim India of the pre-Partition days to work out in collaboration with the Hindus an acceptable formula which could provide constitutional safeguards to Muslim interests in the subcontinent. The Hindu majority refused to show any magnanimity or generosity of heart towards the Muslim minority. The Muslims never harboured any ill-will against the Hindus. Pakistan came into existence not as a result of war with the Hindus, but rather as a self-defence against the forces that were out to crush the Muslims out of existence as an independent and separate entity.

It sounds odd to persons trained in Western traditions to regard religion, in the twentieth century, as providing a genuine basis for the creation of an independent sovereign State. For the West, State and Church are two separate entities and the domains of the two are quite independent. The rise of secular nationalism further strengthens this belief. Some Easterns who share this conviction of the West find further support for their viewpoint in the great progress and advancement that Europe has made after its separation of State from Church. Religion, it is held, smacks of fanaticism and Mullaism and exercises a retarding influence on the healthy growth of a people. Further, some students of culture may contend that the roots of Pakistani culture extend to a period much earlier than the advent of Islam in the Subcontinent. Racial unconsciousness is a heritage that is an organic element in the collective consciousness of a people. The various elements which form the basis of Pakistani culture need proper expression and not suppression in various fields of national life. There is some force in this line of reasoning but the truth contained in it is not negated by asserting that the political ideology of Pakistan is founded upon Islam. Islam does not believe in fanaticism or compulsion in religion, nor is it averse to progress. These critics overlook the function of the principle of movement in the structure of Islam. As a socio-political movement Islam lays great emphasis on *Ijtihad.* The law of Islam admits of evolution and change. Life is dynamic, and a religion which from its very beginning was a social code, a way of life, could not have survived had it not given due place to the categories of change and permanence in its socio-political structure. '*Ijam*', i.e. consensus of opinion is an important source of Islamic Law and this provides ample scope for change in the Law of Islam to meet new and complex situations in collective life. Further, Islam is, in no case, antagonistic to local elements to which it gives due place in the emotional life of a people. Islam retained, after due modification, a number of

institutions of the Arabs of pre-Islamic days. It regulates individual and collective life to ensure spiritual growth of a people. It is not merely a religion like other religions, say Buddhism and Christianity. Before the advent of Islam religion everywhere meant other worldliness Buddha recommended complete annihilation of desire, for he regarded life as an evil produced by the desire to live. The only way to escape from evil was to annihilate desire. "Primitive Christianity was founded," says Iqbal, "not as a political or civil unit, but as a monastic order in a profane world, having nothing to do with civil affairs, and obeying Roman authority practically in all matters."[2] Jesus's famous maxim: "Give unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's," further confirms this thesis. With Islam the case is otherwise. The distinction between the temporal and the spiritual does not exist. The mundane is spiritual. The world is not a profane world. Islam is a complete code of life based on a definite outlook on life and this is what Islam means to the Pakistanis. It is in this sense that the political ideology of Pakistan is based on Islam or that Pakistan is an ideological State.

I

The structural principles of Islam include, among others, belief in the unity of God, belief in the finality of Muhammad's prophethood and faith in all prophets.[3] From the last it follows that Islam preaches respect for and tolerance of other faiths and thus emphasises the principle of peaceful co-existence. Islam is a religion of peace. A dispassionate study of the rise of Islam can easily refute the false allegations against Islam that it is a religion based on force and was propagated with the sword. It had to wage wars in self-defence, to protect and establish itself. With its emphasis on *tuwhid,* or the unity of God, it preaches unity, equality and freedom of all men; and with its emphasis on respect for and

tolerance of other faiths it advocates the principle of peaceful co-existence of all nations. Ideologically considered, Pakistan has her political moorings in the Islamic principles of (i) *tuwhid* with its obvious implications of equality, solidarity, and freedom of all men, and (ii) respect for and tolerance of other faiths together with the peaceful co-existence of all nations. In what follows I propose to bring out the implications of these constituents of our ideology.

II

The God of Islam is an individual[4] and a supreme creator[5]. The Qur'anic emphasis on the unity of God is very great[6]. From the unity of God follows the unity of the world. In the history of philosophy there have been great systems which advocate consistent monism. Plato's world of Ideas, though consisting of a plurality, was a systematic whole in as much as the Ideas formed a hierarchy with the Idea of Good at the top. True, the Ideas did not deduce themselves one from the other, as the Hegelian categories did, yet they constituted a world of their own. Leibniz's monads despite being windowless showed due regard for mutual adjustment by the operation of the principle of pre-established harmony. Spinoza's substance laid one-sided emphasis on the unity of the whole. Attempts are not lacking in the world of philosophy where reality is described as one in many or many in one. Even science considers the world to be a *universe* and not a *multiverse.* The Qur'anic concept of the unity of God and the world has its parallels in the realms of Philosophy and science.

The Islamic concept of *tuwhid* or the unity of God points to the unity, equality and freedom of all men. Such a conception of man and his status combines the merits of philosophies known as Marxism and Existentialism and at the same time provides ample scope for the spiritual growth and inner expansion of man which Marxism so conspicuous-

ly lacks. If Existentialism lays emphasis on the individual, Marxism extols the society. The former is unable to account for a social theory, the latter fails to account for the subjective individual. Existentialism cannot supply social Philosophy; Marxism cannot establish independent status of the individual. Sartre realises this complementary opposition between the two philosophies and thinks if a union between the two could be achieved a splendid theory would result. In *"Ouestion de Methode"* which he incorporated as a preface to his later work *Critique de la raison dialectique* he says, "We are at the same time deeply convinced that historical materialism provides the only valid interpretation of human history and that Existentialism constitutes the only concrete approach to reality.[7]" His main concern is "to work out a theoretical foundation which would permit, without falling into the mystification of liberalism, the stabilization of the status of the individuals in a socialistic society."[8] He wants to bridge the gap between Marxist conception of a determined society and existentialist conception of a free creative individual.

In *Critique de la raison dialectique,* Sartre considerably modifies his earlier position as contained in *Being and Nothingness* and tries to work out the union of the two philosophies. But the compromise is not acceptable to the Marxists in that Sartre, despite granting the power of natural dialectic *to* the individual, retains the latter's freedom by asserting that it is individual himself who invites the movement of the dialectic and it is he who is responsible for it. "It is the individual who posits scarcity in the material world and it is the individual who through his power of totalization creates the groups which, in turn develop into institutions that direct and lead the movements of society." The Marxists cannot agree even to such a modified and limited freedom of the individual. The dialectic is present in the world without the aid and intervention of the individual. The laws of operation of the dialectic in the material and social world are indepen-

dent of the individual. Adam Schaff, a Polish Marxist, comments on Sartre's stand in the following words: "Between the Sartre who remains loyal to Existentialist tradition and the Sartre who accepts the philosophical position of Marxism there is a contradiction that can only be overcome through the repudiation of one of the antagonistic positions now observed in his views. In its most concentrated form this contradiction is noticeable in the treatment of the problems of the individual."[9]

Both Marxism and atheistic Existentialism are antagonistic to religion primarily because of the empirical spirit of the age that gave birth to these philosophies. Religion in its highest form is essentially experience, and it realised the necessity of having experience as its basis long before the birth of inductive intellect. It holds out the prospect of bringing man into direct contact with the roots of his own being. The individual thereby rediscovers himself and experiences inner expansion and attains freedom in the highest degree. The individual realises that he is not a supernumerary, nor is he just a product of the social existence. He enters into intimate contact with the source of all life and creativity. This gives him a vision of values. He seizes the ultimate principle of value and discovers his metaphysical status. Marxism fails to account for the role which creative individuals play in moulding society and carrying it to increasingly higher planes of existence. Islam as a polity affirms the dignity of the individual,[10] allows him equality of consideration in matters affecting his material well-being, and by its emphasis on the spiritual origin of life brings humanity closer together. Man is not simply a physiological being moulded by social environment. True, his bodily needs have to be met with, but the spiritual or the higher element in man is not simply an offshoot or a by-product of the material. The Marxists put the cart before the horse when they trace all higher functions of man to the working of the dialectic in both the material and the social realms. The spiritual growth or the inner

expansion of the individual has a claim that cannot be dismissed as an illusion or a neurosis. For Islam spirituality has a twofold aspect. It implies personal relation of man to God and also man's relation to society, together with full cognizance of social rights and responsibilities. The institutions of congregational prayers, *zakat, fitrah* and the duty of *Hajj* on those who can afford, all lay stress on social aspect of life. Thus when we say that the political ideology of Pakistan is founded on Islam we mean that the social order which the Pakistanis seek to promote provides ample scope for belief and practice. The distinctions of cast, creed and colour do not exist for a society that believes in the spiritual origin of life. The Qur'an very explicitly states: "O Mankind: We have created you male and female and have made you nations and tribes that you may know one another. The noblest of you in the sight of God is the best in conduct."

III

As hinted at above, the partition of the Indian subcontinent was effected to bring peace to the Subcontinent. If the later events have belied our hopes it is because Bharat has not yet reconciled herself to the fact of Partition. The right of self-determination is a fundamental human right. The Indian Muslims exercised this right to help the two nations, the Hindus and the Muslims, to live in peace and harmony. Thus the other important element that is an integral constituent of our ideology is the principle of peaceful co-existence —a co-existence that ensures well-being of minority communities within the country and recognises the right of other Sates on independent and autonomous existence.

Philosophers and seers throughout human history have expressed their views on war and peace. There have been a few great advocates of war among the ancient and modern thinkers, while quite a large number of philosophers and mystics have suggested plans for regional and international

peace. Heraclitus extolled war as "father and king of all". Strife, he argued, was the principle of life. Plato's *Republic* is, in spirit, a design for military community. Cicero and Plutarch counted war as a factor in the spread of civilisation. For Hegel "war was the catalyst through which history unfolded its purpose". Nietzsche regarded war as a witness to the superior quality of the superman. Carlyle, Kingsley, Ruskin and Emerson all praised war.

Pacifism too has a long history. The Epicureans declared against warfare. The Stoics of the Roman Empire preached cosmopolitanism based on unity of mankind, making war among its members a despicable thing. In the seventeenth century speculations for permanent peace in Europe began to develop. Plans were prepared for a unification of Christian States in a final effort to expel the Turks. The West has, in fact, never tolerated the existence of a Muslim State in Europe. The anti-Muslim design already figured in the fourteenth century in the plan for unification of Europe by Pierre Dubois. In the eighteenth century these peace plans for Europe were given a new lease of life with the French and German Enlightenment. Rousseau in his *A Project of Permanent Peace* and Kant in his *Eternal Peace* supported European confederation with a strong centre as an effective step for establishing peace. Among the nineteenth-century English Utilitarians Bentham, James Mill and J. S. Mill provided much of the background for peace movements. It may be of interest to note that all this while, when English philosophers were speculating on various aspects of the peace movement, Great Britain was developing into a mighty colonial power. Peace simply meant peace for Europe while countries in Africa and Asia were to be kept under subjugation and that too because the white man was so conscientious of his "burden". It is only as a result of the two World Wars fought in the first half of the present century that the peace movement has gained tremendous momentum. With the availability of nuclear weapons to the great powers and the great

destructive power of these new devices of mass extinction, the problem of international peace has become all the more pressing since the end of World War II. As a move towards securing peace for all, the League of Nations and the United Nations Organisation were formed at the conclusion of the two World Wars. The League of Nations faild in her mission and the U.N.O too has proved ineffective in vacating aggression from Kashmir, Arab countries in the Middle East and Vietnam, to mention only a few. The failure of the U.N.O is due to the fact that the right of existence to the developing countries is not conceded to in spirit. It is the block interest that is dominant. Group morality is founded upon expediency and self-interest.

The British Philosopher Bertrand Russell, in *New Hopes For a Changing World,* recommends a World State which must be imposed by one nation or a group of nations as a condition of permanent peace. When the World State has been in existence for a century or so it will be able, argues Russell, to secure willing co-operation of its members. Russell's proposal sounds very much akin to the claim of the communists that the final global victory of communism will remove all causes of war. The price that States may have to pay for the founding of a World State may be too heavy as compared to the gain in terms of peace that may or may not last long. Any plan for world peace must be based on the principle of peaceful co-existence of all States. This is a fundamental right of every State and must be conceded to both in letter and in spirit. The identity of a group should remain intact. If an individual is to undergo brain-washing for personal security he can hardly be wiser for his purchase. Further, there is the problem of a community within a community. The minority community must enjoy complete freedom of belief and practice. Thus the right of States to exist in peace must be granted. And that is what the principle of peaceful co-existence stands for. Islamic philosophy of peace grants this *in toto* and further supplements it with the

observation that persecution and harassment of a people should be quelled with force. The aggressor if dealt with collectively, can be set right. "And fight with them until there is no persecution."[12] War in Islam is not a crusade against the non-believers. "And if two parties of the believers quarrel, make peace between them; but if one of them acts wrongfully towards the other, fight that which acts wrongfully until it returns to God's command; then if it returns, make peace between them with justice and act equitably ; for God loves those who act equitably."[13]

Peace, thus, can be secured by a collective effort of all nations. The big powers are not psychologically prepared to concede that the viewpoint of the opponent has to be tolerated and respected. But that is what the canon of justice requires: Every-one to count for one and nobody for more than one. Peace founded upon justice alone can survive. A World State imposed by one nation or by a group of nations cannot bring permanent peace. Permanent peace has to grow from within and cannot be imposed from outside. It is only by showing respect and tolerance for other faiths as well as by conceding the principle of peaceful co-existence in respect of all nations that any hope for a lasting peace can be entertained.

Pakistan, thus, stands for peace—not regional or territorial peace, but international or universal peace. Pakistan's philosophy of peace ensures complete freedom of belief and practice for the minority communities. The Quaid-i-Azam, in his inaugural address to the Pakistan Constituent Assembly on 14 August 1947, rightly observed: "The tolerance and goodwill that great Emperor Akbar showed to all the non-Muslims is not of recent origin. It dates back thirteen centuries ago when our Prophet not only by words but by deeds treated the Jews and Christians, after he had conquerred them, with the utmost tolerance and respect for their faith and beliefs. The whole history of Muslims . . . is replete with those humane and great principles which should be

followed and practised"

Since the basic principles of Islamic philosophy of peace are justice, unity of man and his freedom, there is no bar for people of different faiths to join together for the restoration of justice and peace. The Prophet of Islam allowed Jews of Qainuqa to fight with him against his enemies in the *Ghazwah* of Khaibar. Again, Safwan ibn Umayyah, a polytheist, fought with the Prophet against his enemies in the *Ghazwah* of Hunain.

Thus when the Pakistanis claim that Pakistan is an ideological State, they in fact assert the existence of a social order which tries to realise the ideals of unity, equality, and freedom and which further works for universal peace through its advocacy of the principle of peaceful co-existence. The future of man depends very much on how he tackles the peace problem and in this respect the ideology of Pakistan has a constructive suggestion to make.

FOOT NOTES

1. *The Pakistan Philosophical Journal*, October 1962, Vol. VI, No, 2, p. 34.
2. S. M. Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 55.
3. *Al-Qur'an*, ii. 36 ; xlii. 13.
4. *Ibid.*, cxii 1.
5. *Ibid.*, xlvi. 3 ; xxx. 27 ; xxv. 1.
6. *Ibid.*, ii. 163 ; iii. 18 ; vi. 19 ; xvi. 12.
7. Translation from Polish Publication *Tworezox*, p. 41.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 77.
9. Quoted by Walter Odajnyk in *Marxism and Existentialism*, p.141.
10. *Al-Qur'an*, xvii. 70 ; xcv. 4 ; xx. 122.
11. *Ibid.*, xlix. 13.
12. *Ibid.*, viii. 39.
13. *Ibid.*, xlix. 9.

PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN PAKISTAN AND NEEDS OF THE TIME

The subject of this symposium requires an exhaustive treatment of philosophy of life which may be, pragmatically considered, beneficial to, and suitable for adoption in, Pakistan. The emphasis here is on what may be termed as social or practical philosophy. For philosophy of life of a people implies some principles or values or beliefs or a system of these to which they feel devoted and may even organise their collective conduct in accordance with those principles. I doubt the cogency and reasonableness of an attempt to recommend for Pakistan a philosophy of life which Mr. Abdul Wahhab terms as philosophy of life for the modern world. Pakistan is a young country and has, therefore, to face certain internal problems which do not exist for most of the countries in the West. It is true that the world to-day is facing a great crisis born of the opposition between conflicting ideologies of atheistic socialism and secular nationalism, on the one hand, and the great difference between the intellectual advancement and moral backwardness of man, on the other. Pakistan has to be alive to the world situation but has also to meet a complicated situation at home. Besides, she has her own distinctive outlook on life. In this paper, I, therefore, propose to discuss a philosophy of life which is suited to the genesis of Pakistanis and is also con-

sonant with the demands of the modern world. I would first like to add a few remarks about philosophy of life.

The philosophy of life of a people is related to and grows out of the traditions and beliefs, stresses and strains prevalent in the community life of the people. The organisation and generalisation of traditional codes and principles of belief and a gradual synthesis of them with the matter-of-fact positivistic knowledge which gradually grows up, generates philosophy of life of a people. It is, therefore, relative to the climate of opinion of its people, i.e. cultural habits that determine intellectual as well as emotional and volitional attitudes. Its specific problems vary with the changes in the life of a people. Now life is essentially a process, a growth, a development and consequently with the change of conditions the philosophy of life of a people also undergoes a change. But in this change it should not lose its contact with its past. It should keep in its fold both the categories of change and permanence. A nation has to move forward with the weight of its past traditions and customs, beliefs and practices. It has to maintain its identity and also move in varying degrees with the changing circumstances.

This is true of the Greek, the Roman and the Christian philosophies of life that have had their day in the West. In Europe, Christian philosophy of life was abandoned in the third quarter of the nineteenth century and has been replaced by a philosophy of life which is based on materialism leading to power or might as the most important and, in a way, the only value. There has been since then a blind race for power in the West. This took place when the man in the street discovered what the man of learning had discovered in the eighteenth century, viz. the fact that the Christian faith was hollow. With the triumph of man over God in the West and, with it, destruction of spiritual values, a period of anxiety, suspense, dread, suspicion and distrust set in. The man in the West, in this machine age, is in dire need of a

philosophy that may restore him his lost status and thus enable him to live soulfully.

Pakistan did not come into being by a process of natural selection. It was the result of a concentrated effort of the Indian Muslims to save their religion, culture, traditions and all that the Muslim India stood for. The Hindu opposition to the Muslims was not based on racial difference or provincialism or economic rivalry. It was Islam which made Muslims unacceptable to the Hindus. And when the Muslims in Madras, Bombay and Bihar voted for Pakistan it was not out of any self-interest that they did that. Their sole motive in working for the establishment of Pakistan was their conviction that Pakistan alone could warrant preservation and promotion of Muslim interest in the Subcontinent. Islam was the basis of the two-nation theory. Pakistan was made a homeland for the Muslims although Muslims alone were not to live in it. Islam is certainly the cornerstone of nationality in Pakistan.

Pakistanis have a distinct cultural heritage spreading over thousands of years. It is their history, customs, traditions, literature and languages which distinguish Pakistanis from Muslims in other parts of the world. History is to a nation what memory is to an individual ; it constitutes its identity. Pakistanis have to maintain their identity and yet move with the time. Philosophy of life for Pakistan will, therefore, imply the maintenance, preservation and promotion of values that Islam stands for, together with culture and traditions which are distinctly Pakistani.

The God of Islam is the Supreme Creator. He is eternal but dynamic. Life is a forward movement, a flow, but not a chaotic flow. It is an organised and centralised force. It believes in individuation. It exhibits itself in centres of energy. Man is the highest organisation of life. The Qur'an regards man as a bearer of trust which the heavens, the earth and the mountains refused to receive. Man has infinite potentialities to assimilate Divine attributes and thus become

God's deputy on earth. He is superior to all creatures (even the angels) by virtue of his powers of conceptual knowledge. In his efforts to promote good, he receives help from God. God responds to man's call. He speaks with him but from behind a veil. Man is destined to become a permanent element in the scheme of Reality. This view of human situation is in sharp contrast to philosophies known as Humanism and Existentialism. An existentialist views man as forlorn and foresaken, overcome with dread and anxiety, heaped with absurdities and engaged in commitments that carry him nowhere. Existentialism emphasises the importance of the individual and yet at a touch it reduces him to an absurdity and a supernumerary.

The ultimate reality, according to the Qur'an, is spiritual. Islam does not regard the antithesis between the spiritual and the secular as real. To quote Iqbal: 'Matter is spirit in space-time reference. . . . The spirit finds its opportunity in the natural, the material, the secular. All that is secular is, therefore, sacred in the roots of its being.' A society with such a notion of reality cannot disregard the material and the temporal. It engenders a positive seeking attitude towards the temporal. Man is a social being. He needs some social structure to develop his potentialities and capacities. The Qur'an is silent on the nature of State-structure. It is, I believe, a human institution, but it has to be based on certain fundamental principles.

The basis of social unity in Islam is the principle of *Tauhid.* Allah is a person, a unique individual. He is the Supreme Creator and follows His universal and immutable laws. From such a conception of God follows the equality, solidarity and freedom of all men. 'Islam as a polity,' says Iqbal, 'seeks to make the principle of *Tauhid* a living factor in the intellectual and emotional (and volitional) life of mankind.' Our philosophy of life requires a State-structure based on the ideals of equality, solidarity and freedon, so that the individual may be able to develop his potentialities

effectively. I propose to concentrate on the ideal of solidarity.

The ideal of solidarity is of special significance to Pakistan. It has a pivotal position in Pakistan's social set-up. It is true that a nation does not attain easily to the ideal of unity. It has to pass through great ordeals before its people, with no ethnic affinity and with differences of sects and languages, are welded into a unity. This is well known to a student of history.

It was the fear of Hindu domination and consequent loss of their cultural heritage that brought Indian Muslims together and led them to make a demand for Pakistan. Since the birth of Pakistan this fear has persisted in the form of apprehension of trouble from across the border because of India's hostile attitude towards Pakistan. But fear is only a negative way of bringing people together. If integration is based on fear, remove the fear and disintegration starts.

There are two phases in the realisation of the ideal of solidarity in Pakistan. The first phase may seek welding of Pakistanis into one cohesive unit, one nation. The basis of nationality in Pakistan is not geographical or ethnic or linguistic unity. The two wings of Pakistan lie separated with over a thousand miles of territory of a hostile neighbouring country between them. But in this age of telephone, television and space-travel physical distances have shrunk. Political unity has become independent of geographical contiguity. The union of Alaska with the United States is an example in hand. Territorial remoteness cannot, therefore, stand in the way of welding a people into a unity. Pakistanis have not even a racial or linguistic unity. Ethnically people in various regions of West Pakistan and East Pakistan are not from the same stock. But there are countries where the nation comprises people from different races. Britain and United States are well-integrated nations despite being a hotchpotch of different races. Canada and Switzerland are bilingual and trilingual countires respectively. These examples show that lack of racial and linguistic homogeneity cannot constitute an

unsurmountable obstacle in securing unity of a people. It will be readily conceded that a bilingual country can progress rapidly to its goal of unity if it adopts a common script. Suggestions have been made for adopting Roman script as a common script for Pakistan. The reason behind this move, in all probability, is the fact that English is the language of sciences and is Pakistan's instrument of interwing communication as also with the outside world. The utilitiy of English as a language cannot be denied. But that will hardly be a compliment to English if Pakistan adopts Roman script. Pakistan's cultural heritage will be substantially lost in this switch-over. Turkey has not been able to render in Roman script in the last thirty-five years even a negligible portion of her ancient treasures of books. Pakistan's already low percentage of literacy will drop considerably in this changeover. I would suggest adoption of the Arabic script as a common script for Pakistan. Muslims are expected to be (and they are) acquainted with the script of the Qur'an. Adoption of the Arabic script will help preserve Pakistan's cultural heritage, weld our people into a unity and bring them closer to the Muslim world.

Other suggestions for effecting national unity could be securing of economic parity in various regions. The talk in undertones about independent economy of the two wings of the country as also of regionalism can be traced back to unequal economic development of different regions. Steps will have to be taken for economic rehabilitation of the people of backward regions and a reasonable measure of equal econmic development in the two wings. The idea of Common Market has taken root in Europe. They are prepared to forego a part of their sovereignty for stabilising their economy. Pakistan has to take a lesson from what is happening around.

Pakistan cannot afford to remain a poor country for long if it is to survive as a political and ideological unity. Islam has not sought spiritual emanicipation of man at the cost of his economic dislocation. It is due to the unhealthy

influence of Sufism that the attitude of avoidance of the mundane crept into the socio-cultural fold of Islam in the medieval times. The challenge of Communism can be effectively met by fighting successfully against poverty. It should be remembered that sermons are seldom welcome on empty stomachs.

Mass education, inter-wing teachers' and students' exchange programmes, inter-wing sports tournaments at the school and university levels, promotion of Bengali in West Pakistan and Urdu in East Pakistan could go a long way in welding Pakistanis into one integrated nation.

Unity could further be effected by adopting a national dress, a dress which is in keeping with Pakistani traditions. It is true that Islam does not prescribe any specific dress. It only enjoins that sartorial freedom should restrain from wanton exhibitionism. But national dress does inspire a sense of unity in a people. And a lead in this direction is to be given by the people at the top. Respect for an abstract principle is cultivated by a relatively few persons. The great majority of people have to be taken to the goal of unity by presenting it with symbols in a concrete form. And national dress is a symbol of unity and does exert a cohesive force on the masses. Serious thought should be given to the question of adopting a national dress and while deciding this issue the past traditions and cultural and climatic conditions of the country should be kept in view.

'Cultural pattern' exerts a cohesive force on a group. Pakistanis have a distinct culture which contains elements of Hindu, Buddhist, Iranian, Turkish, Arab and English cultures. No culture can afford to remain pure. You assimilate new ideas from your relations and contacts with others. Pakistani culture should not be a mosaic of discrete elements. Such a culture-pattern would be a mechanical whole where the parts are not affected by the whole nor by the presence of other elements in the whole. It should rather be a pattern which is wide enough to encompass regional elements and is also a

configuration which is a fusion of different elements composing the pattern. This will help solve the problem of building unity and stability in national life. A great responsibility rests on the intelligentsia of the country in this regard.

The second phase of the realisation of the ideal of solidarity may be directed towards making the Qur'anic concept of *Millat* a basis for the creation of a kind of commonwealth of Muslim States. The concept of *Millat* seeks to unite Muslims in all parts of the world into one homogeneous integrated group where racial, territorial and linguistic differences are subordinated to group-consciousness. It also paves the way for the establishment of the institution of Universal Caliphate. History, however, shows that the idea of Universal Caliphate failed in practice. It worked when the world of Islam was intact. It has ceased to be operative. The failure of the U. A. R. as a republic with three components, Egypt, Syria and the Yemen, is an example of the non-working of this institution in the recent past. The efforts at the unification of the Muslims since the second half of the nineteenth century in the form of pan-Islamism, pan-Arabism and Arab League and the Muslim Brotherhood *(al-Ikhwam al-Muslimun)* have failed because of inherent negativism of these movements and the rise of nationalism in the Middle East. These movements arose from the consciousness of the antagonism between East and West and the resentment against colonialism, imperialism and Western domination. But we should remember that negative attitudes and impulses are uncreative. In the present age of nationalism Pakistan can take the initiative and work for the creation of a family of Muslim States. Such a commonwealth of Muslim States would be a great force if its members were a well-integrated unity. Nationalism as understood in the West is the greatest barrier to the formation of an international mind which alone can effectively deal with the moving forces of present-day labour, science and art. Happily Islam provides us a principle which can weld Muslim States into a solid block to help promote the cause

of basic human values.

Besides the principle of equality, solidarity and freedom, Pakistan needs another principle to maintain herself honourably in the comity of nations and to promote the kind of manhood the Qur'an envisages. And that is the principle of power. Power alone can help a country retain its sovereignty. Weak countries invite aggression even from those who proclaim themselves to be champions of non-violence. The secret of might lies in scientific and technological advancement. It is an age of science and the strength of a country depends upon its scientists and technicians as also on its resources. To recommend, as is suggested by Mr. A. Wahhab, a stoppage to further venture in the so-called scientific truth 'till such time that goodness grows and develops to overtake its partner, the truth,' is to take an unrealistic view of human nature. Man's adventures into the realm of knowledge and his unravelling of the mysteries of Nature cannot be stopped. There is an instinctive urge to discover the secrets of Nature. So long as Nature is not completely subjugated there can be no 'stoppage to venture in the scientific truth' and that is a goal which keeps ever receding. Pakistan is a developing country. It is the backwardness of a country which at present constitutes threat to world peace. The race between the big powers for political and ideological conversion of the African and the Asian countries is due to the backwardness of these regions. Let these regions be economically strong and technologically advanced; the world situation will atuomatically improve. This advocacy of might is not to be interpreted as a blind will to power leading to nihilism as was advocated by Nietzsche. It is not the challenge of becoming 'adult and godless.' It is only an attempt at reconstruction of continents that have been a special care of the West.

The inherent strength of a country lies in its constructive thinkers and productive young men. An individual is not a finished product, something given. He is not something to be catered to, whose pleasures and possessions have to be

multiplied. It is true that the State-structure and its units, its laws, organisations and institutions exist for men rather that men exist for them. But they are not means for obtaining something for the individual, not even happiness. They are the means for creating individuals. Philosophies which regard doling out of some commodity, be it riches or happiness, to the individuals as the goal of society, are based on a misunderstanding of the true nature of individuality. An individual is not to be taken as a ready-made product, as something already there. It is only in the physical sense that the individual is given. Biologists may even contest this statement. In social and moral sense individuality has to be achieved. 'For it implies,' in the words of John Dewey, 'initiative, inventiveness, varied resourcefulness, assumption of responsibility in choice and belief and conduct.' Obviously these are achievements and not gifts to be distributed by society to its members. Socially and morally, therefore, a person wins his individuality. This takes place when he realises his capacities fully. The State is to provide opportunities for the realisation of latent capacities and dormant faculties of an individual. Happiness would follow automatically if the individual is helped in this process of attaining his individuality. The duty of a State is not, therefore, to make people happy; its duty is to allow them to develop their potentialities and harness them for the general good. Man is not made moral by coercion. He has to develop into a moral being. He has to seek an integration of reason and emotion, practice and imagination. It is only by creating individuals that moral improvement is made possible. The spiritual and moral emancipation of man, preservation and procreation of life in all its forms, mutal co-operation and perfect fidelity in all men's relationships and transactions—all these values can be realised by creating proper individuals. It is only proper individuals who, in the words of Bertrand Russell, would 'act so as to produce harmonious rather than discordant desires.' Salvation of man is possible only by

creating proper individuals.

The paramount need of the time in Pakistan is the creation of persons who have fully attained to their individuality. The future of a country is safe in the hands of its well-integrated young men. It has to be checked up if the system of education, institutions and universities in Pakistan are turning out socially and morally well-knit, forward-looking young men.

The stresses and strains prevalent in the country require a reconsideration of the methods in vogue for deciding problems of settlement and transfer of evacuee property. Procedure for issuing of tickets for pilgrimage, crosswords, lucky coupons, sale of country-made goods through attractive and tempting offers, prize bonds, etc., all curb the drive for creative activity. Darwin insisted that 'natural selection' and 'chance variations' determine the origin of species. This principle has been slightly modified and now 'chance selection' is the principle of success in life. Respect for individual is undermined, frustration spreads among people and a morbid type of manhood is produced in a society where 'chance selection' is the basis of distributive justice.

I have contended that life is a creative force. The highest specimen of this force is man who has potentialities of acquiring attributes of the Supreme Creator. He is a soldier of an ideal which he has to realise or to which he has to seek increasing approximation. To help him develop his capacities he needs a social structure based on the principles of equality, solidarity and freedom. Such a polity needs some further acquisition to guard itself against internal and external dissolution. This is the principle of might or power. In the modern world the secret of might lies in scientific and technological advancement. A State has to check up if its institutions, laws and organisations are helping its members to attain to their individuality. Such a philosophy of life is not the philosophy of Superman in the Nietzschean sense. Nietzsche's Superman is courageous but godless. The philo-

sophy of life I have suggested aims at the integration of man together with his moral and spiritual emancipation. It is to prepare him to become a permanent element in the scheme of Reality.

If I have to name the philosophy of life suggested above I should call it a philosophy of social and moral reconstruction. I have sought this reconstruction on the basis of Islam. It may sound odd to a westernised young man to talk of religion as forming the basis of philosophy of life for Pakistan. The desirability of such a philosophy is questioned all the more by the fact that the West has got its modern progressive outlook after its separation of Church from State, after its relegation of religion to the status of a private affair of the individual. These pseudo-cultural converts of the West forget that the gloom and catastrophe, which endanger the West and with it a major part of the globe, can be legitmately attributed to West's attitude of indifference to religion and its complete disregard of spiritual values which different religions jointly emphasise.

DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL SENTIMENT IN PAKISTAN

National sentiment is a social attitude, a commitment to given ends and means of attaining them. These ends comprise (i) national assets, (ii) national unity (iii) and national independence both political and economic. National assets include among other things traditions, language, culture, religion, history, etc. This sentiment is shared by a people by virtue of their common possession of certain peculiar characteristics, such as homeland, language, religion, history, traditions, culture and the will to live together. It expresses itself in devotion to, and advocacy of, national interests, unity and independence. There is no clear image in the mind of the masses as to what really Pakistan stands for. What is Pakistani culture? Has it roots in Islam or are these also to be traced back to the pre-historic civilizations of Mohanju Daro or Taxila? What are the traditions and the ideals around which national sentiment is to be organised? How are these to be symbolised and presented in concrete form to the society? An answer to these questions will help determine the development of national sentiment.

National sentiment, I believe, is a recent phenomenon in history. It replaces the old concept of partriotism where love of country implied loyalty to kings, rulers or generals or to a particular section of society but not to the nation. One has just to turn to the pages of history to find a confirmation of

this statement. One remembers how in the past battles were fought and won and loyalties were changed overnight. The love of country expressed itself in fidelity to a person—the ruler, the king. Nationalism, which is an outward expression of national sentiment, is of recent growth and is a product of certain historical, social and intellectual conditions. Its rise in different countries varies, therefore, with the conditions prevailing in those countries. It is inconceivable without the idea of popular sovereignty preceding, i.e. without transfer of sovereignty to the people. With the birth of nationalism, attention is turned away from kings, and their royal courts and is directed towards the life, language and arts of the people.

The complex cognitive-emotional dynamics of national sentiment has for its composite texture some of the oldest and primitive feelings of man which constitute important factors in the formation of social groups. There is a natural tendency in man to develop attachment for his birth-place or the place of his childhood, its surroundings, its climate, etc. He has preference for his own language, for he understands it and can use it quite effectively. He likes native customs, native food and prefers them to alien ones. He takes pride in his native characteristics and believes easily in their superiority. These feelings have always existed and correspond to certain facts, viz. territory, language, culture, traditions, common descent. They are some of the natural elements around which national sentiment is organised. But here they are entirely transformed, charged with new and different emotions and embedded in a broader context.

The mental life of man is as much dominated by ego-consciousness as it is by group-consciousness. The collective or group-consciousness can centre round entirely different groups, viz. the family, the class, the caste, the church, the State. Group-consciousness is never exclusive. Men are members of different groups at the same time. Among these groups there is generally one which is recognised as the

supreme and most important to which, therefore, in event of conflict of group-loyalties, the individual owes supreme loyalty. He identifies himself with the group and its existence.

In different periods of human history and in different civilisations, this loyalty has been given to different groups. In Europe, however, since the French Revolution, the nation demands the supreme loyalty of man. All men, and not simply certain individuals or classes, are drawn into this common loyalty and the Western civilisation is now dominated or till very recently has been dominated more by this one supreme group-consciousness, the nation.

Now the question is : What is a nation to which this extreme loyalty is due? If we follow the lead given by W.B. Pillsbury, we may define a nation as a 'group of individuals who feels itself one, is ready within limits to sacrifice the individual for the group advantage, that prospers as a whole, that has groups of emotions experienced as a whole, each of whom rejoices with the advancement and suffers with the losses of the group.' *(The Psychology of Nationality and Internationalism)*. It is obvious that what keeps the group together is one principle or some ideal to which the group feels organically related.

Some critics may object to this definition of nation and may like to point out that a nation is inconceivable without a State. I would simply draw their attention to the following. Jews were a nation before they got their State in 1948. Hindus and Muslims were two nations residing in the sub-continent before the partition without either having a state of their own.

Further, national consciousness is not necessarily based on racial or territorial unity or community of language or common political allegiance or religion. These factors are not essential for national consciousness but these may be and frequently have been of great importance as contributory causes. By general agreement one factor is of great importance, viz.

common traditions and customs, memories of a common past and aspirations for a common future. A nation, says Ernest Renan, is a spiritual principle constituted essentially of two things : 'one is the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories, the other is actual consent, the desire to live together, the will to continue to make the best use of invisible heritage received.' The expression of this will to live together is generally made by a synthesis of some of the constitutive elements, viz. common descent, language, territory, political entity, customs and traditions and religion. In case of Pakistan the constitutive elements of our nationality are our common history stretching a little over one thousand years, our customs and traditions going back to a still remoter past, to the days of Harappa civilisation and our religion—Islam.

The assertion that Islam alone is the basis of our nationhood is not a correct appraisal of facts. For if religion is the only cementing force to keep Pakistanis together, then why cannot it be said that Pakistanis, Iranians, Syrians and Egyptians can all be welded into one single form, pattern or distinct single nation, for they all profess the same religion. It is obvious that Muslims in different countries constitute separate nationalities. Pakistanis have a distinct identity which differentiates them from Muslims in other parts of the world. Our differentia with regard to other Muslim States is our rich heritage of customs and traditions, history and culture. A nation cannot live without its past. Its past constitutes its identity. A nation derives its strength from its past and seeks to enrich its glorious heritage. Pakistanis draw their inspiration from Islam, from their rich cultural heritage, their traditions and customs and their history. Pakistan came into existence because Indian Muslims resolved to live in a separate homeland where they may be able to have a polity which is through and through Islamic in spirit and be also able to preserve their noble heritage or traditions and culture.

I may now state in clear terms what I understand by national sentiment and how it is related to nationalism. National sentiment is a social attitude, a commitment to given ends and means of attaining them. With achievement of these ends comes national pride. These ends comprise (i) national assets, (ii) national unity and (iii) national independence, both political and economic. National assets include, among other things, customs, tradition, language, culture, religion, history, etc, This sentiment is shared by a people by virtue of their common possession of certain peculiar characteristics, such as homeland, language, religion, history, traditions, culture,and the will to live together. 'Nationalism signifies a movement which is the principle or agency, in the creation of nations or states,' says Professor William Thomson. It inspires groups or nationalities to become State. It is, in other words, an outward expression of national sentiment. National sentiment is the root while nationalism is its expression or fruit. In the words of Max Weber, Nationalism is 'devotion to, and advocacy of, national interests, unity and independence.'

Nationalism as understood in the West can be differentiated in two distinct forms. One is the classical French concept where the appeal for allegiance of the people is to the State or the government, as their State or their government, irrespective of race, colour or religion. The other nationalism is what one might call typically Germanic. Here blood and race are exalted as the basis of nationalism. Besides, Western nationalism is secular. It advocates a complete divorce between the church and the state. But nationalism in Pakistan is neither the one nor the other. Islam is an essential element of Pakistani nationalism. Racial affinity or superiority is not the basis of Pakistani nationalism and ethnically we are not a homogeneous whole.

Secular basis of nationalism in the West can be traced back to Christianity. 'Primitive Christianity was founded not as a political or civil unit,' says Iqbal, 'but as a monastic

order in a profane world having nothing to do with civil affairs and obeying the Roman authority practically in all matters. Such a thing could never happen in Islam, for Islam was from the very beginning a civil society . . . In Islam it is the same reality which appears as church looked at from one point of view and state from another . . . . Islam is a single unanalysable reality which is one or the other as your point of view varies.'

There is one point which I wish to elucidate before proceeding further. Muslim thinkers right from Jamaluddin Afghani up to Iqbal have preached against nationalism. The reason for this revolt perhaps is that Islam does not recognise distinction of colour, race, location as basis of society. Such a conception works against the concept of *Millat.* Nationalism in the West is now moving towards internationalism [commonwealth of nations, etc.]. Similarly Islam could be the basis of formation of a comity of Muslim nationalistic States. Iqbal's tirades against nationalism are based on the fact that nationalism 'draws upon the psychological forces of hate, suspicion and resentment which tend to impoverish the soul of man and close up his hidden sources of spiritual energy.' Iqbal recommends as a panacea to all ills of despairing humanity a return to religion understood in its highest form, a form in which religion is neither dogma nor priesthood nor ritual, but a direct contact with the ultimate source of all life and creativity leading to a biological renewal of man. To me it appears that nationalism is not basically averse to freedom of thought, expression and faith. Under nationalism the possibilities of moral and spiritual emancipation of people are not closed. And to say that nationalism draws upon the psychological forces of hate, suspicion and resentment is a one-sided statement and a negative way of saying that nationalism believes in competition. Competition does involve rivalry of a healthy or morbid kind; it has its pitfalls but it is a course universally recommended for the development of persons, institutions, societies and States.

Again, it should be remembered that social hostility is an inevitable product of social living and hostility to other groups is a condition of peace within the group. As members of a group, men strive to meet their individual needs. In order that these needs may be gratified, the members have to curtail their claims and observe definite rules of action. This results in renunciation and frustration of some of the impulses. Frustration leads to aggression which has to be suppressed. Repressed aggression is, therefore, the price one pays for being in society. Society itself allows certain legitimate occasions for the unleashing of aggression. 'In our own society we are allowed, for example, a limited right to compete for direct goals as by business manipulations, courtship or sport. We may kill in war-time, defensively, of course; and we have limited rights to derogate others, such as children by adults, women by men, . . . and some politicians by other politicians'.[1] Hostility to other groups is, therefore, a condition of peace within the group. 'Acts of war serve to drain off the suppressed tendencies to hate and attack.'

The growth of national sentiment in Pakistan is closely linked with, and springs out of, the freedom struggle which the Indian Muslims waged against the foreign rule. In fact, it can be traced back to factors which led to gradual development of political consciousness among the Indian Muslims. The political disintegration of Muslim society in the later half of the eighteenth century resulted in economic and social degeneration of the Muslims. They found their prestige gone, their laws replaced and their education devoid of all monetary value. The mainstay of the Muslims had been administration and as they began to lose their political power their economic condition grew worse. The history of Muslim India since 1857 is a story of slow but sustained effort to rehabilitate themselves socially, economically and politically. Sayyid Ahmad Khan's was the first attempt in that direction. The Indian Muslims had a distinct culture, tradition, history and religion and with the awakening of political consciousness a

concentrated effort was made to secure a safeguard of their national interests. In the beginning they favoured a unitary form of government with constitutional provisions for the protection of their assets. The indignation felt by Muslims at what they had experienced under the Hindu economic and political domination made them realise what their position would be in an undivided India where they would be, despite all assurances and safeguards, a permanent minority under a Hindu government. Thus Pakistan came into existence because, in spite of the safeguards which were from time to time offered to the Indian Muslim, the latter did not feel that their national interests would be safe in an undivided independent India. Pakistan emerged as an independent state in 1947 and at its very existence called for a united effort on the part of the people to save the country. The nation was called upon to meet the gigantic problems created by refugee exodus and also to defend the vast frontiers against an attack from India. It is true that the sense of nationhood is furthered by contact with and struggle against a foe. But fear as a cohesive force for welding a people into a strong nation is only a negative approach. If integration is based on fear, remove the fear and disintegration starts. National sentiment requires for its development some positive content around which it may be organised. But unfortunately the example set by the men at the helm of affairs in the country especially in the first eleven vears of its existence was most unenviable. Prior to the taking over by the revolutionary government,the political history of first eleven years of Pakistan's existence, with a few exceptions, is a story of power-seekers, job-hunters, exploiters and inefficient politicians. It caused great frustration among the people and distorted whatever image, no matter how sketchy, people had of their country. At every change of government, the masses heaved a sigh of relief and stood firmly by the new government installed in office. The one constructive step, taken by the pre-Martial Law Governments, towards

greater integration of the country, was the creation of one Unit, or the province of West Pakistan. The intelligentsia hailed this decision and its implementation.

The enthusiasm which the Pakistanis showed earlier for activities directed towards solidarity, unity and independence of the country is therefore now on the wane. People are indifferent and frustrated for they had looked to the establishment of an Islamic State in the country and what they got had not even the faintest resemblance to it. The phrase 'Islamic State' is a wide and vague one. People had only nebulous, hazy and subjective or individualistic notions of what the Islamic State of Pakistan would be. There is no clear objective picture in the mind of the masses as to what Pakistan really stands for. What is Pakistani culture? Has Pakistani culture its roots in Islam or are these also to be traced back to the prehistoric civilizations of Mohanju Daro and Taxila? What are the traditions and the ideals around which national sentiment is to be organised? How are these to be symbolised and presented in concrete form to the masses? These and allied questions baffle the thinking sections of our society. A stupendous effort will have to be made to develop national sentiment in Pakistan.

I make here a few observations as to the steps that may be taken to develop full national sentiment.

A great cohesive force which integrates Pakistanis is their religion—Islam. Islam as a polity stands for the creation and promotion of all real values—intrinsic and instrumental. Islam attaches very great sanctity to life in all its forms together with its preservation and procreation, health and efficiency. It enjoins upon Muslims the duty of moral self-culture, acquiring of knowledge and its expansion, freedom of thought and expression, of belief and worship. It emphasises the importance of social values, viz. mutual co-operation, perfect honesty and fidelity in all one's relationships with others, love as expressed in friendship and justice as expres-

sed in the principle of equality of consideration. A society which actively seeks to promote these values can have unity in its ideal form. It is the responsibiltiy of the State to provide conditions for the creation of such a society. It is Islam which can effectively weld Pakistanis into a unity of emotions, thoughts and actions.

Participation in National Activity. For the development of national sentiment it is imperative, I believe, that the masses should take interest and actively participate in national activity. They must be made to come out of their narrow shells of personal ends and helped to think in terms of national interest. They must have authentic existence and be allowd to attain to their individuality. Without large-scale education, it will be an idle hope that a time will come when even Pakistan's most backward citizens could be raised to the level of modern-minded, participating members of the State. An all-out drive should be made to provide educational facilities to all children of school-going age. At present less than 50% of primary-education age-group children get admission in schools and out of this number 50% and in some areas 75% of students drop out before they have completed two or three years of schooling (Report of the Commission on National Education). The result is that every year there is a substantial increase in the number of illiterate and unproductive people in the country. Top priority should be given to the liquidation of illiteracy.

It is to be ascertained how far education inspires young Pakistanis with national feelings. How far the message of the Holy Prophet, sayings of the great saints of Islam, heroic deeds of Muslim warriors, poems of Hali, Nazarul Islam, Khushhal Khan Khatak and Iqbal, musical compositions of Amir Khusrau, Bullhe Shah's *Kafis*, and folk-songs of Shah Abdul Latif find a niche in the hearts of teen-agers in the country. I was delighted to meet some students of a village primary school in Changa Manga forest where I had gone with my students two weeks ago. My students were having

a competition in reciting verses. These village boys (between nine and twelve years of age) joined the company and recited effortlessly a number of verses from Hali and Iqbal. One of my students observed that these boys had their roots in the soil. I wonder if students from public schools or semi-public schools could have the same feelings.

In the East the teacher has always been held, in the past, in very great esteem and respect. One regrets to note that the image of the teacher as a person who ruled over the hearts of his puplis and who commanded the greatest respect from the pupils at large, is breaking fast. The result is that talented persons are not being attracted to this profession and the task of nation-building is being impeded. Steps should be taken to improve the lot of the teacher. He should be raised economically and socially to a level that teaching profession may attract best brains in the country.

Promotion of National Language. National language has a definite role to play in welding a people into a unity. Regional languages and dialects do have a claim for protection and some patronage, but these should not be allowed to weaken the national language. Some hundred years ago Arabic and Persian occupied a very prominent place in our education. Our cultural history is associated with these languages. But with the change of political conditions we discarded first Arabic and then Persian. Their place has now to be taken up by Bengali and Urdu. These are now the languages of our culture. We need not evolve a new common language—that is a fantastic suggestion—but should concentrate on the development of the two national languages. Literary treasures of regional languages should be translated into national languages. Further steps should be taken to popularise Urdu in East Pakistan and Bengali in West Pakistan. If an average Pakistani were to gain knowledge and understanding of the two national languages, what a great cohesive force will this exercise on the people and weld them into a strong nation!

In this age human beings are constantly being influenced by what other people before them have thought and done or are now thinking and doing irrespective of long distance that separates them. Pakistan cannot remain aloof in this world of constant contact and impact. No nation can afford to sever itself completely from its past, nor can its culture remain absolutely pure. A living nation has a dynamic culture. It has its roots in its past but is open to influences in the changing world and assimilates fresh ideas that give it a new vigour and a reorientation. Our contacts with the West have resulted in the formation of a powerful section of society which advocates a blind following of Western traditions. The devotees of the West are not culture converts. They are much impressed by the great advancement that the West has made in science and technology and in providing material comforts. Some rightly recommend forthright adoption of Western social practices and institutions. Others are diehard conservatives and are opposed to introduction of any change. We have, therefore, to work ourselves through this problem of building up unity and stability in national life. A great responsibility rests on the intelligentsia of the country. We can live in the modern world and yet discover and preserve our abiding values and institutions, work out a system of social life that will be in keeping with the modern world and yet protect what we cherish most.

FOOT NOTE

1. Miller and Dollard, *Social Learning and Imitation,* p. 272 .

PHILOSOPHY IN PAKISTAN

Pakistan is a young country but its philosophical traditions extend back to over one thousand years to the days of Arab conquest of Sind, nay they recede still back into the archaic past. The unconscious element forms an important part of an individual's mind. It also forms an integral part of the mind of a community or a people. Iqbal rightly observes that a nation moves forward with the entire weight of its past.

The philosophical traditions in Pakistan were given a definite shape with the establishment of the Pakistan Philosophical Congress. The Philosophical Congress provided a platform where philosophers from the two wings of the country, as also from other parts of the globe, assembled every year to discuss various movements in modern thought. The Congress afforded thinkers in Pakistan an opportunity to project the philosophical basis of the ideology of Pakistan, the philosophy of life which our country advocates, Islamic values etc. This helped the thinkers in Pakistan to delineate the various facets of the ideology of Islam and their prominence in the moral habitude or the ethos of our people. The late Professor M. M. Sharif and some of his colleagues especially Professor Q. M. Aslam, Professor C. A. Qadir, Mr. B. A. Dar, Dr. G.C. Dev and Mrs. Akhtar Imam deserve thanks of the nation for setting the Pakistan Philosophical Congress on sound footing and guiding and chanellizing its activities to secure national integration and to project the Philosophy of the country.

In tonight's discussion we propose to limit ourselves to a discussion of the philosophy of four thinkers viz. Iqbal, M. M. Sharif, Dr. G. C. Dev and Professor C. A. Qadir. Of course there are other thinkers who could be profitably included in the list but in view of the short time at our disposal we are restricting ourselves to these four only. Before we start discussing philosophers individually, it appears proper to state a few general characteristics of the philosophy of Pakistan.

The chief characteristic of the philosophy of Pakistan is that it is theistic both in spirit and in content. All notable thinkers of Pakistan have, with some variations, subscribed to theism. Pakistan has a long tradition of sufism. Sheikh Ali Hajvari, popularly known as Data Sahib, who lies buried in Lahore, was the first person to write a treatise on sufism. The saints and sages have been preaching, through the ages, in the areas now comprising Pakistan, different sufi traditions. Sufism has a great impact on our literary traditions. You turn to Urfi, Amir khusro, Mir Taqi Mir, Ghalib, Bulley Shah, Waris Shah, Baba Farid and you find how their works are steeped in sufi traditions. Despite the hold of sufism on public mind, pantheism or the doctrine of wahdat-ul-Wajud has not found favour with the Pakistani thinkers. In some quarters it is urged that Iqbal was in the beginning of his career an advocate of pantheism. The basis for this assertion is a certain letter of McTaggart who, on reading Asrar-e-Khudi, was much influenced by Iqbal's philosophy of self and wrote that while in England Iqbal made him believe that he was a pantheist. Even Dr. Javid Iqbal in his introductory article to a collection of Iqbal's essays entitled "Iqbal, the Poet of Tomorrow" subscribes to this view and further adds that in his note-book (Stray Reflections), the poet philosopher admits that Wordsworth saved him from atheism and since Wordsworth was a pantheist Iqbal must have been for some period at least, a pantheist. This is hardly a sound argu-

ment. Wordsworth's Ode to Immortality and Iqbal's poem on Glow Worm remind one of strong influence of Plato on these poets; yet we can hardly describe Wordsworth as a camp follower of Plato. And the title that Iqbal gives to Plato in "Javid Nama" shows in what measure he held the great Greek Philosopher. Even in his famous lectures on Reconstruction Iqbal appears to relish in laying threadbare the inherent weaknesses in the systems of Plato and other Greek thinkers.

Another characteristic of the Philosophy of Pakistan is that the opposition between reason and intuition finds no place in it. Iqbal, Khalifa Abdul Hakim and Dr. G. C. Dev have laboured to award equal status to the two modes of apprehension and regard them as complementary processes. Iqbal in fact overshoots the mark when he takes Ghazali to task on this account.

The third feature of our contemporary thought is that in the last decade there is a marked shift in it to analytical thought. This is especially true of the contributions of the late Professor M. M. Sharif but more so it appears in the works of Professor C. A. Qadir, at present Iqbal Professor of Philosophy, at the Punjab University. To Professor Qadir goes the credit of presenting Logical Positivism and Existentialism in lucid form in the country but what merits greater consideration, is his firm approach to a defence of the language of religion, in terms of its meaningfulness. With these preliminaries we now turn to a brief survey of the thought of four thinkers whom we propose to take up during the rest of the time at our disposal.

IQBAL

Iqbal is a spirtitualist and a pluralist. He regards God as the ultimate basis of all existence. He arrives at this conclusion through an analysis of conscious experience. He further finds support for his thesis in concepts of matter and life

as developed in modern physics and modern biology. An analysis of experience reveals that life is pure duration. There is nothing static in our inner life : all is constant mobility, a perpetual flow in which there is no halt or resting place. Constant change, however, is unthinkable without time.– Conscious existence thus means life in time. He further asserts that pure time is an organic whole in which the past is not left behind, but is moving alongwith, and operating in, the present. Pure time is not a mechanical repetition of homogeneous moments. No two moments in the life of an individual can be exactly alike. 'To exist in real time is not to be bound by the fetters of serial time, but to create it from moment to moment and to be absolutely free and original in creation.'

After having established the creativeness of conscious existence and life, Iqbal proceeds on anology and infers that the universe is a free creative movement. 'The universe is not a thing but an act.'

From the analysis of conscious experience, Iqbal further concludes that ultimate reality is pure duration in which thought, life and purpose inter-penetrate to form an organic unity. Since life is not a chaotic but an organising principle, Iqbal conceives it as a centralizing ego. He perceives a rising note of egohood in the universe. There are different grades of egohood. 'It is the degree of the intuition of 'I-amness", says Iqbal, 'that determines the place of a thing in the scale of being . . . . Our 'I-amness' is dependent and arises out of the distinction between the self and the not-self'. But to the ultimate self the not-self does not present itself as a confronting other. What we call nature or the not-self is only a fleeting moment in the life of God. HIs I-amness is independent, elemental and absolute'. Self gets expression through self-revelation. Just as a finite self reveals itself in character, similarly the Infinite Self or God expresses itself in a uniform mode of behaviour. 'Nature is to the Divine self as character is to the human self.' Nature therefore is capable

of growth and expansion. It is finite but boundless. Its boundlessness is potential and not actual. Creation is, thus, a continuous process

یہ کائنات ابھی ناتمام ہے شاید   کہ آرہی ہے دمادم صدائے کن فیکون

(This Universe is, as yet, far from being complete,
For the echo of the Eternal Be is continuously being heard)

God or the ultimate reality is both immanent and transcendent in nature. Man, the finite ego, is to strive to assimilate divine attributes. His highest development is not a slipping into the Infinite but a bold affirmation of his self in His presence. An individual who shows such a degree of self integration is Mard-e-Momin or Insan-e-Kamil. Ethically speaking, the ideal is to strive for that degree of self-integration which helps the individual to have perfect composure and self-possession in the presence of the Infinite Ego.

M. M. SHARIF

Professor M. M. Sharif during his life time developed a synthetic and comprehensive philosophy of his own which he named Dialectical Monadism. It was G. M. Leibnz in 1714 who first conceived of the concept of force to be the basic cosmological principle that exists in the atoms which he calls monads. The monads are then the soul atoms which are not static but alive and active. Professor Sharif's philosophy is in line with the pluralistic traditions in modern thought for he believes in the reality of monads which are the finite centres of experience.

Professor Sharif analyses experience as a complex of thought and the object thought of. Experience comprises both the subject and the object or what he calls the base-entity and the basic entity. The two play an active part in experience.

Artistotle in his metaphysics emphasised the object or the basic entity as the cause of sensation-complexes. Kant had, on the other hand, said that as the categories are universal they could not be derived from physical objects. They are thus the contributions of the perceiving mind (the base-entity). The categories have a universal and necessary meaning of their own that can be apprehended independently by the subject without any reference to the experience of physical objects. They are, however, holds Professor Sharif, not the contributions of the subject alone because as characteristics of physical objects these categories are relatively independent of the subject's will. One cannot, for example, apprehend physical objects, the spatio-temporal sensation-complexes having qualities, quantities, relations, at one's will. According to Professor Sharif, knowledge is the result of inter-action between both the subject and the object. Both factors, the base-entity and the basic entity, play a vital role in experience and to deny or exaggerate the role of any one of these factors would only lead to a distorted view of reality.

Knowledge about our own selves as base-entities, Professor Sharif thinks, is direct, intuitive and synthetic. My knowledge of my self reveals that I am a self-identical, active, persistent, and self-conscious centre of energy having a free will working within the limits of the categories and their manifold. This centre of energy he calls monad and it is related to the manifold of other monads starting from the inorganics to the human individual. The higher Monads are immanent in, and yet transcend, the lower ones.

Professors Sharif believes that the process or the activity that takes place within the monads is dialectical. The dialectical process, according to Hegel, proceeds from one idea of thesis to its anti-thesis, both of which continue to form a synthesis. Hegel, of course, conceived of this dialectical process in a purely rational or conceptual sense. Karl Marx thought it to be a purely material process. For Professor Sharif, however, the dialectical movement is a Monadic move-

ment, a movement of being essentially like my self. The dialectical process is a movement of the self through the complementary not-self and then to the synthesis of both in a more developed self. The dialectical process is basically teleological from the lower or the organic to the higher human level. The lower or the organic level is not a conscious level but at the higher or human level it becomes conscious and is thus explicitly teleological. Man creates ideals for himself. There are, however, limitations in his way which he is constantly trying to overcome. Man thus creates ideals which involves the absorption of the not-self into himself and which then results in the realization of the ideal. Such a dialectical process goes on in man without end. Man has a strong desire to shed his imperfections and attain to perfection and, since the latter is not attained, the dialectical process goes on endlessly.

The dialectical process constitutes the very existence of each monad and is a value to which it tries to give a richer content. The categories and values are immanent in the finite monads but, because they are spiritual entities, they transcend every one of them. God is the unity behind all values and is a Monad among all monads. God is immanent in all finite monads but He, being spiritual, transcends them all. The question regarding the existence of God, Professor Sharif contends, cannot be decided on purely rational grounds and is primarily a matter of faith. "Since the Absolute is the highest ideal of our will and in His contemplation our feelings are fully appeased, and His idea is the highest reach of our imagination, we develop the faith that the Absolute is not merely a real on the plane of thought but is the ultimate real as being."

DR. G. C. DEV

Professor G.C. Dev, at present head of the Department of Philosophy, Dacca University, can rightly be termed as

the philosopher of synthesis. The synthesis of reason and faith, or of matter and spirit is, what he tries to work for, In the preface to his book Idealism : a New Defence and a New Application, he writes, "On the basis of a new orientation of the time-old idealist philosophy, I have made in it a defence of one-world and visualised the future of the common man in a synthetic philosophy that finds the truth of matter in spirit and of spirit in matter." Professor Dev lays more emphasis on the practical aspect of philosophy than on its theoretic aspect for he holds "that world's best philosophy is to my mind more an answer to human needs as expressed in human history than a product of subjective fancy of select individuals." In his Presidential Address delivered at the 10th session of the Pakistan Philosophical Congress he observed: "——my approach to philosophy has been more through the heart than through the head as is generally desired in our times——Rightly or wrongly, I have been used to look at philosophy with the magnifying glass of a lover and not with the dissecting surgical knife of an analyst. That temperamental preference has its dangers, but for me it has been a most rewarding experience without which life will not be worth living."

Dr. Dev regards unity as the essence of spirit and plurality as the essence of matter. That which divides and distintegrates is matter and that which integrates and unites is spirit. They are the two inseparable aspects of the same reality. Reason, the objective reason, by an analysis of normal experience, can give us an insight into the material aspect of reality. It may end in materialism as its only philosophy and an attachment for material values as the sum and substance of its ethics. Left at this stage, reason is sceptical in its attitude to spirit and indifferent to spiritual values. But reason has a subjective role too which hankers after unity. In religious experience reason attains to its ideal of unity and can have a peep into the nature of spirit and thus a new dimension of reality dawns before the imagination of the

philosopher. "The nucleus of a sound and sobre philosophy is neither materialism nor spiritualism as they are commonly understood, but a happy merger of both." Dr. Dev discovers in Islam a happy synthesis of both spirit and matter so beautifully expressed in the phrase *'Din and Dunya'*. It is this philosophy of synthesis of spirit and mater which can save humanity from destruction. Since the essence of spirit is unity and that of matter plurality it is only the perception of essential unity which can bring men closer together and thus prepare them to accept the principle of peaceful co-existence.

C. A. QADIR

Professor C. A. Qadir, Iqbal Professor of Philosophy, at the University of the Punjab, is a notable figure in the fraternity of living philosophers of today. In Pakistan he was for a long time regarded as the sole champion of Logical Positivism, a movement in contemporary thought which started in the twenties in Europe. A marked shift in his writings to existentialism and to a defence of religion became visible in the early sixties. His articles on 'Language and Religion', 'Psycho-analysis and Religion', 'God and Logic', 'Question of the Pot' and 'God and War' contain the fruit of his mature thought on religion, its role in establishing peace and a defence of religion in the context of contemporary philosophic thought—a task which had been admirably taken up by Iqbal in his Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam. Professor Qadir rightly points out that the language of religion is multi-dimensional. It is sometimes the language of analogy, sometimes of obedience or faith, sometimes of encounter. The meaningfulness of religious discourse has, therefore, to be determined with reference to the context in which it occurs. This context is different from the contexts of scientific and mathematical languages. The criteria are also different. . . . . . There is no need to suppose that truth is synonymous with

deductive or inductive reasoning and the results of that reasoning. There are countless ways in which truth is arrived at in practical life and to confine it to just two ways is a great injustice. Religious truths are arrived at differently, with the help of criteria which are different from the scientific and logical ones. 'Religious language is essentially interpretative and attempts at literalism are doomed to failure'.

In his article 'God and war' which forms a chapter in the Critique of War edited by Robert Ginsberg, Professor Qadir has made out a cogent case for tackling the problems of war on the basis of some of the fundamental principles of Islamic ideology. He says 'the theocracy of Islam recognizes neither church nor priesthood, it's simply an assertion of the sovereignty of God, which in turn is the sovereignty of values ...... The idea of sovereignty of God is .... very useful for peace. As observed already, the sovereignty of God is, in fact, the sovereignty of values, or what amounts to the same thing, the sovereignty of man, for values have no meaning except in a human situation that is enriched and ennobled by their adoption. This idea stresses the accountability of man to the ultimate reality which is essentially good."

From the sovereignty of God follows the idea of the brotherhood of man. Oneness of God implies oneness of mankind. A sound political outlook can harbour no racial, geographical or materialistic conceptions.

Thus we find that thinkers in our country have theism as a pivotal point in their thought. With God as the supreme creator and also the locus of all ultimate values the requirements of a religiously oriented society are fully met. From the unity of God follows the unity, equality and freedom of all men. Such a conception alone can bring mankind closer together and make universal peace possible.

IQBAL ON GOD

In his discussions on God Iqbal was supposed to argue on two points. These are (i) existence of God and (ii) nature of God. Regarding the first point, Iqbal's philosophical approach is almost negative. Iqbal points out quite convincingly weaknesses inherent in the classical arguments which scholastic philosophy furnishes in defence of existence of God. These arguments, the cosmological, the teleological and the ontological fail to establish the existence of an Infinite Being because these regard thought as an agency which is foreign to its object. Thought, in these arguments, is not formative of the being of the object about which it thinks. The Infinite thus reached is limited by the thought which contemplates it. Iqbal believes that at the level of God thought has to be conceived as an agency which is formative of the being of its object i.e. thought and being constitute a unity. Even if we grant this premise, the existence of God is not established. It only shows that if there were such a thought,it would not be limited by its object. But it is not an existential proposition. It is only a truth of reason and belongs to the sphere of the possible.

Iqbal admits that knowledge as applied to the finite ego always means discursive knowledge and at this level the ego views an object as its other existing per se.[1] Such a movement of thought will always establish a finite and a limited god, a being which cannot be an object of worship for any true religion of the world. Iqbal, however, warns us that

thought has a deeper movement in knowledge and is capable of reaching the Infinite. "In its deeper movement, however, thought is capable of reaching an immanent Infinite in whose self-unfolding movement the various finite concepts are merely moments. In its essential nature, then, thought is not static; it is dynamic and unfolds its internal infinitude in time like the seed which, from the very beginning, carries within itself the organic unity of the tree as a present fact. Thought is, therefore, the whole in its dynamic self-expression appearing to the temporal vision as a series of definite specifications which cannot be understood except by a reciprocal reference. Their meaning lies not in their self-identity, but in the larger whole of which they are the specific aspects, This larger whole is, to use a Quranic metaphor, a kind of "Preserved Tablet," which holds up the entire undetermined possibilities of knowledge as a present reality, revealing itself in serial time as succession of finite concepts appearing to reach a unity which is already present in them It is in fact the presence of the total Infinite in the movement of knowledge that makes finite thinking possible".[2]

In the history of Western Philosophy it was Leibniz who described a contingent proposition as infinitely analytical. He based his distinction between truths of reason and truths of fact on the finitely analytical and infinitely analytical character of propositions expressing truths of reason and truths of fact respectively. Truths of reason are necessary propositions such as we have in mathematics and logic. These are not existential propositions and are concerned with the sphere of the possible. All truths of reason are true necessarily and their truth rests on the principle of contradiction. Truths of fact are contingent propositions. They are not necessary propositions and their opposite is possible. As a principle of explanation for the existence of contingent facts Leibniz introduced the principle of sufficient reason and the principle of perfection. There must be sufficient reason for any event to happen as it does happen and not otherwise. And

out of the undetermined possibilities of existence of the possible worlds God's choice of creating the existing world was moved by the consideration of the principle of perfection i.e. of the best possible world. Further Leibniz thought that all propositions about reality were of subject-predicate form. Now in case of contingent propostion, Leibniz held, the predicate assigned to the subject one of the modes of its being. The subject, for Leibniz, was a windowless monad which could receive nothing from outside nor any influence could ever generate from it which could influence other monads. All undetermined possibilities of an individual monad were always present to an Infinite Mind. If Baber conquerred India it was indeed comprised in the notion of Baber. Thus, for Leibniz, a contingent proposition attributed to a subject one of its possible modes of being. All the unrealised possibilities of a monad can be known to the Infinite Monad but these possibilities reveal themselves gradually to the finite monad. Since monads were windowless, no interaction between monads was possible. The life of a monad had thus to be conceived as a self-revelation. Their mutual cooperation and adjustment was explained on the principle of pre-established harmony. The possibilities of being of a monad, because of its being windowless, were contained in its very concept. Thus a contingent proposition, though not necessary, was analytical in the sense that all possible predicates of a subject were contained in its very concept. Only the analysis required was infinite. Each monad, for Leibniz, was the universe in miniature and embraced the Infinite.

The deeper movement of thought to which Iqbal refers pertains to truths of fact, to contingent propositions. About thought, Iqbal furhter says" . . . . . . its real function is to synthesize the elements of experience by employing categories suitable to the various levels which experience presents. It is as much organic as life. . . . ." In conscious experience life and thought penetrate each other. They form a unity. Tho-

ught, therefore, in its true nature is identical with life".[4] 'The undertermined possibilities of knowledge' are thus for Iqbal the undertermined possibilities of existence of things. "The undertermined possibilities of becoming of reality" are contained in an ego as open possibilities. Iqbal assumes that all propositions about reality are of subject-predicate form. The predicate simply attributes to a subject, one of the infinite possiblities of its being at any one particular moment. Where Iqbal differs from Leibniz is that he grants inter-action between egos or monads. The life of an ego is a constant interaction between the ego and its environment. The future states of an ego exist only as open possibilities of its modes of being.

You record your destiny with your own pen.
Your brow has been left blank by the Divine Pen.[5]

Since, for Iqbal the egos are not windowless but are in constant give and take relationship with one another and with the environment, each realises the undetermined possibilities of its being as a result of this interaction. In terms of the subject-predicate form of proposition the possibilities of being of an ego which could be predicated to it are infinite and all these in a way belong to the ego. It is the realization of any one set of properties which fashions the ego as an individual. The realization of one set of properties rules out the possibility of realizing another set of properties. This, in a way, curbs the freedom of the ego. For Sartre, the emergence of empirical ego is an act of bad faith because consciousness, in thus creating the empirical ego, conceals from iteself its infinite freedom. Infinite freedom, if retained in its infinity, will make action impossible, for an action is nothing but realization of one particular course out of the unlimited number of possibilities available to an ego at any one particular moment. For Iqbal, however, this limitation on one's freedom is an act of free choice.

We may note that contingent propositions are always about events and happenings in the spatio-temporal order.

The deeper movement of thought which is identical with life, synthesises various stages of life and presents them in the form of propositions. The propositions must be either true or false. As G. Ryle points out : "It is not extrinsic but intrinsic to a thought to be true or false, or to have 'objective reference'. When I judge, I judge that something is the case. If it is not the case, then I have misjudged; and the allegation that I have misjudged implies that something else is the case. In saying what we think, we do not just signal what is going on in our head; we describe or else we misdescribe reality".[6]

Life, Iqbal emphasises, believes in the principle of individuation. It manifests itself in the form of egos or monads. The deeper movement of thought which is to grasp life in its wholeness is the movement of the appreciative self—a self which we occupy in moments of profound meditation.[7] Conscious existence at the level of appreciative self is pure duration i.e. a non-successional change. Inner experience is uniquely individual; it is confined to the subject. Even if we multiply such experiences of all sentient creatures it would imply enjoyment by each of its own duration. To regard my own inner experience as connected with or dependent upon "a wider whole" (in the sense of Infinite) is something to which no clue is furnished by thought at any level—appreciative or efficient. In fact no rational proof can be furnished about the existence of God. Iqbal's attempt to make the deeper movement of thought as confronting the ego with the Infinite belies all verification. Truths of fact must submit to verification to be cogent and workable.

(ii) As to the nature of God, Iqbal's approach is routed through an analysis of conscious experience. Making conscious experience the pivot of his reasoning, Iqbal interprets matter and life objectively but later, on the analogy of conscious experience, conceives all forms of sense experience as indicative of a spiritual character of Reality. Such an approach opens him to the charge of anthropomorphism which he partly admits.

". . . . since our conscious experience is the only point of departure for all knowledge, we cannot avoid the limitations of interpreting facts in the light of our own inner experience. An anthropomorphic conception is especially unavoidable in the apprehension of life ; for life can be apprehended from within only".[8] But he, at the same time, warns us : "To interpret this life (God) as an ego is not to fashion God after the image of man. It is only to accept the simple fact of experience that life is not a formless fluid, but an organising principle of unity. . . ."[9]

Iqbal thus relies on analogy in explaining the nature of God. It may be pointed out that the term analogy is here used not in the sense of a mode of inference but in the sense of "resemblance" or "basis of comparison" for explaining meanings of religious concepts. The implication is that the words used for describing the nature and attributes of God have been used neither univocally (i.e. with exactly the same meaning) nor equivocally (i.e. with completely different and unrelated meaning) but analogically. All predications of God are analogical. Let us explain the meaning of analogical predication by taking a simple example. On observing the behaviour of a dog to its master we may say that the dog is faithful. We may also describe a man as faithful. There is, however, a world of difference between the behaviour of a man which earns him the adjective faithful and the behaviour of a dog. We are, therefore, not using the word univocally. We are using it analogically to show that at the level of dog there is a certain quality of behaviour which corresponds to what at the human level we call faithfulness. But human faithfulness differs from canine faithfulness. There is thus difference within similarity and similarity within difference and it is this fact which is the basis for using the term analogically in two different contexts.

Iqbal proceeds by analysing experience at the level of sense perception i.e. matter, life and consciousness. His analysis of conscious experience reveals that life is pure

duration, a creative flow. Now what is true of conscious experience is also true of matter or the universe (a structure of events possessing the character of a continuous creative flow). "On the analogy of inner experience, then the universe is a free, creative movement".[10] Iqbal applies his analysis of conscious experience analogically to both matter and God. "A critical interpretation of the sequence of time as revealed in ourselves had led us to a notion of the Ultimate Reality as pure duration in which thought, life and purpose interpenetrate to form an organic unity. We cannot conceive this unity except as the unity of a self—an all embracing concrete self. . . . . of such a self it is impossible to form an adequate conception".[11] The main difficulty in such an approach is posed by the question "In what way are the properties of human beings and God supposed to be analogous? You experience matter, life and consciousness. You get in these areas help from Physics, Biology and Psychology. You study them independently and the analogical use of language may help you in interpreting the facts of matter and life "in the light of your own inner experience." In describing the nature of God analogy can help if we could first know God independently. Only then can we answer the question stated above. In analysing the concept of matter Iqbal is quite objective. He maintains this attitude in his discussions on life and consciousness as well. The analysis of the three levels of sense experience is later on reduced, on the analogy of inner experience, to pure duration. The same procedure has not been observed while dilating on the nature of God. When we say that a certain expression X symbolizes the nature of God better than another expression Y we presuppose that we know God. For otherwise, we shall not be in a position to make such a judgement. This has, however, not been done, for Iqbal has simply confined himself to a study of sense experience and God is not an object open to sense perception.

II

A logical analysis of Iqbal's argument brings out the weaknesses inherent in any attempt to furnish rational proof of existence of God. Besides the three levels of sense experience which Iqbal critically examines, there is another type of experience which is termed religious experience, the case for which Iqbal has very forcefully projected. It is this experience which needs a careful study by modern students of religion for our knowledge of God. The subjective nature of this experience is very much emphasised but this does not pose an insurmountable difficulty in the way of its study and communication. What is urgently needed is the formulation of a criterion to distinguish a genuine religious experience from a spurious one. When Berkeley was questioned that if things are ideas how can one distinguish between ideas, illusions and hallucination, he came out with a criterion. To know whether an experience is hallucinatory one has simply to check whether the sense-experience in question belonged to a family. In doing this, we relate our sense-experience to one another. A visual object can be confirmed by touch. In case of religious experience, perhaps, tactual sensations cannot operate. Sound sensations, however, in some cases of revelation accompany visual phenomenon. "It is not for man that God should speak with him, but by vision or from behind a veil".[12] Iqbal held that a genuine religious experience can stand both pragmatic and intellectual tests. In the following verses of the Quran an outline of criterion for religious experience can be discerned.

"By the star when it setteth, your *compatriot erreth not, nor is he led astray. Neither speaketh he from mere impulse.* The Quran is *no other than the revelation revealed to him*

. . . .

His heart falsified not what he saw".[12]

The communicability of religious experience needs special attention of students of religion. Is not all experience subjective and unique in a way ? Let us approach this problem through a study of our experience of the external world.

Our experience of the external world as experience is smeared with subjectivity. It is as much private and personal as the experience of the inner world. At the common sense level we regard "the experience without" as caused by objects existing in the external world. This was the position assumed by Descartes and Locke. Berkeley's analysis of matter led him to believe that matter was ideas and ideas could only exist in a mind. But ideas, (things) being passive could not act on spirit *i.e.* cause any sensation in us. The passivity of matter or ideas Berkeley had accepted uncritically from Locke. Some of the ideas in us, Berkeley argued, were produced by other minds. You speak and I hear; you communicate and I understand. You being an active spirit or mind could act on me. Hence sensations in me were produced by some active spirit. The regularity and orderliness with which sensations about the external world or nature were produced in us indicated the great wisdom and power of the spirit which caused them and Berkeley termed that spirit God. Thus it was God who produced sensations in my mind. The world of matter was, in fact, for Berkeley, ideas in the mind of God. Hume confining himself to a more rigorous analysis of experience, could not affirm the cause of sensations. An impression can be compared only with an impression. We cannot compare impressions with things. We only get impressions and cannot contact things. Thus, for Hume, the cause of sensations could not be known. Experience furnished no clue as to the being and nature of that which could be regarded as the cause of sensations or impressions. Hume held that all experience whether of the external world or of the inner world was only passing states of consciousness. Hume's position committed him to solipsism.

Since what is available to a subject are his own sense-data, the question how can a number of private sense-data conceivably make up a common public world emerges as a relevant issue. Must we say with Stace that a theory of knowledge be necessarily based upon the individual's private experience. In his Theory of Knowledge and Existence, Stace observes: "I cannot experience anything except my own experience. I can see my red but I can never see yours. I can feel a pain in my leg, but I can never feel the pain in your leg. I can feel my emotion but not yours. Even if your anger infects me, so that I feel it in sympathy with you, it is yet, in so far as I feel it, my anger, not yours. I can never be you, nor you me. I cannot see through your eyes, nor you through mine. Even if you can telepathically transfer a mental state, say an image, from your mind to mine, yet when I become aware of it, it is then my image and not yours. Even if, as some think, I can directly perceive your mind, without having to infer it from your body, still this perception of your mind will then be to me my perception, my experience.

"All knowledge", he continues, "all philosophy must be based upon experience. And from whose experience can I begin except from my own? Whatever belief I hold on whatever subject must be either a datum of my consciousness or else an inference or mental construction which I base upon my data. If I accept a scientific belief on your authority, this belief must be an inference which I make from the sounds (words) I hear you utter, and from my belief in your repute as a scientific authority. Whatever I believe rests in the end upon the data of my own consciousness. Therefore all knowledge must have had its beginning in my own self-enclosed personal experience. This original solipsism is utterly unescapable except by prejudice or refusing to see it."[13]

Prof. Ayer has pointed out[14] that real difficulty with Stace is that he fails to see how to make the transition from

the individual's "self-enclosed personal experience" to the common, social world. "If we describe personal experience, say of pain, as numerically different from the pain of every other person then there is no doubt that the proposition 'I can never feel the pain in your leg' is analytically true proposition, for it is a matter of convention that any pain that I feel is numerically different from any pain that is felt by you. It is not, however, logically necessary that all the pains that a person feels should be located in his own body".[15] Spinoza's account of sympathetic pains is an instance in point. We do frequently utter such sentences as "Mr. President you are expressing the feelings of the whole house ——". Again "I like him for we have so many tastes in common." When a mother feels the pain in her son's body, her pain is numerically different from the pain of her son. This is true, but it does not mean that she can never share the grief or joy of her son. We do share feelings and communicate to one another. If one is completely confined to one's own private world he would have no reason to believe in the existence of any knowledge besides his own. Earlier in the history of philosophy, Descartes had taken such a position and found it difficult to come out of his own shell except through his reliance on a principle (veracity of God) which his own position had, in fact, ruled out.

The real problem whether we talk of the experience of the external or the internal world is that of description i.e. the problem of communication. The conditions which make mutual understanding possible are partly intra-linguistic and partly extra-linguistic. The intra-linguistic condition may be expressed as follows. Agreement must be reached about the rules according to which we use the words of our language i.e. we must speak the same language. The extra-linguistic condition may be formulated as under: "We should be so constituted that we can speak the same language and this depends partly on the fact that our bodies are similarly constituted and have the same sense organs and reactions to

stimuli, and partly on the fact that our subjective experiences and our bodily expressions regularly go together". I can teach the meaning of feeling cold to a person by taking him into a cold room and telling him that he is feeling cold. I rely here on what has been described as the extra-linguistic condition of communication. The bodily expressions of cold, shivering, contraction of blood vessels, paleness etc. go with the subjective experience of feeling cold. It is this correlation between bodily expression and the subjective experience which makes it possible to learn the words which describe experience. Prof. Ayer goes even a step further and says that even if no manifestations of feeling come from a person's body, there could be other psychological grounds for believing that the pain was felt by him. A description of pain by A may be characteristic of pain of B and consequently B may be able to affirm that he too had the experience.[16] Here certainly the intra-linguistic condition is the main basis for communication of purely subjective experiences. We may further add that a certain degree of intelligence is also needed for communicating experiences by words. Animals lack that degree of intelligence which is needed for making abstractions and hence communication by conventional symbols is not possible for the animals. We may here note that ordinarily we communicate our subjective experiences on account of the definite bodily phenomena which accompany these experiences for, on this fact depends the possibility of our learning the words for these experiences.

If there are subjective experiences which do not accompany any marked bodily processes the communication of such experiences is not possible in a common language. (The psychological description of an experience to another presupposes that intra-linguistic condition of communication does exist) An experience can be communicated to another only if the other is capable of experiencing it. You cannot teach a born blind man how to pick out red objects from among coloured objects. He cannot have that experience,

hence no communication with him on that point. A subjective experience which is without any extra-linguistic condition is incommunicable. It may, however, be recorded in "monologic" language. A child makes use of a monologous language when he just starts learning to speak conventional symbols. Only the child's mother understands her son's "monologic" language.

Religious experience, Iqbal rightly points out, is a genuine experience. It has been reported from times immemorial and the contribution which it has made to the moral and intellectual fund of the world cannot be questioned. The problem that arises here is: Do the mystics use "monologic" language for recording their experiences.? We have said above that even purely subjective experiences can be communicated if intra-linguistic and extra-linguistic conditions of communication are met with. The incommunicability of religious experience is often stressed, yet it is claimed that the experience has a cognitive content. So far as the content of any subjective experience is concerned it is numerically different from the experience of any other person yet by a certain verbal convention these experiences are communicated and this fact presents no difficulty.

Iqbal very much wished that language used by Sufis be remoulded to become intelligible to students of religion. The language of Sufis may have intra-linguistic and extra-linguistic conditions which the novice and his preceptor understand and on the basis of which they discuss about their experiences with each other. Consider in this connection, as quoted by Iqbal, the observations made by Sheikh Ahmad of Sarhind on hearing the mystic experience of one Abdul Momin.

The experience of Abdul Momin was described thus:

'Heavens and Earth and God's throne and Hell and Paradise have all ceased to exist for me. When I look round I find them nowhere. When I stand in the presence of somebody I see nobody before me: nay even my own being is

lost to me. God is infinite. Nobody can encompass Him; and this is the extreme limit of spiritual experience. No saint has been able to go beyond this'.

On this the Sheikh replied :

'The experience which is described has its origin in the ever-varying life of the "Qalb", and it appears to me that the recipient of it has not yet passed even one-fourth of the innumerable "Stations" of the "Qalb". The remaining three-fourths must be passed through in order to finish the experiences of this first "Station" of spiritual life. Beyond this "Station" there are other "Stations" known as Ruh, Sirr-i-Khàfi and Sirr-i-Akhfa; each of these "Stations" which together constitute what is technically called Alam-i-Amr has its own characteristic states and experiences. After having passed through these "Station" the seeker of truth gradually receives the illuminations of "Divine Names" and "Divine Attributes" and finally the illuminations of the 'Divine Essence'.[17]

These passages indicate that the language of Sufis is not wholly "monologic". It is rather a technical language and is understood by the Sufis. What is needed is an effort to recast this language in terms which the 20th Century students of religion can understand. The intra-linguistic and extra-linguistic conditions of the language of Sufis be delineated.

A Sufi takes great care to ensure objectivity of his religious experience. He tries to hold his subjective and personal interests and desires in abeyance. This process of sifting the subjective and personal elements from the objective contents of the experience goes on till the final stage is reached. For this purpose a Sufi seeks a confirmation of his experience by discussing it with his preceptor. This process of eliminating the subjective factors when completed results in "the revelation of a new life-process—original, essential, spontaneous. The eternal secret of the ego is that the moment he reaches this final revelation he recognises it as the ultimate root of his being without the slightest hesitation."[18]

"Our selves are our centres and pine for manifestation.
We are waves and rise from the bottom of Being."[19]

This touch with the roots of one's own being generates faith in the whence and whither of the ego. It is our pro-attitude to directly or indirectly experienced facts that constitutes faith. Faith presupposes knowledge or experience. Faith generates confidence and builds itself up into an unshakable conviction in the Infinite and this changes the entire man. At this stage the individual says God exists because "I choose Him" or better because "I encounter Him".

III

And now a word about metaphysics of Iqbal.

To regard the outer and the inner experience as symbolic of God at once exposes you to the difficulties which pertain to the fields traditionally called cosmology and ontology by the metaphysicians. Since all variety of experience is to be conceived as symbolic of the same reality, Iqbal easily switches from his analysis of conscious experience to the nature of matter, life and God. The universe in its totality becomes organically related to the Most Real which it symbolises. The universe is, therefore, treated as a "fleeting moment" against the age of the universe which the geologists estimate at trillions of years makes the use of the phrase "fleeting moment" a very unusual use. Iqbal is not very cautious in the choice of words for he says:

The wise do not get involved in the intricacies of words.
Is the diver interested in the pearl or the shell
If the heart confirms a certain complicated meaning,
In value it surpasses a glittering pearl.
It is either dead or is at its last gasp
A philosophy which has not been written with your life-blood[20]

God creates, sustains and transcends the universe. Nature is not ideas in the mind of God as was conceived by Berkeley. It is an ever creative process which remains dynamic and growing because it is just an expression of "His Great I amness".

This is not pantheism. In pantheism Nature and God equate. In Iqbal God is immanent in nature but at the same time transcends nature. A person reveals himself through any of his activities, but the person himself is much more than the momentary expression which his activities signify. A person does transcend himself but at the same time creates his self through his conduct. God likewise both creates and transcends the universe. The universe, for Iqbal, is a growing and dynamic universe.

Such a metaphysical account at once presents a number of problems which one finds in the history of Philosophy—problems pertaining to cosmology and ontology, and to which no cogent answer can be given, e.g. the problems of creation, God's foreknowledge and human freedom, good and evil, relation of temporal with the non-temporal etc. Your answers to these questions depend upon the attitude you adopt towards them. A realist, an idealist, a pragmatist, a materialist and a vitalist will all give you different accounts. Your metaphysical views are, therefore, a matter of choosing your point of view The descriptive part of your account is not of primary importance. This point is very forcefully brought out by Stevenson's concept of pursuasive definition.[21] A materialist and an idealist both make use of pursuasive definition in dealing with the subject of their inquiry. Their differences are rooted more in their disagreement in their attitudes towards their subject, and hence cannot be resolved.

Since your metaphysical theory provides you supporting reasons for your philosophy of life, for your system of values, you have to judge the worth of a metaphysical theory in terms of its workability If it provides a firm and effective

support to your philosphy of life, it has genuine worth for you. The Greek, the Roman, the Christian and the Islamic, all these views of life find support in different metaphysical systems. Your metaphysics is closely linked with your philosophy of life and so long as you live, you cannot dispense with metaphysics of some sort. "Metaphysics has a long and distinguished history, and it is consequently unlikely that there are any new truths to be discovered in descriptive metaphysics. But this does not mean that the task of a descriptive metaphysics has been or can be done once and for all. It has constantly to be done over again. If there are no new truths to be discovered there are old truths to be rediscovered."[22] Iqbal himself admits the relative and tentative character of a philosophical theory. Iqbal never claimed finality for the views he expressed in his Reconstruction of Religious Thought. "It must, however, be remembered that there is no such thing as finality in philosophical thinking. As knowledge advances and fresh avenues of thought are opened, other views, and probably sounder views than those set forth in these lectures are possible."[23] In applying intellectual test to the revelations of religion Iqbal simply wanted to provide supporting reasons to the philosophy of life presented by Islam. To a theist, Iqbal's account makes a strong appeal. But if viewed critically it is open to all those objections to which reference has been made. There are limits within which supporting reasons operate. To a materialist, supporting reasons for an idealistic philosophy of life make little sense. In the ultimate analysis it is your attitude that determines the relevance or otherwise of a philosophical theory.

FOOT NOTES

1. *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 77.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 52.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 52.
5. *Zarb-e-Kalim*, p. 179.
6. G. Ryle . *Revolution in Philosophy*, p.7.
7. *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 47.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 59.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 60.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 51.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 55–56.
12. Quran 42 : 51, 53: 1–4 & 11.
13. Stace : Theory of Knowledge and Existence p. 67.
14. Ayer, *Foundation of Empirical Knowledge*, p. 145.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 141.
16. Ayer . *Foundations of Empirical Knowledge*, pp. 141 – 142.
17. *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 193.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 197.
19. *The New Garden of Mystry* Q. No. 7 line 15-16.
20. *Zarb-e-Kalim*, p. 37.
21. Stevenson , *Ethics and Language*.
22. Strawson , *Individuals*, Introduction.
23. *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*(iv)

IQBAL ON THE CONCEPTION OF MORALITY

I propose to discuss in this paper Iqbal's view on the conception of morality. This study will not include an analysis of, what the moral philosophers describe, first-order ethical terms like 'right', 'good' etc., but will confine itself to an examination of second-order ethical terms as 'moral' or 'non-moral' when these are applied to norms, values, judgements and reasons, etc. The question that I am to discuss shall be in the form, what are the characteristics of a principle which entitle it to be called moral? or what characteristics, *formal* or *material*, are *intrinsic* to morality? Iqbal, it is true, did not write any treatise on morality but his works contain a number of statements which provide a lot of material to answer the question that I propose to discuss.

I

A principle for Iqbal is moral only if it is freely chosen. Further, this choice is exercised when the individual is in possession of complete knowledge about the facts. Conventional values have no place in the thought of Iqbal. Operative principles if accepted blindly or on authority lead to degeneration of the self and thus negate a material condition which Iqbal considers essential to the meaning of morality. For, a moral principle has not only certain formal features but has also a material condition as intrinsic to its very definition. Iqbal regards integration of personality as built into the very

definition of morality. Moral reasoning is present if the ego-integration principle is appealed to. A choice is moral if it is ego-sustaining and is immoral if it is ego-dissolving. The moral principle is a vital principle which is legislated not from the consideration of the circumstances of a particular community or people but from a plane of existence which is above spatial and temporal circumstances of a particular group, i.e. a principle is moral if it is not 'culture bound'. It transcends the cultural limitations of a group and thus has the formal characteristics of being universalizable and of being supreme or overriding and is trans-individual.

The social environment to which an individual belongs is made up of customs and traditions, dos and donts, which were existentially experienced in the remote past by authentic individuals. Adherence to these for the persons who conceived them was essential to the meaning of morality. With the change of circumstances and conditions which are consequent upon knowledge and experience, convential values lose their true import. They cannot be, therefore, considered, from the point of later generations, as essential to morality. In order to have a moral point of view one has to rise above the level of conventional values, to a plane of existence which is not tinged with local hue derived from the ethos of a people. The moral law is thus essentially enacted by a man of vision. The moral legislator has to tear himself from the fetters of his culture and to seek contact with the roots of his own being. Such a kind of contact Iqbal describes as "Travel into Yourself." The individual can have the moral point of view even if he remains at the level of customary morality (the stage of obedience to Law), the same point of view is available at the level of reflective morality (the stage of self-overcoming). One can also ascend to the level of creative morality (the stage of vicegerency) and, for Iqbal, a principle to be truly moral has to be enacted from this third and the highest level. When an individual legislates from the level of creative morality his choice is not arbitrary as is

the case with some existentialists but is well-grounded and is trans-individual and in a way trans-milieu. This in brief is a statement of Iqbal's conception of morality. He has emphasize. both formal and material conditions as essential to the meaning of morality.

II

Iqbal characterizes the moral point of view in individualistic, social and material terms. A principle or norm for Iqbal is moral only if it is freely chosen and is not accepted on authority. In fact conventional values are rejected by Iqbal. Imitation, uncritical acceptance of norms or values leads to degenerationof the self which would in turn negate the material condition or content element of morality. In *Payam-i-Mashriq* he says:

تراشِ از تیشۂ خود جادۂ خویش　　براہے دیگراں رفتن عذاب است
گر از دستِ تو کارے نادر آید　　گناہے ہم اگر باشد ثواب است

Carve your path with your own axe,
Following the beaten track is calamitous.
If you accomplish something unique,
It is virtue even if it is a sin.

Again

اگر تقلید بودے شیوۂ خوب　　پیمبر ہم رہِ اجداد رفتے

Had imitation been morally good.
The prophet would have followed the parctice of his ancestors.

Again

میانِ آب و گل خلوت گزیدم　　از افلاطون و فارابی بریدم
نہ کردم از کسے دریوزۂ چشم　　جہاں را جز بچشمِ خود ندیدم

In this place of mud and water I took solitary abode,
I turned away from Plato and Farabi;
I did not beg for sight from any one,

I have not looked at the world but through my
own eyes.

Again

زخاکِ خویش طلب آتشے کہ پیدا نیست   تجلّی دگرے درخور تقاضا نیست

Seek from your own clay the fire that is lacking :
The illumination of another person is not worth
having.

But is this free choice available to the individual? Is man free or has he to win freedom? From the fact of "guidance and directive control in the ego's activity," Iqbal concludes that "ego is a free personal causality." But he warns that there is a constant rise and fall in this power to act freely.[1] The ego is most free at the level of appreciative self. At this level it is above distinction of caste and creed, culture and nationality

ہنوز از بند آب و گِل نرستی   تو گوئی رومی و افغانیم من
من اوّل آدمِ بے رنگ و بویم   پس از ہندی و تورانیم من

You have not yet freed yourself from earth-rootedness,
You say, I am a Rumi and an Afghani.
I am first a being above the distinction of colour and scent,
Afterward I label myself Hindi or Turani.

Iqbal makes a distinction between the efficient self and the appreciative self.[2] The former is the practical self of daily life while the latter is one that we have in moments of deepest meditation, when the efficient self is held in abeyance. It is the inner centre of experience. You have freedom in the highest degree when you rise to the level of the appreciative self. Free choice is, truly speaking, choice exercised by the appreciative self. At this level the individual is in direct contact with the roots of his own being. His vision of life and values goes beyond the limitations of time and space. In *Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadid,* he says:

بخود پیچیم و بے تاب نمودیم   کہ ما موجیم و از قعر وجودیم
دمادم خویش را اندر کمیں باش   گریزاں از گماں سوئے یقیں باش
تب و تاب محبّت را فنا نیست   یقین و دید را نیز انتہا نیست
کمالِ زندگی دیدارِ ذات است   طریقش رستن از بندِ جہات است
منور شو ز نورِ "من یرانی"   مژہ برہم مزن تو خود نمانی
چناں با ذاتِ حق خلوت گزینی   ترا او بیند او را تو بینی
بخود محکم گذر اندر حضورش   مشو ناپید اندر بحرِ نورش

Our selves are our centres and pine for manifestation,
For we are waves and rise from the bottom of Being.
Lie in constant ambush against the self,
Fly from doubt to faith and certainty.
The fire and ardour of love are not subject to extinction;
Faith and 'sight' have no end.
The perfection of life consists in seeing the Essence,
The way of achieving it is to free oneself from the limits of time and space.
You should enjoy privacy with the Divine Person in such a way,
That He sees you and you see Him.
Become illumined by the light of "What you see,"
Do not wink, otherwise you will be no more.
In His presence, be strong and self-possessed,
Don't merge yourself in the Ocean of His light.[3]

This 'sinking' in the depth of the appreciative self yields an experience which Iqbal terms as "vital way of appropriating the World." The moral legislator views human situation from that point of view. It is creative of norms and values. At this level the norms are intuited. In *Zabur-i-'Ajam* he says :

خوشا کسے کہ حرم را درون سینہ شناخت
دمے تپید و گزشت از مقام گفت و شنود

How happy the man who recognises the Sanctuary
in his own bosom,
He consumed himself for a while and passed beyond
the stage of argumentation.

But when the norms and values thus discovered are given content, limitations creep in. In *Payam-i Mashriq* he says :

تراشیدم صنم بر صورت خویش   بشکلِ خود خدا را نقش بستم
مرا از خویشتن رفتن محال است   بہر رنگے کہ ہستم خود پرستم

I carved idols after my own image,
I pictured even God after my own form.
I cannot transcend limitations of my being,
Whatever form I assume I worship my own self.

Again

ہزاراں سال با فطرت نشستم   باو پیوستم و از خود گسستم
ولیکن سرگزشتم این دو حرف است   تراشیدم، پرستیدم، شکستم

For thousand years I sat with nature,
I became tagged to her and broke away from myself.
My story is contained in these words :
I carved idols, worshipped them and broke them
later on.

Thus, for Iqbal, a principle or norm is moral when it is freely chosen in the light of available knowledge, i.e. is not taken on authority. Those who remain at the level of custom sink to a sub-human plane. Iqbal quotes in two of his works Rumi's famous lines about a Shaykh who, in broad-day light, was roaming about with a lamp in hand in search of a real man. The followers of custom appeared animals and beasts to the Shaykh :

دی شیخ با چراغ ہمی گشت گرد شہر   کز دام و دد ملولم و انسانم آرزوست
زیں ہمرہان سست عناصر دلم گرفت   شیرِ خدا و رستمِ دستانم آرزوست

Yesterday the Master with a lantern was roaming about the city,
Crying, 'I am tired of devil and beast, I desire a man.
My heart is weary of these weak-spirited companions;
I desire the Lion of God and Rustam, son of Zal.'

Vision of values and norms bestows upon the individual unlimited power. He regards his principles supreme. He says :

برتر از اندیشۂ سود و زیاں ہے زندگی   زخاکِ خویش طلب آتشے کہ پیدا نیست
ہے کبھی جاں اور کبھی تسلیمِ جاں ہے زندگی   تجلیٔ دگرے در خورِ تقاضا نیست

Life is above the consideration of profit and loss.
Sometimes it is synonymous with soul and sometimes it is surrendering the soul.

Now if a principle is moral only if it is freely chosen and is also held supreme by the individual, on what basis can it be conceived as trans-individual? It may be binding on the individual who discovers it or creates it. It is immersed in pure subjectivity. May we not say with the existentialists that norms and values are not valid in themselves. Your norms are valid for you only. You take away my freedom when you give to your norms social currency. On what basis do you claim trans-individual validity for your judgement? At one point you condemn uncritical acceptance of norms and values and at another you consider your moral principle as trans-individual. Iqbal establishes the trans-individual character of moral law on the basis of his ontological position. The plane of appreciative self is the same for all. Moral law at that plane is universal. The appreciative self brings home to you that "we are waves and rise from the bottom of Being."[4] It is this contact with the source of all norms and values that guarantees trans-individual validity to principles subjectively discovered.

Nothing has so far been said about the material or content of the moral principle. Only formal characteristics of a moral principle have been stipulated. These characteristics are : a principle is moral if it is chosen freely in the light of full knowledge of facts, is held supreme, is universalizable and trans-individual. Iqbal believes that the moral law has a content aspect as well. For Iqbal the goal of moral activity is integration of self or personality. Iqbal conceives human personality as an act. "Thus my personality is not a thing, it is an act. My experience is only a series of acts, mutually referring to one another and held together by the unity of a directive purpose."[5] Further, he says, in the English introduction to *The Secrets of the Self*, "The idea of personality gives us a standard of value, it settles the problem of good and evil. That which fortifies personality is good, that which weakens it is bad. Art, religion and ethics must be judged from the standpoint of personality." In a poem in *Bal-e Jibreel* he says :

سرود و شعر و سیاست کتاب و دین و ہنر
گہر ہیں ان کی گرہ میں تمام یکدانہ
ضمیرِ آدمِ خاکی سے ہے نمود ان کی
بلند تر ہے ستاروں سے ان کا کاشانہ
اگر خودی کی حفاظت کرے تو عینِ حیات
نہ کر سکیں تو سراپا جنون و افسانہ

Music, poetry and politics, literature, religion and art—
All these contain in their fold pearls of a unique kind.
These disciplines grow from the conscience of man.
Their abode is higher than that of the stars.
If they fortify the ego they become the very essence of life,
If they fail, they are mere illusion and fiction.

The social concern of the moral law is equally important. Self cannot develop in isolation. It needs a social environment and cannot exist without it. He says :

فرد قائم ربطِ ملّت سے ہے، تنہا کچھ نہیں
موج ہے دریا میں اور بیرونِ دریا کچھ نہیں

Individual exists by virtue of his ties with *Millat*,
A wave can exist only in a river,
Outside the river it is nothing.

This development of the individual is fully represented by the two concepts of *'Ishq* and *Faqr*, the positive and negative aspects of *La ilaha Illallah*. *'Ishq* stands for love and sustained devotion to the ideal and *Faqr* "indicates that attitude of mind which enables a man to strive, shunning all delights and all rewards except the attainment of worthy ends." This attitude prepares the individual to fight against all forces of evil, to rescue mankind from servitude. But the real progress of society depends on *mard-i hur* (cf. *Pas Chey Bayad Kard)*. Self-centred individuals alone reveal the depth of life. They disclose new standards in the light of which we begin to see that our environment is not wholly inviolable and requires revision.[6] He says :

آگ اس کی پھونک دیتی ہے برنا و پیر کو
لاکھوں میں ایک بھی ہو اگر صاحبِ یقیں

His fire ignites the young and the old,
If there is only one man of faith in a multitude of thousands.

Iqbal conceives three stages in the normal development of the individual, i.e. stages in the self-integration of the person. These are (i) obedience to Law. Here the individual is required to conform to the operative values of the group. The moral law is a force that acts from outside. This stage is followed by (ii) self-control or self-overcoming. This self-control or self-overcoming is a common feature to all conceptions of morality in the ancient and the modern world.

"Specific differences between particular moralities may be due," says Walter A. Kaufmann, "to divergent conceptions not only of the aim and sanction, but also of the manner of self-overcoming. Thus the classical ideal was that reason should control the inclinations, while Kant insisted .... that inclination must be overcome to the extent that it may not be a co-motive of action."[7] This self-control for Iqbal is the control of the efficient self by the appreciative self. The third stage is possible only if appreciative self rules and directs the efficient self :

صبح ازل مجھ سے کہا جبرئیل نے
جو عقل کا غلام ہو وہ دل نہ کر قبول

At the beginning of life Gabriel told me :
Do not accept a heart which is a slave of reason.

The vital experience of the appreciative self is the essence while ends and objectives, values and 'norms' are its changing manifestations. In Nietzschean terminology they are mere fore-grounds. The third state is the stage of Divine Vicegerency, the stage of creative morality. In my account of Iqbal's conception of morality I have considered it from the point of view of the third stage.

III

Now on the questions : (i) whether or not a claim to intersubjective validity is to be taken as essential to moral judgement and (ii) whether or not a material (individual and social) concern is to be regarded as essential to morality, Iqbal's position is quite clear. Iqbal claims intersubjective validity as essential to moral judgement. It is true that universal agreement on moral judgements may not be available, but we never make a claim that a moral judgement has no validity beyond ourselves. Our disagreement on moral judgements may be due to the difference in the levels of our moral development. The point of view at the stage of obedi-

ence to law or conformity to operative values is narrower and culture-oriented as compared with the one you have at the stage of creative morality. This has been conceded by Ayer. If there is this difference, then the intersubjective validity of moral judgement is restricted to the level of the group you belong to. Even thus understood, its validity is not confined to ourselves. Again disagreement on moral matters are partly resolved with more factual enlightenment. Pierce was giving expression to the faith of the moralists when he said that those who share the moral point of view will agree in the end, as those will, who share the scientific point of view. A scientist has to check his data and rearrange his facts, if he finds that others in the field do not agree with his conclusion. Similarly in morals, despite agreements on facts if still there is disagreement, the individual must ask himself if his judgement has really been made from the moral point of view.

As to the question whether or not material concern is to be regarded as essential to morality, Iqbal's answer is in the affirmative. As referred to above, Iqbal recommends that ethics must be judged from the standpoint of personality. It may be here noted that Iqbal's use of morality is a descriptive claim and not a normative claim. A descriptive claim implies that the term is actually used in the sense specified while a normative claim makes a proposal about the use of the term.

Before proceeding further one clarification about Iqbal's conception of morality is required. This pertains to the fact that individual concern is held by Iqbal as essential to morality. It may be argued that ego-centred morality is only enlightened self-interest. To regard social concern as essential to morality may be acceptable but to confine morality to individual concern may distort morality beyond recognition. Such a line of argument will amount to a complete misunderstanding of Iqbal's position regarding the inherent unity of individuals and also the task of his *mard-i hur* or *mard-i momin.* His rider of destiny is to silence the noise of nations,

has to harp the tune of brotherhood and to bring once more days of peace to the world.[8]

About the unity of mankind he says :

نہ افغانیم و نے تُرک و تتاریم — چمن زاریم و از یک شاخساریم
تمیزِ رنگ و بو بر ما حرام است — کہ ما پروردۂ یک نوبہاریم

> We are neither Afghans nor Turks nor sons of Tartary.
> We are born in a garden, are from one branch.
> The distinction of scent and colour is forbidden for us
> For we are the nurslings of one spring time.

Thus the material concern essential to morality for Iqbal is individualistic and social and the charge of narrow egoism does not hold good. But even if we concede that, for Iqbal, material concern intrinsic to morality is social, the position is not unassailable. The followers of Kant may say that moral law is only formal, and it has no content. Thus content reference is not essential to morality. It may be urged that we do not *in fact* apply the term moral only to those judgements which appeal to the social concern. Some apply it even to those judgements which appeal to the will of God. Again, the intuitionists may deny that all moral duties have a social reference. Thus social concern is not *in fact* taken as *necessary condition* of morality. Nor can it be regarded as a sufficient condition for the obvious reason that without the condition of universalization there can hardly be any morality. And lastly if a person were to ask : why should I be socially oriented? there is no answer. Morality should carry its own sanction. It should, therefore, be defined in a way that the individual cannot sensibly ask but why? Iqbal's conception of morality does not fulfil this condition.

FOOT NOTES

1. Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p. 109.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 47.
3. *Question* 7, 15-28. Translation by B. A. Dar.
4. *Gulshan-i Raz-i Jadid*, question 7, line 16.
5. Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p. 103.
6. Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p. 151.
7. Kaufmann, Nietzsche, p. 187.
8. Cf. The Secrets of the Self, Eng. trans., pp. 83-84.

than to harp the tune of brotherhood and to bring [illegible] [illegible] of [illegible] on the [illegible]

[illegible] the unity [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] Tartary.

We are born in a garden, are from one branch

The distinction of scent and colour is forbidden for us

For we are the nurslings of one spring time.

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FOOT NOTES

1. Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p. 109.

IQBAL'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY

Philosophers make a distinction between first-order and second-order inquiries in ethics. The first-order inquiry is the concern of the moralist, the critic of society, and is aimed at making actual moral judgements i.e. providing guidance in moral matters, telling someone what to do and what to desist from. The second-order inquiry in ethics is the privilege of the philosopher and comprises a study of basic ethical terms, the nature and function of moral judgement and its likeness to, or difference from, a scientific statement, command, emotive ejaculation, prescription etc. and the logic of morals. It is true that a study of second-order inquiry in ethics does have its effects on moral living but what is claimed is that the sphere of moral philosopher is limited to a study of second-order inquiry in ethics and we are not to look up to him for a lead or guidance in matters connected with moral living. This limiting the field of moral philosophy to an analysis of basic ethical terms and to a study of the language and logic of morals has not been strictly adhered to even in the writings of twentieth century moral philosophers (Moore, Ross, Hare etc.) but, by and large, the caution has always been not to seek any exhortation to moral virtues from moral philosophers, not to look up to them for guidance in practical matters concerning day-to-day living. A moral philosopher, it is argued, does not enjoy any special privilege which may entitle him to guide people in the art

of living. One can learn from a sage more of practical wisdom than from a philosopher. Yet in the past moral philosophers have been moralists as well. Socrates, Plato, Spinoza, Butler, Hegel, Nietzsche are all great as moral philosophers but they also provide guidance in moral matters and delineate the principles of right-living. Iqbal too is a moralist and has deep concern for Moral Philosophy as well.

The emphasis on analytical or linguistic approach to ethics in recent times has adversely affected normative ethics i.e. ethics as a study of norms or ideals involved in evaluating conduct, in designating actions as right or wrong or pronouncing an end as good or bad. The assumption behind this emphasis on meaning and analysis of ethical concepts and on the function of moral language is that norms and ideals of a people are simply the projection of cultural values of the people concerned. They have significance and meaning for the group whose cultural values they reflect. This makes morality a matter of social conditioning and deprives it of its claim for trans-milieu objectivity. It was for this reason that Sir A.J. Ayer held that there are no disputes on questions of value.[1] All disputes in moral matters are disputes about questions of facts. The implication is that, if in moral disputes the parties to the dispute belong to the same society, they will own a common sytem of values and will display identical attitudes or emotive responses to events, practices and institutions in that society. If there is, therefore, any disagreement or moral dispute between them, it can be attributed to the fact that factual details have not been provided to one of the disputants. When the facts are clearly stated, the disagreement will naturally end because their moral conditioning has been the same and they will display the same attitude to the facts narrated. But if in moral disputes the parties to the dispute are from different societies, i.e., they have different systems of value there can be no argument between them on moral questions . . . . argument is possible on moral questions only if some system

of values is presupposed.[2]

Iqbal does not share this faith of the emotivists or present day moral philosophers who concentrate on metaethics. Even in this linguistic approach to ethics the assumption is that since there are different moral codes in differrent societies, the attempt to establish the superiority of one against the other be abandoned. Every individual has a right to choose any one moral code. If there is an ethical dispute it could be resolved by giving supporting reasons. The supporing reasons work within limits set by the cultural values of the group concerned. The logic at work in reasons deserves special attention of the thinkers.

Iqbal does not believe in such a relativism in morality. He has his own views on the conception of morality but exhibits greater interest in the ideal which the moral agent is to realize. Iqbal bases his thesis on his ontological position regarding the nature of reality. He thus tries to provide a sound metaphysical basis to his ethical theory. Before expounding and critically examining Iqbal's ethical theory I think it necessary to give a brief statement of Iqbal's conception of morality, morality understood as 'an institution of life' as compared with religion, law or science. What is required in this connection is a statement of the characteristics, both formal and material, which are intrinsic to morality i.e. the characteristics which make a principle/norm/Judgement/reason moral. A rule of the road or of a game, say chess, for example, is not a moral rule. What characteristics a rule must possess before it could be pronounced moral. Similarly 'It is a good pencil' is a value judgement but is not a moral judgement. What characteristics are intrinsic to a value judgement to be termed as moral judgement. Is morality a matter of individual choice or is social concern intrinsic to morality? Do the moral principles have only formal characteristics or is some material content essential to the meaning of morality. Is moral judgement an expression of belief or feeling or attitude? Your answer to these questions would

constitute your conception of morality. It is true that Iqbal did not write any treatise on morality but his concern with moral philosophy was very deep as will be clear to any person who cares to read his poetical works and prose writings. For Iqbal both formal and material characteristics are intrinsic to morality. A moral principle, for Iqbal, has the formal characteristics of universaliability, is chosen freely and not accepted on authority, is held supreme and is trans-individual. It has also a content aspect, Moral activity involves integration of personality. 'That which fortifies personality is good, that which weakens it is bad'. Moral principle has, in addition, a social concern as well. Society provides a field, an environment for the individual to develop his ego or personality. A principle of conduct to be moral must exhibit concern for society. Some of the verses which bear directly on Iqbal's conception of morality are :

تراش از تیشۂ خود جادۂ خویش　　براہِ دیگراں رفتن عذاب است
گر از دستِ تو کارے نادر آید　　گناہے ہم اگر باشد ثواب است

(Carve your path with your own axe. Following the beaten track is calamitous. If you accomplish something unique, it is virtue even if it be sin).

اگر تقلید بودے شیوۂ خوب　　پیمبر ہم رہِ اجداد رفتے

(Had imitation been a good practice, the prophet would have followed the practice of his ancestors)

میان آب و گل خلوت گزیدم　　ز افلاطون و فارابی بریدم
نہ کردم از کسے دریوزۂ چشم　　جہاں را جز بچشمِ خود ندیدم

(In this place of mud and water I took solitary abode. I turned away from Plato and Al-Farabi. I did not beg for sight from any one, I have not looked at the world but through my own eyes).

زخاکِ خویش طلب آتشے کہ پیدا نیست   تجلی دگرے درخور تقاضا نیست

(Seek from your own clay the fire that is lacking. The light of another person is not worth asking for).

برتر از اندیشۂ سود و زیاں ہے زندگی   ہے کبھی جاں اور کبھی تسلیم جاں ہے زندگی

(Life is far above the consideration of profits and losses. It is sometimes synonymous with soul and sometimes it consists in surrendering the soul).

فرد قائم ربطِ ملت سے ہے تنہا کچھ نہیں   موج ہے دریا میں اور بیرونِ دریا کچھ نہیں

(Individual exists by virtue of his ties with millet. A wave can exist only in a river, outside the river it is nothing).

This, in brief, is a statement of Iqbal's conception of morality. I now proceed to present his ethical theory alongwith its ontological moorings.

The universe exhibits observed regularities or uniformities in nature. The uniform mode of behaviour of objects makes prediction possible and also enables man to control the occurrence of events in nature. It is this control and prediction of events that confirm uniformity in nature. Without uniformity of nature life would not have been possible; there would have been complete chaos. The civilization and the moral order which man has built up throughout the ages has been possible only because of the continued operation of

the principle of uniformity of nature. Man has not created the universe with its observed regularities. He finds it out there as a given fact. But man is also a creator, though on a small scale. He has created a moral order which makes the emergence and growth of civilization possible. Without the creation of moral order, the law of jungle would have ruled supreme in the human world. There is order in nature which is unchanging. The moral order which man creates needs constant efforts to maintain it. Laws comprising moral order can be violated. These, therefore, need constant effort to maintain them.

Kant made a distinction between moral good and the complete good. Moral good signifies the effort to realise the complete good. The complete good stands for the Ideal, the state of affairs, the realization of which has been the goal of human endeavour. Moral order is not something given once for all. It has to be created and needs constant effort to maintain it.

Iqbal, explaining to Prof. Nicholson the philosophical basis of the Asrar-i-Khudi, writes :—

"To my mind, this inexplicable finite centre of experience (ego) is the fundamental fact of the universe. All life is individual; there is no such thing as universal life. God Himself is an individual; He is the most unique individual. The universe, as Dr. McTaggart says, is an association of individuals; but we must add that the orderliness and adjustment which we find in this association is not eternally achieved and complete in itself. It is the result of instinctive or conscious effort. We are gradually travelling from chaos to cosmos and are helpers in this achievement. Nor are the members of the association fixed; new members are ever coming to birth to co-operate in the great task. Thus the universe is not a complete act; it is still in the course of formation. There can be no complete truth about the universe, for the universe has not yet become 'whole'. The process of creation is still going on, and man too takes his

share in it, inasmuch as he helps to bring order into at least a portion of the chaos. The Quran indicates the possibility of other creaters than God".[3] Blessed is God the best of those who create (xxiii vi 14)

It is this fact of creation of a moral order which has helped man to rise from animal to a truly human plane of existence. Iqbal's moral philosophy takes a special cognisance of this creative contribution of man in moving from chaos to order in the human world. 'Of all the creations of God he alone is capable of consciously participating in the creative life of his Maker'.[4]

The concepts which are of special significance in a discussion of Iqbal's ethical theory are those of life, evolution and ego. As quoted above, Iqbal regards life not as something general but as individual - - - - - an inexplicable finite centre of experience, an ego. Further, there is the fact of evolution. Life at a later stage has exhibited unpredictably new features which it previously lacked. Iqbal, in agreement with modern scientists, recognised the great value of varied individual personalities. This ruled out the possibility of reducing life to a closed system, fixed in its natural categories, such as Medieval Philosophers had elaborated. The whole cosoms, for Iqbal expressed the individuality of the absolutely unique Individual. Iqbal discovered in the uniqueness of individuality (personality) a standard of value: "That which fortifies personality is good, that which weakens it is bad. Art, religion, and ethics must be judged from the standpoint of personality".[5] The destiny to which each human being is called is to be more and more like God which means to be more and more uniquely individual, to fully realize the potentialities and develop into a well-integrated person. The traditional values of beauty, goodness and truth do not appear supreme in the system of Iqbal. To be more and more uniquely individual is to be more and more creative, original and free. "The moral and religious ideal of man is not self-negation but self-affirmation and he attains to this ideal by

becoming more and more individual, more and more unique. The Prophet said تَخَلَّقُوا بِاَخْلَاقِ اللہ (create in yourself the attributes of God). Thus man becomes unique by becoming more and more like the most Unique Individual. The greater his distance from God, the less his individuality. He who comes nearest to God is the completest person. Not that he is finally absorbed in God. On the contrary he absorbs God into himself.[6]

What fortifies the ego is love (*Ishq*). Love for Iqbal is not simply the desire to assimilate, to absorb; in its highest form it is the creation of values and ideals and the endeavour to realise them. 'Endowed with the power to imaging a better world and to mould what is into what ought to be, the ego in him aspires, in the interest of an increasingly unique and comprehensive individuality, to exploit all the various environments on which he may be called upon to operate. . . . .'[7]

'Indeed, its nature is wholly aspiration after a unity more inclusive, more effective, more balanced and unique'.[8]

Iqbal also warns against the dangers which weaken the ego. It is asking, or begging which lowers the ego and keeps it away from its goal of appropriating divine attributes.

In Ramoz-i-be Khudi, Iqbal emphasises the importance of society and explains how the idea of Tauhid forms the basis of a genuinely dynamic society. The concept of Tauhid forms the ground for the operation of the principles of Equality, Solidarity and Freedom. A society which accepts Tauhid, the unity of God as the basis for unification of its members, guarantees equality of treatment in distribution of wealth and freedom of thought and expression to its members besides providing a psychological basis of human unity :

فرد را ربط جماعت رحمت است   جوہر او را کمال از ملت است
تا توانی با جماعت یار باش   رونق ہنگامہ احرار باش

(For an individual ties with society constitute a blessing, his talent achieves perfection through Millat. As far as possible be a friend of Society, be the moving spirit of the group).

Iqbal explains in detail how the ego in its development passes through the stages of—

1) Obedience to Law
2) Self-Control and
3) Divine Vicegerency.

These roughly correspond to the stages of customary, reflective and creative morality. It is the last stage which is of special significance to students of ethics. It is a stage where morality is a matter of authentic choice. But the choice is not arbitrary as is the case with some existentialists. It is a choice which is ego-oriented i.e., guarantees integration of personality and generates new values and thus takes society to a higher plane of existence. "Such individuals alone reveal the depth of life. They disclose new standards in the light of which we begin to see that our environment is not wholly inviolable and requires revisions".[9]

خوشا کسے کہ حرم را درون سینہ شناخت
دمے تپید و گزشت از مقامِ گفت و شنود

(How happy the man who recognised Harem in his own bosom; he consumed himself for a while and passed beyond the stage of argumentation).

This, in brief, is a statement of Iqbal's ethical theory. Most of the ethical theories are a historical. They generally assume a stable and unchanging social context. But a living society has to seek continuous adjustment to its ever-changing milieu. Ethics is not simply concerned with the rights and obligations of existing persons with respect to one another. It has to think of the future generations as well. Any decision that we take may affect the future generations adversely. A decision to be moral will have to keep in view the rights of as-yet unborn generations. Iqbal's account of morality poses no such problem which, for example, intuitionism poses , concerning problems of population explosion, birth control, air-pollution etc. Iqbal's vitalistic philosophy lays emphasis on revision and change and recom-

mends the rearing of self-concentrated individual for meeting the new challenge which future may pose to society.

Iqbal's ethical theory cannot be termed as self-realization for it is not clear whether it includes or excludes what is called self-sacrifice. The self is already real in a sense and what then is meant by realizing that which is already realized. T. H. Green distinguishes between animal self, habitual self and the true self. Self-realization does not indicate which of the different selves is to be realized.

Among the Greeks the Cyrenaics indentified self with sentient nature of man and ended up in a crude hedonism of self-indulgence as the meaning of self-realization. The epicureans abandoned sensualism of the Cyrenaics but retained the higher forms of pleasure as the meaning of self-realization, as some of the saner Cyrenaics had done.

If self is understood as a rational self –– the Cynics & Stoics among the Greeks had advocated such a view of the self ––then self-realization would imply self-sacrifice, a sacrifice of life of feelings and emotions for the life of reason. Aristotle's eudaemonism overcomes the one sided approach of Cyrenaics and Epicurians on the one hand and that of Cynics and Stoics on the other. But it ignores society or social self completely. Iqbal's emphasis on development of personality together with concern for the society places him at a higher pedestal than the Greek thinkers referred to above.

So far as the recent trends in ethical theory are concerned regarding the place of reason in ethics, we find a paradigm case of such an approach in Iqbal's treatment of the objections raised by the Turkish Poet Zia in questioning the inequality of Women in matters of matrimony and inheritance in the legal system of Islam. The question of legal rights is not purely a legal matter, It is a moral question as well. The supporting reasons which Iqbal gives in defence of the existing Islamic injunctions in respect of the institutions of

marriage and inheritance give some idea of how the moral implications of the social and legal problems facing Muslim Society could be taken up by the scholars and thinkers to help clarity and removing confusions about them.

FOOT NOTES

1. *Language, Truth and Logic*, 2nd Edition, p. 40.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 111.
3. Introduction to English Translation of *Asrar-i-Khudi*, p. xii-xiii.
4. *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 72.
5. Introduction to English Translation ol *Asrar-i-Khudi*, p. xv.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. xiii-xiv.
7. *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 72.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 98.
9. *Reconstruction of Religious Thought*, p. 151.

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8. *Ibid.*, p. 95.
9. *Reconstruction of Religious Thought*, p. 151.

IQBAL AND AUTHENTIC INDIVIDUAL

I propose to discuss in today's meeting the central theme in Iqbal's 'Javid Nama'. I shall try to present Iqbal's thesis in simple language and shall also indicate how 'Javid Nama' is complementary to 'Asrar-i-Khudi'.

The central theme which I propose to discuss has been presented by Iqbal under 'Secrets of the Ascension'. As a prelude to the main subject, Iqbal has referred to an interesting episode connected with a Greek philosopher. Maulana Rum had narrated this incident in one of his ghazals and Iqbal had printed, on the fly-leaf of 'Asrar-i-Khudi' the verses, relevant to the incident. We are concerned primarily with the truth behind this incident. First, let me narrate the incident. It is said about Diogenes, a contemporary of Plato, that once, in broad daylight, he was searching for something with a lamp in his hand. People inquired of him what he was looking for with a lamp in daylight. He replied that he was looking for a man in the town. The people inquired, in surprise, if the persons living in that town were not humans in the eyes of the philosopher. The philosopher replied that they were mere, 'animals and beasts'. None of them was a man. Here the question arises: 'For whom was the philosopher looking in his town?' people did reside there. What characteristics were they lacking in that they had sunk to the level of 'animals and beasts' for the philosopher. Another philosopher from Greece was confronted with a queer situation but that helped in projecting, in bold relief, his

individuality. He was Socrates. There was the Oracle at Delphi which was visited by a large number of persons, interested in seeking solace by putting questions, to which the answers received, at the temple, were given great significance and credibility. Once a pilgrim inquired, at the temple, who was the wisest man in the world? The oracle named Socrates as the wisest man. The people rushed to Socrates to felicitate him. Socrates sought a confirmation of the announcement at Delphi. He talked to a number of persons and learnt that most of the people do not admit that they are not in a position to give any opinion on subjects which they do not know. They, on the contrary, do give their opinion in such matters and never realise that they are not competent to give any opinion. Socrates had this satisfaction that he knew that his knowledge was quite limited and that he could offer expert opinion on a few things. The greatness of Socrates lay in the fact that in the domain of science he was conscious that he knew very little. Socrates sought a confirmation of his 'Self' at two planes. The first was the plane of self-awareness i.e. he assessed himself in the light of his own consciousness. The second was the plane of concsiousness of others i.e. he assessed himself in the light of judgements of others. The third plane was the awareness of the gods and even at this stage the verdict had been in favour of Socrates. If I use a twentieth century term, I should designate Socrates as 'an authentic individual'. An authentic individual is not bound by fetters of customs and traditions; he generates a new world, a new set of values with his creative activity and accepts fully the responsibilities of his creation. As is well known to students of Greek Philosophy that when Socrates was asked to either take a cup of hemlock or stop philosophising in public, he preferred, very calmly, the former alternative and did not connive at stifling truth. He bade the woman, who started weeping and wailing when his hour approached, to retire and spent the last moments of his life peacefully in the company of his pupils.

What was it, in the person of Socrates, which Diogenes could not find in any person in his town? A passing reference has been made that the people in Diogenes' town were not authentic individuals. They adhered blindly to customs and traditions. They all shunned making a choice. They were the people who were harnessed, like animals, to the dull routine of life, Iqbal says in 'Secrets of the Self':—

" We are alive because we create ends
It is the spark of hope which aglows us."

It is the creation of ideals and the spark of hope which keeps life ever fresh and enriches every moment with new splendour. To be bound by customs and traditions completely is a negation of creativity.

" Creation is the search for a beloved,
It is disclosing oneself on another. "

(Javid Nama)

In the 'Secrets of the Self' Iqbal has made an exhaustive study of the Self. He has, in connection with the maturity and perfection of the self, enumerated a number of sociological and psychological factors which lead to the integration/weakening of 'Khudi' i.e. self or personality. There are three stages at which one can assess the process of integration. Iqbal makes Rumi address as under :

"If you are living or dead or suspended between life and death
Seek a confirmation of your state from three witnesses.
First witness is your own consciousness,
It is looking at yourself in the light of your own consciousness.
Second witness is the consciousness of other,
Third witness is the consciousness of God,
It is looking at yourself with the consciousness of God.
If you remain steadfast before this light
Consider yourself eternal and firm like God.
Life consists in reaching at its source,
It is viewing God in all His naked glory.

A 'momin' is not satisfied with a glimps of Attributes
Muhammad did not accept anything short of a direct vision of God
What is ascension? It is a desire for a witness,
A submitting to an evaluation before a witness.

....

Re-chisel this worn out frame of yours
Evaluate yourself and be in existence.

(Javid Nama)

The first stage, in this process of evaluations is assessment of the self by the individual himself, the second is assessment by others and the third is assessment by God. If, at all the three stages, you get a confirmation of yourself, you rise to the status of authentic individual or (to use the terminology of the Quran) you pass from the stage of *'Nafs--i-Ammara'* to the stage of *'Nafs-i-Mutmainna'*.

THE FIRST STAGE :

LOOKING AT YOURSELF IN THE LIGHT OF YOUR OWN CONSCIOUSNESS.

What are the implications of looking at yourself in the light of your own consciousness? One simple answer to this question is that if you try to deceive another person or if you try to impress others with your 'brushed exterior' you are, at least, aware of the deceit that you practice. To put it more plainly, a smuggler knows that he is a smuggler but he tries to impress upon others his righteousness and sincerity. He manages to camouflage others till legal proceedings are instituted against him. But all this while he knows very well the truth about himself. His self-awareness shows him his double face. But there is another aspect of looking at yourself in the light of your own awareness. And that is the awareness both of your creative powers and the capacity to realise various possibilities of your creation. The famous French Philosopher, J.P. Sartre, describes the state of an individual's satisfaction with his present position as Bad

Faith. For Sartre, bad faith is exhibited equally by a teacher or a party worker or by an efficient cafe waiter or an employee who performs his duties faithfully. To remain satisfied with any existing state of affairs is to negate one's creative powers. It amounts to lowering oneself and abandoning the claim:

> " Every moment a 'Momin' has a fresh glory, a new radiance to adorn him."
>
> (Zerb -i- Kalim)

Iqbal refers to the same fact when he says :

> " Do not be contented with the world of colour and smell."
>
> (Bal -i- Jibreel)

A person who remains busy in the routine of life is, for Camus, like the Sisyphus who was commissioned, as punishment for his misdeeds, to take a heavy stone to the top of a mountain. He spent the whole day in pushing the stone up the mountain and when at night fall he reached the top of the mountain, the stone would roll down the mountain under its own weight. Sisyphus went on repeating the dull and meaningless task everyday. A clerk joins service at the age of 20. He handles, daily, files tied in red-tape. He repeats this process till the time of his retirement. The entire performance of the clerk from the time of his entry in, till his exit from, the office is not different from the task of Sisyphus. The same is the fate of businessmen who work in markets or in busy streets. They spend the whole of their lives in making transactions. They never get any awareness of their creative powers. In comparision to them, consider the case of Spinoza, a 17th century Philosopher. Spinoza would close his shop and would sit till late at night engaged in creative thinking. For him, to exist was not an end in itself. He had committed himself to the creation of a new world, to a new vision of life and values, His concept of passive and active emotions, his doctrine of Substance etc. have found a permanent place in the history of ideas. Spinoza's

life is a good example of 'looking at yourself in the light of your own consciousness.'

The phrase 'The light of one's consciousness' contains a world of meaning in it. My consciousness is fashioned by historical, social and psychological factors. In the completion of myself the historical process of millions of years is a contributory factor. I have my relations with Adam. I am the custodian of the heritage of Man, a deflection of 'Nafs -i- Wahida'. It was because of such confusions that Bulhae Shah, the Rumi of Punjab, had observed :

" Oh Bulhae, what do I know who am I"

I am a social reality, an individual tied down to customs and traditions of my society, its dos and donts, its cultural limitations, language, religion and morality. All these factors form, in a way, both an obstacle and a stimulus to creative activity. By negating these limitations I become a contemporary of Adam but at the same time I deprive myself of all that man has achieved since time immemorial. I am a psychological entity as well, comprising both conscious and unconscious elements. The unconscious element in me is both personal and racial. Consciousness is non-spatial; mental events are not in space: these are only temporal. Spatial concepts are not applicable to states of consciousness. My personality is not a thing like a table or a chair nor is it simply a series of happenings in the past. I am the possibilities of my being. You cannot assess completely the reaches of my creative powers and the possibilities of my being :

" Can anyone measure the strenght of a 'momin'
His mere look changes the course of destiny."

I have to look at myself with reference to the future and not the past. I can create a new world as I step into the future and can thus give a new form to my person. This looking at myself in the light of my own consciousness is intended to ascertain if I, who is. a command of my God, 'a creative entity', have not become a static being bound in the fetters of customs and traditions or operative values and sunk to the

animal level. It is an assessing of oneself from the highest point of view and a negation of regarding any particular state of affairs as the ultimate limit of the possibilities of my being. It is to confirm what is contained in the following verse :

> " You are a 'Shahin' (Eagle), your function is to fly,
> There are other heavens before you beyond the horizon."
>
> (Bal -i- Jibreel)

The stage of self-awareness needs constant vigilance. It is the first step in the process of testing the degree of integration of your ' Khudi' (Self). If you fulfil the requirements of the first stage, you are ripe for the second.

The second stage is the stage "looking at yourself with the light of others" Here the question that poses itself is : Does the other stand for a person or a society and how to choose the other for a confirmation of my self or person. The great poet, Akber of Allahabad, was smitten with shame on meeting some muslim ladies who were not observing purdha. And just contrary to it the Victorian society was shaken when Miss Florence Nightingale offered her services to the British Government to serve as a nurse. The dailies and weeklies wrote editorials condemning her. Some even observed that had Miss Florence Nightingale eloped with her friend or staked away her father's fortunes at a horse race she would not have done as great a harm to society as she did by becoming a nurse and going to Sacuttari to look after the wounded soldiers in the Crimean War. (Roll call of Honour). Further, if there are class barriers in a certain society to which class shall one turn, to assess or evaluate himself. Iqbal has observed in Bang -i- Dara :

> " If the ruled just awake from their stupor, the ruler puts them back to sleep with the magic of his septre"

For the ruled, the consciousness of other would be the values and practices of the elite among the ruling class. In

capitalistic society, the capitalist, has no awareness o the hard life of the labour. In Javid Nama, the soul of Abu Jahal has been presented bemoaning in the Ka'ba against the values which the prophet of Islam introduced in his milieu. Abu Jahal looks at himself in the light of the operative values of his times and he discovers the values, introduced by Islam, smashing old gods. He, therefore, beseeches the universe to take revenge from him. In today's world an individual's milieu is not determined by spatial contiguity. He is a participant in the affairs of the world. He has crossed the barriers of family, school, institutions and government and has gained membership of the world community and legitimately asks if, for assessing himself, in the light of consciousness of others, he has to turn to the people of the third world struggling hard for their freedom or has he to measure himself in the light of the Security Council resolutions. How do the zionists view the activities of the Palestinean Commandos and how do the Pakistanis evaluate them? In a capitalistic society, the capitalist looks at the tillers of land and the labourers from a point of view which guarantees the continuation of the capitalistic system. In short, an individual evaluates his conduct in the light of the operative values of his society and since society has a strong hold on its members, quite a large majority of individuals do not question the moral criteria and regard observance of social practices as the zenith of moral growth. Such persons are regarded peace loving and do not create any problem for the administration. They are devoid of creative activity and regard the operative values as given, once for all. They have no ambition nor are prepared to expose themselves to any risk. They are the defenders of the prevalent social pratices.

In some quarters a distinction is made between subjectively right and objectively right actions. A subjectively right in the light of the facts, available to him. In such an evaluation the limitations of time and space, culture and practices do creep in and it is possible that what was considered subjec-

tively right for a Socrates at a particular time may not be judged as right at a later stage i.e. the action be not objectively right. An objectively right action is one whose consequences confirm its rightness. Thus considered, a subjectively right action has a claim for being objectively right, but it is only its consequences which establish its objective rightness. The whole point of this discussion is that a mere confirmation of the self at the first two stages is not a guarantee that the self has attained the highest degree of integration. Projecting your ideas to the world at large and in case of opposition getting the world round to your point of view is, indeed, the most difficult task. Such a condition exists at the third stage of conscious existence. Iqbal has described this situation as reviewing yourself in the light of God's awareness. Before taking up a discussion of this stage it will be interesting to refer to another stand point about "others awareness" which is quite different from that of Iqbal. For Sartre the presence of others is hell for an individual. Their presence upsets the world as he interprets it, curtails his freedom and converts him from pour soi to en soi. For Iqbal, the presence of others provides an opportunity to test the integration and moral maturity of personality. It also prepares the individual to create a new world and give a new vision of life to the people. Further the presence of others reminds an individual of the limitations of his milieu, goades him on to create a new world, new 'morns and eves' and ultimately confirms the rightness of his choice. As individual is not born in a social vacuum that he should seek escape from others. It is only by participating in social activities that one can hope to improve society.

The test of integration of personality at the third plane of existence has been described, as stated above as looking at oneself in the light of God's awareness. It is the most trying stage and to attain an access to such an encounter amounts to sinking to the very roots of your being. For Iqbal, only strong personalities are capable of

having such an encounter. The path of righteousness is very exacting. Spinoza was right when he said that if salvation had been easy to attain men would not have been indifferent to it.

Looking at yourself in the light of God's awareness is described by Iqbal in Zaboor -i- Ajam as "Travel into yourself". It is a sinking into the depth of one's own being. He says in, *Zaboor-i-Ajam* :

> " How happy is the man who recognised the Harm
> (Ka'ba) in his bosom,
> He consumed himself for a while and passed
> beyond the stage of argumentation. (p-167)"

Again in the same book he says :

> There is lamp in your bosom.
> What light is this which is reflected in your mirror.
> Don't be careless, you are its trustee
> What folly is this that you do not look at yourself.

To attain to such a stage both the active participation in and the reflective withdrawl from society are equally important. Iqbal regards God as the locus of all values. A direct vision of reality gives you an opportunity to assess how far you have appropriated divine attributes. Such an experience brings about a great change in consciousness and results in the creation of a new set of values. The individual rises from the stage of 'Nafs -i- Amara' to the stage of Nafs -i- Mutmainna'. He becomes an authentic individual. The 'Khudi' gets a confirmation of its being fully integrated. The dead and ossified values are replaced by new and life giving values and the society is greatly overhaulled. Diogenes was looking for such a person with a lamp in broad day light in his town persons devoid of creative thinking were, for him, no better than animals.

To appropriate divine attributes is a creative activity. Your principles are reflected in your action. Here, an English philosopher rightly says that your conduct expresses more eloquently than words your moral principles. If there is a disparity between your statement and your actions it is an

indication that you do not have any commitments for your principles or values. You are a stranger to yourself and suffer alienation. you are a useless cog in a big social complex. The zenith of life consists in having a direct vision of God. Iqbal says :

> " You should enjoy privacy with the Divine person in such a way,
> That he sees you and you see Him.
> Become illuminated by the light of 'What you see'.
> Do not wink, otherwise you will be no more.
> In his presence, be strong and self-possessed,
> Don't merge yourself in the Ocean of His Light."
>
> *Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadid*

To create divine attributes amounts to bringing about a great change in your consciousness. It creates such a situation of 'God awareness' that the individual and God both are in each others observation. Such an individual enjoys freedom in the highest sense and overcomes all fears.

[illegible]

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BASIC HUMAN VALUES

I hold that basic human values are objective, and that they constitute the ultimate goals of human effort. Human behaviour shows goal-seeking tendencies. A little consideration would reveal that most of these goals are means for higher ends and these latter for still higher ends. The lower ends exist for the realisation of the highest ends. Since life is an organic unity, these ultimate ends stand interrelated. The highest form of existence that we are acquainted with is our self-conscious existence and the highest value, therefore, is to try to attain as far as possible the ideal form of existence. We have not simply to live but to live a worthy form of existence.

Some people think that all values are subjective, for they are as variable as individuals, and are mere figments of human imagination. Judgments of value are simply statements about the speaker's feelings and express one's likes and dislikes in the case of art and one's feelings of approval and disapproval in the case of morals. An agreeable feeling is a value and a disagreeable experience is a disvalue. G.E. Moore rightly points out that if it were so it would be impossible to argue about questions of value. The same object may arouse opposite feelings in two persons and each would be making a true statement in expressing his feelings and thus there could be no dispute about questions of value. But it is obvious that we do dispute about questions of value and, therefore, the orthodox subjectivist's view must be false.

We come across another form of subjectivism in the writings of Logical Positivists. A. J. Ayer, for example, con-

tends that all ethical concepts are pseudo-concepts. 'The presence of an ethical symbol in a proposition,' Ayer argues, in *Language, Truth and Logic,* 'adds nothing to its factual content. Thus if I say to someone, "You acted wrongly in stealing that money," I am not stating anything else than if I had simply said, "You stole that money." In adding that this action is wrong I am not making any further statement about it. I am simply evincing my moral disapproval of it.' The function of ethical terms, according to him, is purely emotive. It is used to express feelings about certain objects and not to make any assertions about them Ethical judgments are not capable of being true or false, because they do not make any assertion at all, and, therefore, possess no validity. Moral judgments are not genuine propositions. Value judgments are *expressions* and *excitants* of feelings. (Orthodox subjectivists would hold that moral judgments express genuine propositions about a speaker's feelings and that these can be true or false.) Thus in moral matters we cannot argue about the validity of moral principles. When we know that our opponent agrees with us in expressing moral disapproval of all actions of a certain class X, then we may get him to condemn a particular action 'A' by showing that 'A' belongs to type X. This, of course, is a plain question of fact whether 'A' belongs to the type X or not. *All disputes about questions of values are really disputes about questions of fact.*

It is true that in case of disagreement on moral matters, i.e. in deciding whether a particular action is good or bad, reference to facts—the consequences of the action or the motives involved—is made to arrive at an agreement. But this clearly *displays* the conviction that if we could agree to the facts of the case, 'we should find ourselves in agreement on the moral question.' We may differ in our moral judgment in a particular case but we certainly 'agree in our fundamental judgments as to what kinds of consequences ought to be

arrived at.'

Moral judgments are not mere expressions of likes or dislikes, which one might hope to persuade others to feel. When we argue in moral matters we try to convince one another that the liking or the dislike is justified, that is to say, we imply that there is sóme inherent character of the action that *deserves* to be liked or disliked, is good or bad.

There is yet another group of subjectivists who explain value in terms of interest. Spinoza, for example, declared that things are good because they are desired and not desired because they are not good. Professor R.B. Perry, in his *General Theory of Value,* states : 'Any object, whatever it be, acquires values when any interest, whatever it be, is taken in it, just as anything whatsoever becomes a target when any one whosoever aims at it.'

Even this position is not tenable bacause we regard many things good irrespective of the fact whether any person takes interest in them or not. An act of duty is an instance in hand. Our reason informs us that an act done out of respect for the moral law has a value of its own and to deny this would be to distrust the very power of our reason to know reality.

We are thus led to conclude that values are not subjective nor emotive expressions but objective. The subjectivists may again point out that if values are objective then why have values varied from individual to individual, from group to group and from one age to another? Are not values sociologically determined? The objection seems to have force because our critics forget the distinction drawn between the Formal Ideals and the Operative Ideals of value. The formal ideals of value are ingrained in human nature. But the nature of these absolute values has never been known completely to man at any period in the past. It is made known gradually to the developing consciousness of man. The absolute values as they are known to an individual or a group at any time

constitute operative ideals of value. Absolute values, therefore, are apprehended by a group or an individual in the light of their respective social and cultural background. And it is this latter factor that causes all the difference. Operative ideals of value express themselves in what is called the ethos of people, i.e. the moral habitude of people. The traditions, customs, habits, taboos, group code, social institutions, etc., of a group constitute its operative ideals.

Now these formal ideals and operative ideals of value are ends-in-themselves. They are valued for themselves while other objects are valued because they serve as means for the realisation of goods-in-themselves. Basic Human Values are these goods-in-themselves.

Traditionally, Truth, Beauty and Good have been regarded as basic human values and there is no objection in accepting this classification, provided we add that each of these values comprises a number of goods-in-themselves. A new regrouping of these values on the basis of their interrelation would be profitable and I have attempted to classify them in groups which seem to me to constitute the pivot of basic values. But let me first add a few remakrs about basic values in general.

Basic values are the ultimate goals of human effort. The story of human civilisation is a record of efforts made by man to approximate the world within and the world without to these basic and fundamental regulative ends.

Life is dynamic. It grows and develops. And Operative Ideals of value keep pace with life and undergo a steady process of change both in the individual and the group. It is the paramount duty of the individual to conform his conduct to the Operative Ideals of his group and yet it is his duty to approximate, through reflection, Operative Ideals of value to the Formal Ideals as much as possible with all the limitations of time and place. Such attempts towards appro-

ximation result in what is called 'transvaluation of values.' (The group too keeps expanding for the individual. Starting with family as the group, it expands to community, to state, to *blocs* of states and finally to humanity.)

Basic values are interrelated bacause life is an organic unity. Life which is in itself a fundamental value forms the base for all other values; the significance of all values consists in making life richer and fuller both internally and externally. Basic human values are so interrelated and interdependent that each of these goods-in-themselves may become means for the realisation of other goods. These are ends-in-themselves but are not complete in themselves. They may be described as cooperative end values which are in harmony with the systematic manifoldness that belongs to human nature. These constitute an order, and, therefore, in the event of a conflict of values lesser good is to be sacrificed for the sake of the higher good, and sometimes recourse may even have to be taken to the lesser of the two evils in order to promote general good. War, for example, is a positive evil and yet sometimes nations have to take recourse to it for self-preservation and protection and promotion of ideals. Again, the claims of self-love and benevolence may conflict and in such cases we do not have a dualism of practical reason. We have simply to sacrifice the lesser good for the higher good. Our duty is not simply to promote one value, pleasure or culture, or knowledge or goodwill but the promotion of all values.

Classification of basic values. On the basis of the interconnection of basic values, I have classified them in the following groups. I do not claim that these groups completely exhaust all goods-in-themselves. All that I would like to emphasise is that these seem to cover, to a great extent, basic human values.

1. The first group includes life in all its forms (plant,

animal and human life) together with its preservation and procreation, health and efficiency. This refers, of course, to the life of individuals and groups, i.e. the existence and coexistence of groups governed by different ideologies.

2. *Character values.* This includes goodwill, rational prudence or integration of personality, all self-regarding virtues like courage, temperance, purity, wisdom, decisiveness of choice, perseverance and humility ; benevolence, recognition and performance of duty.

3. *Social values.* Mutual cooperation, perfect honesty and fidelity in all one's relationships with others (this would include business honesty) ; group solidarity which is to be sought through the maintenance of social institutions ; love as expressed in friendship and justice as expressed in the principle of equality of consideration.

4. *Pleasure values.* This group includes pleasures of body as consistent with the requirements of temperance (that is, all values of play and leisure); happiness as experienced in devotion to goods-in-themselves ; peace and relief from pain.

5. *Freedom values.* This group includes freedom of thought and expression, i.e. criticism of existing ideals or system; freedom of belief and worship and tolerance.

6. *Aesthetic values.* This includes the values of beauty as found in nature and works of art, i.e. both appreciation and creation of beauty.

7. *Truth values.* This group includes culture and knowledge together with expansion of knowledge. This consists in bringing the nature of the Highest Good or Absolute Values to clear consciousness and indicating the means by which this end is to be attained.

Spritiual or religious values may also be added to the list of values. God as the Universal Mind may be conceived as the source of all absolute values. It may be noted that

there is no real antithesis between secularism and spiritualism. Material prosperity has always been a condition of spiritual growth. All nations contributed to the intellectual, moral and spiritual fund of the world, in the heyday of their glory. Yet this point was missed by Buddhism, Christianity and all forms of mysticism. It is, no doubt, our duty to develop the spiritual element in man. But this should not lead to the renunciation of the external world. Rather, the light received from within ought to shed its radiance over our activities leading to harmonising of the world of value.

Looking over these groups of basic values I find character values as possessing the highest significance. All values are moral values in as much as it must be moral to promote them. Highest importance, therefore, is to be attached to the choice of the good and the effort to realise it and this is possible only through character. Life is action; it is a constant flow and all activity possesses value, positive or negative. Kant rightly laid emphasis on the right direction of will, for it is only through right-directed will that positive values or goods-in-themselves are promoted and realised. Now character does not consist in single choices but rather in the formation of good habits, i.e. habits of deliberate choice. Deliberate choice presupposes knowledge. 'In order to choose the right, one must know the right.' A man of good character, therefore, possesses insight into the meaning and significance of the Good. Again, character means habitual predominance of the universe of duty. This is possible through complete self-control and integration of personality. A man of good character, therefore, chooses the good and actively seeks to realise it. It is, therefore, character which, in my opinion, constitutes the *summum bonum* of all basic values.

The emphasis, thus, lies on the individual who, as a soldier of an ideal, is to work for its realisation in life. But left to himself the individual cannot develop all the virtues

necessary for the promotion and realisation of values. He is neither a god nor a beast but is a social being and needs a society, a state, based on the ideals of justice to provide him opportunities to develop his faculties fully. This could be ideally realised in a truly democratic state. But democracy presupposes education and political awareness of the highest type among its people. A democratic state is a well-organised society where social, spiritual, aesthetic and truth values all tend to thrive and the individual has better opportunities of realising all real values in life.

CULTURAL RELATIVISM AND MORALITY

Historically speaking, there has been going on in ethics a debate between the relativists and the absolutists since the days of Socrates regarding the nature of value. The debate has been primarily about the metaphysics of morals. The relativists and the absolutists disagree as to what value really is. Again, the relativists among themselves differ on the question whether value is relative to pleasure or interest or attitude or fulfilment. The absolutists cannot decide which value is absolute—Good, Beauty, Charity, Benevolence.

Ethical or better, metaphysical relativism, has to be distinguished from the theory that values are relative to culture, society and history. The latter view is a special case of a wider category which the anthropologists call Cultural Relativism. It regards values relative to each cultural unit. 'Values are relative to culture and what any culture approves is right for that culture.' Here is an echo of Protagoras' famous saying, 'Man is the measure of all things', heard across the corridor of over two thousand years with a host of sociologists and anthropologists as the new champions of an old doctrine with this modification that Protagoras' individual man is taken to represent a cultural unit. It is obvious that such an approach when taken to its bitter logical end results in a virtual denial of all values. Values on such a view are mere facts of historical accident. And a devotee of cultural relativism may say with Sir Richard Burton:

There is no good, there is no bad, these be the whims
of mortal will;
What works me weal that call I good, what harms and
Hurts I hold as ill.
They change with space, they shift with race, and in
the veriest space of time,
Each vice has worn a virtue's crown, all good been
banned as sin and crime.

Such a relativism amounts to ethical scepticism. This attack on ethics as a normative study has been made by sociology and anthropology and the resultant scepticism has to be distinguished from the scepticism which philosophers of language have introduced in modern ethics. The naturalism of the logical positivists admits the distinction between the factual and the normative but reduces the latter to something emotive and to meaninglessness. This makes ethics a natural but non-cognitive discipline. Ethical terms, they hold, have no descriptive meaning. Their only meansing is emotive. At the most, definition of an ethical term is persuasive definition. By an appeal to feelings and emotions, better by arousing such feelings, we try our opponent to have a certian emotive attitude towards certain practices or objects. Thus disagreement in moral matters is either a disagreement about facts or about emotive attitude or a persuasive disagreement. We are in persuasive disagreement when we try to help a person to have a certain attitude but he resists. The peculiarity of the ethical terms is their expressive or evocative power. Moral words are pseudo-concepts. They are not descriptive at all. The same holds true of moral judgements.

The contemporary group of analytic ethicists represented by S. E. Toulmin has not made any significant change in the position adopted by the logical positivists of the twenties and the thirties of the present century. In his *The Place of Reason in Ethics*, S. E. Toulmin argues that there are often reasons and good reasons for acting as we do and these reasons are not to be confused with prudential considerations.

He writes, 'A major weakness of the imperative doctrine of ethics is, therefore, this . . . . it treats ethical statements, which approximate in some respects to commands and interjections, as if they were just commands and interjections. And this paradox is inevitable if one is to dismiss all evaluative inferences as beyond the scope of reasoning. If we are to overcome it, we must grant that ethical reasoning is possible, so that some types of reasoning are "good'. and some "bad"—some of the arguments leading to true conclusions "valid" ones, and all which lead to false conclusions invalid' (p. 53). But he restricts the use of ethical reasoning to a narrow limit, a limit determined by decisions about *an individual action* and *criticism and modification of our social practices.* 'Ethical reasoning may be able to show why we ought to do this action as opposed to that, or advocate this social practice as opposed to that, but it is no help where there is no choice' (p. 162). A closer study of Toulmin's thesis shows that reasons are treated by him just as an extension of emotions as those functioned in the thought of the logical positivists. It is only the rhetorical use of language that he ultimately emphasises. We find in his treatment a more faithful account of how people persuade others and help themselves when in quandaries. This position is quite compatible with a complete denial of the reality of values.

The logical positivists thus make the distinction which the whole movement of modern thought has worked to establish—the distinction between fact and value. Instead of carrying out the implications of this distinction by recognising that the methods of ascertaining the one must basically be different from that of discovering the other, it assumes that since the methods used in establishing facts are not relevant in the domain of values, and supposition that there is a domain of values is nonsense. The method of empirical sciences is limited to a study of facts. And it is obvious that a method which has been calculated to deal with facts is incapable of establishing or overthrowing a single assertion

concerning values. This limitation of the range of the scientific method may stress the need of a new method for a study of values. Values have not to be brushed aside as meaningless simply because value judgements cannot be subjected to the logical empiricists' test of 'verification.' I believe there is in the phenomenon of value something which does not belong to things considered under the aspect of their being—the aspect which empirical sciences study for establishing factual statements. In this paper I propose to examine the thesis of 'ethical relativism' as advocated by cultural relativism and intend to show that the fact that values vary in different periods of history and with different people is compatible with the intuition that morality is not simply an historical accident and that values control and guide the historical process. The objectivity in morals which I shall try to indicate may meet the situation created by the philosopher of language.

I

It must be admitted that the facts which modern anthropology and sociology have brought to light regarding cultural and moral diversity cannot be denied. But when these facts are made the basis of ethical relativism, the latter is put forward as a theory to explain the fact of cultural diversity. To say that in different periods in history men in different societies had different notions of right and wrong and different moral codes is one thing and to say that these facts establish ethical relativism is quite another. For the former pertains to facts while the latter is a theory constructed on the basis of facts furnished by sociology and anthropology. Thus Professor Felix M. Keesing summarising the viewpoint of cultural relativists, states, '. . . . . . one culture cannot be judged scientifically as better or worse than another because no absolute measure or external standard of culture-free character can be established. The "good," the

"right," the "beautiful" do not exist by themselves as objective or absolute entities, even though our language of generalization sometimes seems to imply this. Rather they relate to behaviour in a particular cultural tradition. Where a person trained in our culture may be horrifed by customs such as head-hunting or cannibalism, people in another culture may look upon them as highly sacred acts of great worth. What one defines as a ceremony of great beauty' another may judge to be cruel or wasteful or meaningless' *(Cultural Anthropology,* p. 181). Cultural relativism thus rejects any standards or scales of worth over and above particular cultural traditions, as to what is 'good,' 'right,' 'beautiful' and otherwise 'evaluative.'

To say that values are relative to culture implies that in the event of conflict between different standards there is no way of deciding between them, for every standard is peculiar to its own group and reflects its characteristic point of view. Moral judgements are thus incomplete unless they state the specific 'standpoint' from which they are made. Moral judgements are regarded as expressions of the *bias* of a particular group or community. Professor Singer correctly remarks, 'On this view . . . . there is nothing that can correctly be said to be right or wrong, it is only a question of *what is called* "right" or "wrong" and by what group it is so called.' *(Generalization in Ethics,* p. 329).

Herskovits, a leading exponent of cultural relativism, finds in "this tough-minded philosophy" as he calls it, a great promise for promoting respect and tolerance of conventions other than our own, for it lays stress on the 'dignity inherent in every body of custom' (such a position would be in a way ethical universalism, rather than relativism!).

So far so good. But when this tough-minded philosophy is put forward as a theory to explain this wide divergency of values in different cultures, it is hardly tenable. In the first place, the facts have been greatly exaggerated. A study of value systems of different cultures indicates that

some values are not relative while others are. The anthropologists and sociologists are busy discovering 'cultural universals' or 'high frequency values' common to different cultures. Krober is cautious and suggests that the question how far values are 'relative and variable or universal and permanent . . . is fundamental scientific question which will not be anwsered soon.' Recent trends in this field however indicate, in the words of Professor Keesing,relativism pure and simple. '. . . . . Though, for example, as many interpretations of "truth" exist as there are cultures, a very great range of phenomena are considered "true" in all of them, particularly connected with the external world : night will follow day, man has a need for food, all men die. Less universal are standards of "beauty," though here, too, some matters of aesthetic form, such as sight and sound rhythms, may be universally appreciated. "Goodness" and "rightness" *are notably relative to particular cultural patterns.'* Thus it is urged that morals are 'the sanctification of existing mores' or that they merely 'reflect the underlying institutional reality.'

II

First let us consider the assertion that morals are 'the sanctification of the existing mores' or that they merely 'reflect the underlying institutional reality'. As a *reductio ad absurdum* of the thesis of cultural relativism, it is argued that to hold that morality of each group or social unit is relative to the institutional order prevalent in the group and to no other group which has a different institutional set-up is to imply that a group of thieves is justified in stealing and that Robinhood with his band of outlaws committed no immorality for all that they did in the Greenwood. To say that such a conclusion would be shocking to your 'moral sense' does not carry much weight with the cultural relativists. Empiricial facts and emotional attitudes

may not go together in some cases, and your approval and disapproval of a certain course of action is no guarantee for the 'rightness' of an action. When Florence Nightingale decided upon a career of nursing, the Victorian society was greatly shocked. The Arabs of the Pre-Isalmic days regarded the burying alive of their daughters as a normal routine. 'Morals are not alien to the existing social order but must reflect and sanctify existing institutions.' A change in the social order, argues the cultural relativist, is a signal for the moral order to change. Thus the changes in the latter are derivative and are controlled by changes in the social order. And if you ask how the changes in the social order take place, the answer is that these are resultant upon 'unconscious social adjustment rooted in changing social needs.' These needs are unforeseen, abrupt and emergent. Thus morals of an age are relative to the prevalent social institutions and are rooted in the historical process.

A cultural relativist here appears to put the cart before the horse. Moral reforms precede rather than follow institutional changes. It is true that different values have emerged in human consciousness at different times in the past and certain social and political conditions were perhaps necessary for the emergence of a particular value. 'Effective moral ideals are elicited by circumstances. But they are not *created by them.* It is a prejudice of modern sociology, a prejudice which sociology has taken over from biology, to try to explain the *inner* by the *outer,*' observes Lowes Dickinson. The moral ideals praised by the thinkers of the period of Greek enlightenment advocate individualistic morality and assign no place to benevolence in their system of values. The basis of the Greek City-State was mutualistic. When the institutional order became individualistic and competitive, benevolence emerged as a dominant value. Again, social consciousness of the late Stoicism and early Christianity appeared while Roman culture was individualistic. Moral ideals thus have been compensatory to the social institutions

rather than a mere sanctification of them. Nay, one could go even a step further : the ideals have reacted on the institutional orders and modified them. the social consciousness of Christianity and of late Stoicism did in fact weaken the vigorous individualism of Rome, and 'the Renaissance ideals which were typically individualistic did help destory the prescriptive social order of feudalism and medieval church.' Moral ideals have thus been compensatory and have also been responsible for changes in the social order. The late Professor Kirby aptly remarks, '. . . . The persistence with which compensatory moral ideals have emerged in history suggest the possibility of universal values which transcend any local cultural situation' *(Objectivity in Moral Inquiry).*

The upholders of ethical relativity appear to overlook how the process of moral growth of a people takes place. Regarding our knowledge of facts and the laws that explain these facts, we are indebted to the specialists in various fields of study. Our progress in these fields is not taking place abruptly by some process of natural selection. And moral progress too does not take place in a vacuum. We are born into a social universe. Among the elements of this universe we can distinguish three units—operative values, social institutions and set behaviour patterns. These elements are interrelated. 'The culture of a people is its total equipment of ideas and institutions and conventionalized activities' (Robert Redfield). Thus each group has a certain system of values, social institutions and habitual modes of action required rather by half-unconscious imitation than by any distinct commandments. The individual finds these three elements in the social environment but they are not present in a harmonious blend. Very often a people's ideal does not bear a close resemblance to their institutions or habits. 'A religion of peace and goodwill is compatible with thumb-screw.' Existence of polygamic family is not always a guarantee of social purity. The significance of moral progress lies in bringing the incompatible elements to a properly adjusted

order so as to elevate the ideas, improve the institutions and the patterns of behaviour. This adjustment does not take place automatically but is the result of the efforts of certain individuals who by active participation in and reflective withdrawal from the social life of the community interpret the existing values more consistently and press them back to the principles on which they rest. In fact, values are the instruments of social evolution.

A cultural relativist ignores the distinction that is made between moral ought and the axiological ought. The former operates in the field of interpersonal relationships while the field of the latter has no direct relevance to persons other than oneself. And there may be a conflict between the obligatoriness that arises from the axiological ought and the one that results from the moral ought. Cultural anthropology and sociology lay emphasis on the field of the moral ought—the field that was described by Bradley as 'my station and its duties.' But when an intellectual or an artist or a reformer ignores his social or domestic duties, he does so because of the call of a higher but conflicting value. The obligatoriness that they feel in the context of their axiological ought is fundamentally to their own vision and not to what others think or feel or value. Their loyalty is to the transpersonally prehended value and if there is any conflict between value thus apprehended and the duties of personal or social obligation they invariably choose the former and assert it against all opposition. The locus of value prehension is in the individual. The axiological ought is not socio-or anthropo-centric. 'Rather, it reveals the transcendent nature of the value claim and orientates humanity to a transhuman dimension.'

An odd consequence of the cultural relativism is that one who acts according to the cultural patterns of his society can commit no wrong. The relative value thus becomes 'absolute' for the individual. It may here be pointed out that culturally socities are not homogeneous. There are subcultures in a society and if the frame of reference for right-

ness of an action is constituted by the norms of a culture, how is the individual to guide himself? Has he to conform to the main culture or the sub-culture? If, as Herskovits holds, 'objective indices of cultural inferiority and superiority cannot be established,' there is no way out for the individual. He may seek conformity to the sub-culture norms or main culture norms or may defy both.

Again, cultural relativism ignores the distinction between what is valued and what is worthy to be valued. What a person values depends upon a number of factors, viz. temperamental and situational, 'relatively' permanent and temporary (emotions), social and personal. These factors are not constant and are subject to change. People differ in their degree of moral sensitivity or value orientation and hence the difference in their assessment of what is good. It was Kant who divorced morality completely from experience. In his metaphysics he made the fusion of sensation and reason a necessary condition for knowledge. The forms of sensibility and the categories of understanding must receive material through experience before knowledge of phenomina could be possible. In the realm of morality, however, he held that the moral law needed no content to be filled in by experience. He held the relation between fact and value as self-evident and a priori. The whole tradition of the Cambridge Platonism adhered to this point of view. The relation between fact and value had to be intuited and if you were lacking in intuitive power you would always find yourself in quandary about moral matters. Again, exceptions to moral rules and cases of conflict between genuinely intuited values would be difficult to resolve on the basis of self-evident relation between fact and value. It may be noted that ethical generalizations are vindicated by the facts they create. Sati was practised for a very long time by the Indians and many a noble life was prematurely lost for want of a clear intuition regarding the requirements of fidelity and chastity. Only legislative measures made the Indians realise

that there were other ways for a widow to vindicate her loyalty to her husband. Facts do not create values. But values are inescapably connected with facts. Reflection on the facts in the light of the experience of the race and the community, social group and the individual and also an examination of human aspirations help determine values. 'Morality is not the same thing as public opinion nor is it always in accord with it.' Operative values of a group are confirmed by their workability, by the facts they create. There is in the very phenomenon of value an exigency for its highest realisation, its highest fulfilment. It is only experience which shows how far the operative values attain approximation to the ideal of maximum degree of intensity.

III

Professor Singer in *Generalization in Ethics* has tried to reconcile the fact of relativism and morality on the basis of the distinction between *moral principles* and *moral rules.* He regards moral principles as universal, that is, they hold under all circumstances and admit of no exception. Further, these principles do not come into conflict with each other and are always relevant. These provide the ground of moral rules. As to the difference between moral principles and moral rules, Professor Singer states, '. . . . moral principles are more general, pervasive and fundamental than rules.' These principles are involved in the justification and establishment of moral rules. By a moral rule, he implies a proposition to the effect that a certain kind of action is generally right or generally wrong. 'Moral rules are, therefore, conditional statements. They state what is right or wrong usually or for the most part. Our moral rules . . . . appear to conflict . . . . . . only because we mistakenly try to analyse them in terms of unconditional rather than conditional statements. When they are regarded as concealed, conditional statements, an adequate analysis of the conditions, will always remove

the possibility of conflict.'

Among the moral rules he distinguishes between fundamental rules, *local rules* and *neutral norms.* Local rules–customs, traditions–and neutral norms–rules of the road, library rules, rules regarding payment of taxes, etc–involve an essential reference to social needs and purposes, are more closely tied to their context and are less comprehensive. These depend on variations in social and geographical conditions. They vary with different circumstance. Fundamental moral rules like promise-breaking and telling truth, however, do not depend on variations ; they are more general and comprehensive than the local rules and are relatively free from context. All moral rules are interconnected because they are established by moral principle, especially by the principle called generalization argument.

Among the moral principles he lays all emphasis on *the generalization principle,* the *generalization argument* and the principle of justification. The statement of the first is : 'what is right for one person must be right for anyone in the same or similiar circumstance,' while the second is expressed thus : 'if everyone were to do X, the consequences would be disastrous, therefore no one ought to do X or what would happen if everyone did that?, The third is formulated in the words : 'any violation of moral rules must be justified.'

Professor Singer claims that the moral principles he calls generalization argument and the generalization principle demonstrate how different moral codes and moral rules in different circumstances with different people under different geographical conditions can be established and justified by these principles. But when we examine his moral principles, the inadequacy of Professor Singer's analysis is made obvious. His moral principles are not *relevant under all circumstances.* Take, for example, the generalization argument. It throws no light on the 'utility calculus' on which the hypothetical major premise is based. That is to say, it gives no informa-

tion as to how to ascertain that a certain act would lead to disastrous or undesirable consequences on the whole. Further, the formation of the generalization argument is elliptic, for the argument is mediated by the generalization principle. A more adequate statement of the generalization argument would be : if the consequences of every one's acting or being treated in a certain way would be disastrous (undesirable) then no one ought to act or be treated in that way without a reason. Thus the generalization argument works under the condition of 'limited universality.' Again, 'everyone' and 'no one' apply to certain class of persons. Further, the generalization argument operates under certain conditions. It is not valid if it is invertible.

But even with all these restrictions and limitations, it fails to establish the morality of a certain course of action. Let us admit that it applies not to every person but to every similar person in similar circumstances. Now, consider the case of a Shylock or a dishonest business man who makes a valid application of the generalization argument in defence of his practice. What would happen if everyone behaved like Antonio? The consequences would be disastrous, therefore everyone ought to follow Shylock's practice. Similarly, a dishonest business man could justify his profiteering and black marketeering so long as he remains confined to the narrow limits of the class denoted by the term business man. The generalization argument can thus be used for justifying *any* point of view. And such a principle could hardly be regarded as a moral principle.

Now, take the generalization principle. It is a modified form of the principle of *equality*, as the canon of distributive justice, and operates only if the goods to be distributed were unlimited in extent. If the members of a besieged garrision were to follow the principle of generalization under circumstances where the provisions were not to last long enough till the arrival of the relief, the result would be 'disastrous.' The generalization principle thus ceases to be

operative under all circumstances. Professor Singer might retort that his principle works under the condition of 'limited universality.' Exceptions then could be made even to the principles. This destroys the distinction between moral rules and moral principles. Moral principles are not operative under all circumstances. Psychological justification exists for violation of every moral rule. 'Human evil is largely human weakness' (Maslow). Professor Singer brings in the condition of 'limited universality' because he could not keep in mind the fact that moral judgement is not a judgement *an act* but on the *value of end.* It is the promotion of an end that constitutes your moral duty and not the performance of a certain act under all circumstanees.

The generalization argument justifies only the existing norms in a society. It works against all improvement. Moral codes prevalent in society at a particular period in its history derive their sanction from their utility to the group. A strict adherence to the customs, traditions and to all that the ethical code stands for is required by the argument, 'What would happen if everyone did X?' And when a reformer, a Buddha, or a Socrates, appears and reflects on the values prevalent in a society he is not moved by utilitarian considerations. Perhaps the latter would require him to leave the moral order of his people undisturbed. When he preaches new ideas he is ridiculed and subjected to all sorts of torture. His contemporaries use the generalization argument against his innovation. Social prejudices die very hard. It is only with the passage of time and with education that the reasonableness of the new ideas is brought home to a people. The generalization argument justifies only the *existing morals* and thus *relativism* and does not point to values which could provide rational foundation to any system of operative values.

From formal principles moral rules cannot be derived. Kant made this mistake when he advocated complete divorce between morality and experience. Professor Singer has made

an attempt at the logic of ethics and secures the truth of the hypothetical major of his generalization argument by accounting for all exceptions to the major on the basis of the principle of justification. This opens the door to relativism and controversy in ethics, for justification can be found for any custom, practice, tradition, etc. And, further the hypothetical 'ought' destroys the distinction between moral and non-moral choices.

IV

We now pass on to a consideration of the characteristics of the phenomenon of value with a view to discover if any basis could be found in the very nature of value–phenomenon which could explain the fact of moral diversity and at the same time confirm the objectivity of values. What do we find when we consider the value aspect of an object, i.e. an aspect which does not fall under the category of the being of the object? Natural sciences study objects under the aspect of their being and try to discover the laws which govern and explain facts regarding the being of the objects. These try to answer questions regarding the what and the how of things. When we consider the value aspect of things we in a way transcend these considerations. The first thing to note in this connection is that we have a certain seeking or avoiding attitude towards the value object depending, of course, upon the positive or negative value involved. It may be urged that even a sensation or a purpose may have a colouring of a positive or negative attitude. How is the evaluational attitude to be distinguished from the former? My submission is that in case of value it is a *fundamental significance* that you attach to the object, which affects your conduct and you orient yourself accordingly. There is an element of relative permanence in this significance or meaning which is wholly lacking in things when considered under the aspect of their being. It is like taking a position toward the object involving

choice. It has a significance which is valid beyond sensations and personal ends. Now this fundamental significance or 'meaning-totality' has a creative aspect which results in created good. The 'created good' belongs to or forms a part of what I would like to call the 'content-range' of value. The content-range of a value undergoes a steady process of change both in the individual and the race. The application of a certain value to concrete situation is subject to modification consequent upon experience. The total content-range of a value increases gradually and all the local, historical and geographical factors have their say in the formation of the total content-range of a value. The 'informalists' (i.e. the followers of Wittgenstein) lay emphasis on the multifunctional theory of language and deny that ethical terms have clear-cut meanings. The word "good" does not mean 'A,' it means that good may be either 'A,' or 'B' or 'C,' etc. There is only a 'family resemblance' between the many things to which the term good is applicable. There is no common essence with respect to which they are called good. The emphasis in this linguistic analysis is on the content-range of a value term while the creative aspect of the phenomenon of value is ignored. The informalists direct attention more to the characteristics of language than to the objective facts of human experience. 'The lingusitic form is worthy of analysis, but the act, which is subject to congnitive description, should not be lost to sight.'

The creative aspect refers to the 'qualitative meaning' of value and is organic to life. It provides guidance to life and conduct and makes life 'meaningful.' It creates good, leads to satisfaction of human wants and to richness of experience. Meaning or significance, thus understood, is something to which naturalistic considerations do not apply. It is for this reason that Eduard Spranger remarks that when he tries to discover the meaning in or behind all the striving of human life he is dealing with some spiritual type of phenomenon which cannot be reduced to naturalistic

terms and he associates it with the question of value.

Besides this 'meaning-totality' there emerges another aspect of the phenomenon of value. I have said above that values provide direction to life. The valuable demands a striving towards it. The striving is sometimes for the valuable-in-itself because of its meaning content and sometimes because it is valuable for me or for other. This distinction is described as intrinsic and instrumental aspects of value. Instrumental value is grounded in intrinsic value. But this distinction is not always kept in view and much of the confusion in the field of values is due to a mixing of instrumental with intrinsic values.

A further point to note is that all valuation involves a formal relationship to human consciousness. Values, therefore, cannot be discussed in behaviouristic terms, for these make no reference to consciousness. This relationship has been described in naturalistic terms by different philosophers. Spinoza, for example, held that '. . . we deem a thing to be good because we strive for it, wish for it, long for it, or desire it '*(Ethics).* R. B. Perry came very near this when he said, 'Any object, whatever it be, acquires value when any interest, whatever it be, is taken in just as anything whatsoever becomes a traget when anyone whosoever aims at it.' Hartmann made this reference to a subject the basis of a "a special value evidence", an evidence that bestows normative character upon ethics. Philosophers may differ as to the exact nature of this relation of value to human consciousness but the fact remains that the phenomenon of value does contain this reference.

Further, values admit of different degrees of realisation in the concrete. For example, we talk of the value of character, personality, health, etc; and there are individual differences in the actual manifestation of these. Professor Rintelen makes an acute observation when he says, 'It is only by means of different intensity or degree of fulfilment that we can determine whether we are dealing with a phenomenon

of value for there is an exigency within all values towards the highest possible fulfilment.' Moore rightly points out that no limit could be conceived to the lower and upper limits of the degree of intensity of a value. We cannot conceive of an ideally healthy man or of a man whose health is completely broken. For the content-range of a value is discovered gradually with the advancing consciousness of man. It is only the 'qualitative meaning' aspect, the formal aspect, that remains relatively constant and gives continuity to value experience. I have said relatively constant, for it has a dynamism because of its being organic to life.

Further, values differ in their degree of intimate relation to human existence. Religious and moral values are more deeply connected with life than external goods. The latter may even have negative value as when external goods are used for destructive purposes. A value may thus be high-in-rank and deep in penetration. This aspect of value Phenomenon is described by Professaor Rintelen as height-depth dimension. He writes, 'It may be observed first of all, that every inner value tendency presses forward to surpass the degree already attained. This advance, however, is bidirectional, in that we discern an aspect of depth as well as an aspect of height-in-rank as typical phenomenon of value realisation. By depth, then, I mean penetrating from the general form into the nucleus of a thing, which would in turn reflect varying degrees of fulfilment. In this sense we might talk of the depth-psychologists penetrating into the core of the soul, the creative composer unveiling the depths of aesthetic, the ethical philosophers delving into the depths of existential moral duties, and the theological expounding the religious truth.'

Values, since they are organic to life, are interconnected and form an hierarchy. Sometimes two or more values compete for simultaneous fulfilment. Cases of moral quandary are not infrequent in the life of both individuals and communities. Prejudices, emotional involvments, traditions

and earlier commitments do not permit us to perceive things in their true perspective. And a well incubated decision may not be vindicated by the consequences it leads to. It is only experience that helps us to fill the content-range aspects of values. Individual's and groups differ in their history, economic and social conditions. The climate of opinion has a local colouring and is distinctly relative to the ethos of a group. Thus operative values differ with different groups or in the same group at different times in their history. These facts the cultural relativists very convincingly establish. They pin themselves down to the content-range aspect of values only. Behind the content-range there is the creative the formal aspect, the aspect which gives continuity and freshness to values and makes existence meaningful. A cultural relativist is in fact bound and has his alliance with the concrete. All this is quite useful. But *as I have said above, facts do not create* values, though the latter are no doubt inescapably connected with facts. Values constitute the goals of our endeavour, but these goals are not far off, distant ends which lie in a remote future. They are operative in the present because values are organic to life. Life does not move towards fixed goals. It creates new goals and directs itself accordingly. *Values are vindicated by* the facts they create. A particular conclusion may be *validated* by referring to the rules of inference, but the rules themselves cannot be validated; they can only be vindicated by their facilitating reasoning and communication. Again, a particular belief may be verified by an appeal to induction, but the principle of induction cannot be verified; it can only be vindicated. A moral judgement may be validated by reference to a principle or *norm,* but the principle or norm itself cannot be validated, it can only be vindicated by the facts it produces, by the pattern of behaviour it establishes. Again, the appeal to practice may initiate, in the light of the consequences, a process of valuation which leads us back to a re-examination of our existing norms and beliefs and still again to the conse-

quences. This process continues and leads to what Nietzsche described as 'transvaluation of values.'

Now, values admit of a great degree of variation in respect of their intensity, 'height' and 'depth'. There is a still greater difference in their content-range. Eskimos show their 'filial piety' by killing parents who are too old and weak to survive the rigours of arctic region. If their experience could lead them to discover ways and means to control their climatic conditions their 'filial piety' would surely exhibit itself in new patterns of behaviour, patterns that would not give shock to men of refined moral sensibility. And these degrees of variation in the very phenomenon of value account for the 'relativity' which the advocates of cultural relativisim emphasise. But these variations are compatible with the objectivity that the moralists claim for values. Ethical architectonic does depend on sociological structure, traditions, attitudes and other temporal factors. But these pertain to the content-range aspect of values. Moral judgements have differed with different people or with the same people at different times. It is because moral judgement is, as has been pointed out by James Balfour, conclusion of a syllogism in which the major premise is suppressed, and the minor premise is scientifically or empirically established. For example, if you were to ask me why I ought to tell the truth, I may asnwer : because truth telling is conducive to the welfare of society. This argument has a suppressed major premise which alone justifies the conclusion, and the suppressed premise is : I ought to do that which is conducive to the welfare of society. The minor premise is established by experience but the major cannot be evolved from a scientific or a metaphysical proposition. It is the growth in empirical knowledge, i.e. knowledge about facts that modifies the minor premise. Even cases of 'moral' improvement result from improved knowledge as has been suggested by Maslow in *Psychological Data and Value Theory.* He contends, 'I find it sometimes amusing, sometimes

saddening that so many scholars and scientists, so many philosophers and theologians, who talk about human values, of good and evil, proceed in complete disregard of the plain fact that professional psychotherapists every day, as a matter of course, change and improve human nature, help people to become more strong. virtuous, creative, kind, loving, altruistic, serene. These are only some of the consequences of improved self-knowledge and self-acceptance.'

This stress on experience or scientific procedure is given proper emphasis by the instrumentalists when they assert that good is to be constructed out of experience. Cultural relativists pin their faith on the tangible and the obervable fact of created good. But the question is : what is it that makes the constructed good good? Left to itself it is only fact, neither good nor evil. From "X is the case" it does not follow that X is good or X ought to be (fallacy of factualism). Existentialist thinkers would say that the fact of choice makes all the difference and the instrumentalists would hold that their life fulfilment makes them good. But then it may be urged, why should I choose freely or why should I be devoted to life fulfilment? This can be answered only by asserting the suppressed major premise, viz. one ought to choose freely or life fulfilment is desirable.

V

And, lastly, is not the fact of diversity in values peculiar to different cultures over-emphasised by the cultural relativists? Are there no values which are common to various groups with different cultural backgrounds? What about love, justice, truthfulness and courage as positive values and murder, betrayal, incest (parent-child marriage), taboo and personal hate as negative values? Ethical universals or near universals are admitted by some cultural anthropologists but with a certain restraint and hesitation. The late Professor Clyde Kluckholn remarks, 'Ethical universals are not to be

equated with absolutes. They lead us to "conditional absolutes," "moving absolutes," not in the metaphysical sense but in the empirical sense.'

Herskovit, the "high priest" of relativism in his *Cultural Anthropology*, brings out the difference between an absolute and a universal in these words, 'Absolutes are fixed and, as far as convention is concerned, are not admitted to have variation, to differ from culture to culture, from epoch to epoch. Universals, on the other hand, are those least common denominators to be extracted from the range of variation that all phenomena of the natural or cultural world manifest.' This brings us to the consideration of the type of objectivity that is claimed for moral values.

To begin with, it is obvious that the moral law is not objective in the same sense in which we regard law of natural sciences or fact as objective. The reason is that moral law has a reference to mind. It cannot be independent of mind whereas a law of natural science entails no such reference. Moral law, as we know, is a set of imperatives and it makes no sense to say that there are commands although there may be no mind. Nor can the moral law be regarded as self-evident or as having intuitive certainty, for developments in modern logic and mathematics have shown that self-evidence is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for validity or truth. It is well known to a student of history of modern European philosophy that Descartes made self-evidence of *cogito ergo sum* the basis of his abstractly rational system, only to be told by the empiricists that what he regarded as self-evident did not appear so to them. And it was certainly not because of any 'metaphysical or logical blindness' on the part of the empiricists but because of the fact that the doctrine of self-evidence is not logical but only *psychologistic*. To understand the objectivity of the moral law it is, I think, necessary to keep in mind the fact that moral law was in its beginning indistinguishable from the political law. In primitive societies, there is no distinction made between the

two. Moral law appears as a distinct entity at a later stage in the community life of a people. The emergence of moral law as a distinct entity marks the transfer of the legislation of the law from the head of the tribe to the agent himself.

The philosophers of language who lay all emphasis on the emotive meaning of ethical terms just overlook the fact that at a certain stage in the community life of a people, moral law is indistinguishable from political law. A political law admits of different interpretations as is clear from the fact that lawyers dispute over interpretation of law while arguing cases in a law court. They are not simply emotive in all their arguments. They give reasons in defence of their thesis and the reasons may be strong or weak, their interpretation may be true or false. Similarly, in passing moral judgement, the agent is interpreting moral law and the interpretation may be valid or invalid. true or false. When you condemn Eichmann's solution of the Jew problem, you are not simply expressing your feelings or trying to be emotive. Extermination of millions of people is a positive evil. It is *really* true that Hitler and Eichmann acted badly in killing the Jews. Philosophers of language make no clear distinction between rational argument and mere rhetorical use of language.

A person who gets a clear notion of the moral law regards it as a system of commands *which he himself endorses in giving.* The objectivity of the moral law implies that it is such that any reasonable man who has the requisite information will concur in giving. Reasonableness is more than rationality. A reasonable person is, as has been pointed out by William Kneale, one who is willing to consider reasons for modifying his preferences. Moral law is a set of commands which is legislated not by the head of a tribe or a government nor by some divine agency but by what Adam Smith described as an intelligent, impartial and sympathetic spectator. Moral law is not relative to a particular tribe or state or country or culture. We do not talk of an Egyptian moral

law or a Russian moral law. Moral law is above all ethnic peculiarities and geographical boundries. We do want others to agree with our moral judgements but this agreement is not sought on the ground of persuasive definition, nor because we regard moral judgements as an expression of our likes and dislikes, but because we regard them as interpretations or applications of a law which any reasonable man who had requistite infromation regarding the facts of the case would concur in giving. The validity of ethical norms is judged by informed insight.

People differ in moral judgements because their facts are different. But if they were to have the same facts and were also to differ in their moral judgements, even this would not establish that moral judgements are subjective or relative. This conclusion would follow only if it could be shown that neither party to the dispute *was irrational* or *unreasonable* in so disagreeing and this does not follow from the mere fact of disagreement. Just as some times people are irrational and sometimes are immoral and since also we do not always believe reasonably or act morally, therefore there should be no surprise felt on finding disagreement on moral matters. But the disagreement could be resolved, if the parties involved in the disagreement are prepared to view the facts from the point of view of the sympathetic impartial spectator. It may further be noted that universal agreement is not available even on questions of logic and on questions of empirical fact. We have to concentrate on reasonable and unreasonable disagreement and to attain this we have to go beyond the fact of mere disagreement. And differences in the deepening of moral insight of a people or individuals have also to be kept in view. There are of course degrees of moral illumination.

ETHICAL BEHAVIOUR

In considering ethical behaviour, I would like, at the outset, to determine the area within which I propose to limit my discussion. I am not going to discuss ethical behaviour in the context of ethics of 'spaceship' versus 'lifeboat' controversy. These involve global issues and are relevant to world-bodies versus developing countries or affluent society versus poverty/famine stricken people. Environmentalists regard the earth, metaphorically speaking, as a 'spaceship' and argue that no one be allowed to destroy or waste any part of the world and that the depleting resources of the earth be pooled and be commonly shared by all. Such an approach of equality and security against the growing hunger and over-population problems is contested by persons who use the metaphor of lifeboat against the spaceship. 'Spaceship' metaphor presupposes a world government which controls the spaceship. The upholders of lifeboat metaphor question the assumption that everyone has an equal right to an equal share of earth's resources. They regard affluent society as occupying a life-boat while underdeveloped, hunger stricken people swimming around asking for help and pleading to be rescued and picked up and put in the boat. Since the capacity of the boat to carry passengers is limited, it will not be ethical to permit the open-sea people to climb into the boat. The metaphor is used to emphasise the unethical element in permitting immigrants to settle in advanced countries and thereby be a permanent drain on their economy

or any aids being given to underdeveloped people. Any such step, they argue, will land posterity in trouble. I am not touching this aspect of the problem. I shall restrict myself to a study of that core of ethical behaviour which heroes and saints, sages and moralists have been exhibiting throughout the ages.

The modern subjectivists, through their analysis of basic ethical terms and moral judgement, have greatly undermined the objectivity in morals. Morality has been reduced to a matter of social conditioning and the character of ethical behaviour so dominant in the writings of Moore and other intuitionists appears to have been greatly destroyed. In this new approach, the emotivists constitute the vanguard. By denying the cognitive significance of ethical terms or by making the emotive component of their meaning the dominant component and playing down the descriptive meaning of ethical terms, the concept of the ethical behaviour appears to have undergone a metamorphosis. The analysis of moral judgements, the way they function, how are they like or unlike commands, imperatives, emotive utterances, how they are defended, have made ethics an interesting language game. The old non-natural intuitively apprehended element which gave basic moral concepts, in the opinion of Moore, Ross and Ewing, their unique significance has simply dissolved. By reducing ethical behaviour to the behaviour which is in harmony with prevalent norms of society, ethics has been placed under sociology. Unless the objectivity of moral law and the obligation to follow its imperatives are built into the definition of ethical behaviour, that core of ethical behaviour, which distinguishes it from problem behaviour on the one hand and ethically neutral behaviour on the other is difficult to conceive.

Problem behaviour is the behaviour which is not in harmony with prevalent social norms. It may be of two types. Problem behaviour which springs from conduct problem and the other which flows from personality pro-

blem. The latter falls under the category of pathological cases permitting of treatment like patients suffering from bodily ailments and needing medical care. All such cases are, therefore, ruled out of court as not forming any anti-thesis to ethical behaviour. Problem behaviour that springs from conduct problem may violate norms of society. It expresses itself sometimes in acts of disobedience or violence, stealing, teasing members of the peer group or even elders and in various forms of indiscipline, including campus disturbances, cheating in examination halls etc. Sometimes, behaviour which is not in conformity with the prevalent social norms, may be ethical behaviour of the highest order. Social reformers challenge the existing norms of society. They look at the system of life as a whole and succeed gradually in replacing and overhauling the norms of society. Conformity to norms of society, even if done with a sense of duty, covers a part of ethical behaviour.

The position taken by the new subjectivists is that we are born in a social milieu and pick up the code prevalent in the group. We get conditioned to the practices which are in vogue. Since there is no trans-cultural criterion to judge the relative merits of codes/rules of conduct prevalent in different societies, they all have equal moral worth for their respective cultural groups. This implies that argument on moral matters is possible only if the disputants have the same moral conditioning i.e. they have the same system of values. The disputes are resolved by straightening out facts or by giving reasons. If the disputants agree on facts, they would also agree on question of value. But if the disputants belong to different cultural groups, their differences cannot be resolved, no argument is possible. Your moral code is determined accidentally by your birth in a particular cultural group. One great difficulty in such an account of values is the inability of the subjectivists to explain the feeling of compulsion associated with moral obligation. To say that one's fear of disapproval of society could well induce in one

the psychological feeling of obligation with regard to certain types of conduct does not cut much ice. The point at issue is whether there is such a thing as objective obligation, something which is my duty irrespective of the moral code of my society. True, different cultural groups have different moral codes. But the question that arises requires us to ask 'Are there no rules of conduct, no values and obligations which are common to all or in most of the groups?, Is there any "conformity of the norms with the basic bio-psycho-social nature of man?" If these questions could be answered in the affirmative, some degree of objectivity could be claimed in morals. All that is implied in the objectivity claimed for the moral law is that anyone who has a clear notion of it thinks of it as a system of orders which he himself concurs in giving. It is something 'impartial', 'free from bias', 'independent of personal taste' or 'common to all reasonable men'. A denial of this will place us in a ludicrous position. Will it make any sense to talk of Indian Moral Law or Chinese Moral Law? There could be differences of opinion in the content of the moral law. "The modern subjectivists are right in saying that we want others to agree with us in our moral judgement, but they fail to see that we expect agreement here as of right on the ground that these judgements are not merely expressions of our own preferences or those of our group, but applications of a law to which all men commit themselves when they claim to be reasonable." (William Kneale on Objectivity in Morals, p. 694, READINGS IN ETHICAL THEORY.)

The one point on which I have not been able to reconcile myself to the language-analysis approach is that the moral agent who is a unique individual facing a unique situation is completely kept out of account and whatever the language analysis reveals that is universally applied. On the one hand, universal element is denied in morality and moral codes are segregated in cultural groups; at the other end, the language of morals is analysed and the study is supposed to have a universal import.

To conform to the mores of society, to move along the beaten track is not to be moral in the strict sense of the term. To be moral, one must choose, one must create one's own moral code. This choice is not whimsical or arbitrary. It must be based on some principle that may guarantee the autonomy of the individual. It is an existential choice in which the whole being of the individual is involved. The individual fully accepts the responsibility of what he chooses. This implies that he chooses it for the whole of humanity.

Ethical behaviour, therefore, expresses itself (i) in a course of action which is freely chosen, (ii) the choice is grounded on some principle, (iii) it is value-oriented and (iv) shows the characteristic of consistency. Kant, in his famous formulations of the Categorical Imperative, had tried to make explicit the principles which could serve as a guide in moral decisions. But, as we all know, the critics found fault with his formalism and rigourism and did not appreciate his attempt to reduce the moral man to a thinking-conative machine. The utilitarians insisted on the greatest happiness principle and were caught up in the mesh of hedonistic calculus. Some have insisted on personality fortifying quality of the moral decisions. At any particular time in history and in different places, people practice different moral codes. There is no rule that can prescribe both my values and your values, except one which Robert Maclure put so neatly: 'Do to others, as you would have others do to you', a rule for which you can give good reasons. Ross' concept of prima-facie duties emphasised the situational aspect of ethical behaviour, i.e., the moral choice is not a mechanical affair. It is subjected to the promotion of greater or more important duty. Modern subjectivists have done a good job in pointing out the limitations in resolving moral differences.

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THE ETHICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ASCENSION OF THE HOLY PROPHET

'And certainly he saw him in another descent, by the lote-tree of the utmost boundary, nigh unto which is the Garden of Abode. When that which covers covered the the lote-tree. The *eye turned not aside nor did it exceed the limit. Certainly he saw of the greatest signs of his Lord.* (53 : 13–19).

I

Ethically considered, I believe, the Ascension symbolises the ideal of self-integration to which one has to seek an increasing approximation in life. The integration of an individual into a unity is a matter of degree. Man, to begin with, is a creature of impulses, drives and passions. His behaviour is partly controlled by various stimuli that happen to excite his receptors and nerve centres. But as he grows, he learns to combine and co-ordinate different movements into complex patterns of behaviour. Human personality is a many-sided affair. Different desires pull the individual in different directions in different moods and situations. The individual vacillates and is internally torn. It is only at a higher level of development that one attains to a certain measure of unity.

II

The Quran describes three stages in the spiritual growth of an individual. These are (i) *Nafs-e-Ammarah*, the animal soul, (ii) *Nafs-e-Lawwamah*, the self-accusing soul and (iii) *Nafs-e-Mutmainnah*, the contented soul. In the first stage man is primarily a creature of animal passions and low desires. It is the lowest stage of human existence. But considered ethically this can lead to a situation where man becomes the lowest of the low. "Already, have we urged unto hell many of the Jinn and humankind, having hearts wherewith they understand not, and having eyes wherewith they see not, and having ears wherewith they hear not. 'These are as the cattle—nay, but they are worse. These are the neglectful". 7 : 179. At this level of development an individual is wont to command evil. "And I (Joseph) call not myself sinless; surely man's self is wont to command evil, except those on whom my Lord has mercy. Surely my Lord is Forgiving, Merciful". (XII : 53). At the second stage a little deviation from the path of rectitude causes pangs of conscience. One is now past the animal stage. The individual is sensitive to the pricks of his conscience and is guided and moulded by the dictates of the self-accusing soul: 'Nay, I swear by the self-accusing soul (that this Scripture is true). (LXXV : 2.) The third stage is the growth of the Divine in man and is the highest level of spiritual development. 'O Soul that art at rest, return to thy Lord, well-pleased with Him, well-pleasing Him. So enter among my servants and enter into my Garden". (LXXXIX : 27—30). This is a stage where an individual attains to perfect harmony. His various passions and desires are subordinated to an all-embracing interest, which is in tune with the Divine will. Iqbal describes this all-absorbing interest by the phrase love and holds that love strengthens ego. These stages of development are interwoven in an integrated individual. The lower stage is "sublated" in the higher, is carried forward in the organic synthesis of life process. A

slipping back into a lower stage is possible even at a sufficiently advanced stage of spiritual growth. "And certainly she desired him (Joseph) and he (Joseph) would have desired her, were it not that he had seen the manifest evidence of his Lord. Thus (it was) that we might turn away from him evil and lewdness. Surely he was one of our chosen servants. (XII : 24).

This unity of the self is not attained in a vacuum. It requires social participation as also reflective withdrawal for assessing the true import of various ends which constitute the standards of conduct for the people in general. A prophet seeks a reorientation or a transvaluation of the operative values of his people. The sources of his knowledge are the external physical environments as well as the inner world of the soul. In his person, in the words of Iqbal, "the word-life intuitively sees its own needs and . . . . defines its own direction". Operative values are reflected in the customs, traditions, dos and dont's of the group. The climate of opinion, the ethos of a people form the basis of the group code. Now custom is to a group what habit is to an individual. Habit is easy but puts a cramp on the creative activity of an individual. Customs examplify the approved and recognised modes of group behaviour. Thus when a prophet or a reformer revolts against some of the approved practices of his society, the opposition that he meets is quite natural. The force of custom acquires an authority which has both an emotive and a cognitive significance for the group. The Quran mentions repeatedly how the opponents of the prophets took refuge in the authority of their elders as a justification for their practices.

1. "And when they do some lewdness they say: we found our fathers doing it and God has commanded us thus". (VII : 28).
2. "They said : O Salih, thou wast among us a centre of (our) hopes before this. Dost thou ask us not to worship what our fathers worshipped". (XI : 62).

3. "They said : Hast thou come to us to turn us away from that which we found our fathers following, and that greatness in the land may be for you two (Moses and his brother Aaron)? And we are not going to believe in you". (X: 78).

To guard against this deadening influence of "virtue without imagination" on the character of a person, Iqbal preached creativeness as a distinct goal for an individual to strive for. In Javed Nama he says :

Life is mortality
And everlastingness as well; it is
Compact of both creativeness and zeal.
Dost live? then learn to love and to create
And hold the heavens in grasp like Us.
And shatter all that suits thee not, and make
A fresher world grow from thy mind. The man
Who is liberated finds it burdensome
To live in other's world. The one who lacks
Creative power is an infidle,
A heathen Vile; he doth not from Our grace
Obtain his share, nor from the tree of life
He plucks his fruit. Art thou the man of God?
Then let thy brilliance be that of a sword,
And thyself by thy own world's destiny".
Vs. 3799–3813. (Translation by Mahmud Ahmad).

A deviation from the coventional patterns of behaviour gives a rude shock to the group and when a reformer brings home to his people the cognitive hollowness of a certain custom he is naturally taken as a rebel in the first instance. But since a prophet has his contact with the very roots of his being (this is what Iqbal understands by *wahy)* he realizes the worthlessness of the operative values of his age and undertakes to reshape the contours of life. The culture and civilization of a people is like a mirror which holds up to them, in a condensed form, the past choices, the modes of behaviour and the way of thinking of the race handed

down to them through a long line of ancestors from times immemorial. An ordinary non-reflecting member of a community is crushed under the load of the customs of his group. He has no authentic existence. He never seeks a contemporaneity with people who belong to the remote and archaic past, *i.e.,* with people who lived long before the beginning and development of the culture and civilization which he unconsciously inherits. If he could only shake off th shackles of his racial heritage, he could breathe in an atmosphere which is not polluted with the smell of the operative values. May be he chooses after a Kierkegaard, to be a religionist and may have constantly *to renew his choice,* to rise to the level of, what the existentialists call, the authentic existence, Or he may like a Nietzsche deny all traditional values and preach the gospel of being courageous but godless. This tearing off oneself from the historical roots is no easy process. Spinoza was right when he said : "If salvation lay ready to hand and could be discovered without great labour, how is it possible that it should be neglected by almost everbody? All noble things are as difficult as they are rare". This process of seeking contemporaneity with Adam or the first pre-historic race of man is a highly intense experience and taxes the entire being of the individual. Only a person who has rediscovered himself thus can claim to have attained to unity in the superlative. He enjoys freedom in the highest degree.

III

The Quran regards God as the locus of all ultimate values. "And to thy Lord is the Goal". (LIII : 42). Religious experience brings a person in direct contact with the ultimate source of all life and creation. The mystic, because of the marked, singular saint-like bliss aspect of the experience, is so overwhelmed with feeling that he does not like to come out of the repose of his unitary experience. But for a prophet religious experience is creative of new values. He actively

seeks to reconstruct the social fabric of his environment in the light of his *ever sharpening vision.* The direct contact dispels the existentialistic despair and anguish. The feeling that life is absurd is replaced by faith in life's intrinsic worth as an *ever developing* and *never ending process.* The Ascension of the Holy Prophet is his direct vision of God and *his maintenance of complete self-possession in* that moment of personal contact with the Infinite Ego. 'The eye turned not nor did it exceed the limit' (LIII : 17). In that moment of intimate association with the Infinite he discovered that he had *fully assimilated the Divine attributes* (The Holy Prophet, as the tradition goes, has enjoined on Muslims to assimilate the Divine Attributes). The Ascension is seeking a confirmation of the fact of assimilation of the Divine attributes. And in the maintenance of perfect calm and self-possession at that moment of intimate association with the Infinite lies the true ideal of individual unity. This also represents the acme, the zenith of spiritual growth that an individual can possibly achieve. It is the privilege of *Nafs-e-Mutmainnah* to attain to such a degree of perfection. It may be here noted that it is not simply a striving for a direct vision of God, a direct contact with the very roots of one's being, (for many persons are capable of doing that), but to maintain complete self-possession when one is in direct contact with his Creator that constitutes the ideal form of self-integration. Iqbal describes beautifully this idea in the following verses in Javid Nama :

The flight to heaven means a longing for
A witness who may testify thyself.
Unless it be confirmed by Him, our life
Is nothing but a play of tint and smell.
No one can stand against His beauty bright
Except the one who has perfection reached
Vs. 245-50.

An individual with such a degree of unity can withstand calmly "the blast on the trumpet" preceding the Day of

Judgement. "And there shall be a blast on the trumpet, and all who are in the Heavens and all who are in the Earth shall faint away, *save those in whose case God wills otherwise*". (XXXIX : 68). 'Save those' are the souls who have attained to complete self-integration.

Bayazid Bistami, a persian mystic of the 9th century was the first sufi to describe in detail his mystic experience, which he termed as *ascension.* It is true that a sufi's ascension has no comparison with the Ascension of the Holy Prophet. But it gives some idea of how a great sufi felt his imperfections when he was in contact with God. The following account of Bayazid Bistami's mystic experience is taken from *Tadhkirah* of Attar :–

> "I looked from God towards myself and found that my light was utter darkness in comparison with God's light, my loftiness was utter lowliness, it was all purity there and all darkness here. But when again I looked, I found my light in His light, my loftiness in His loftiness, and that whatever I did I did through His power. His light shone in my heart and I discovered that in truth all worship was from God and not form me, though all the time I had thought that it was I who worshipped. I felt perplexed and received the explanation : All that is, is I and not not–I . . . . I looked from God towards God and saw Him as the only reality. I remained in this stage for long, left all efforts and all acquired knowledge. Grace from God began to flow and I got eternal *(azli)* knowledge. I saw that all things abide in God.i" pp. 112–13.

The sufi's emphasis on the fear of God has its basis in the consciousness of his failure in assimilating the Divine attributes. The essence of man according to Rumi lies in the Vision of the Friend. "Man is vision, the rest in him is dross. True vision is the vision of the Friend". Ascension is

a rediscovery of man resultant upon a contact with the roots of one's own being. It transforms the individual and leads to the creation of new values. It bestows upon him freedom, freedom to break and replace operative values.

IV

Assimilation of the Divine Attributes is a creative process and needs ever renewed contacts with the Infinite. The commandment regarding obligatory prayers associated with the Prophet's journey to the Highest Heaven is a great pointer to the need of constant vigilance and of keeping renewed contacts with the Infinite for spiritual growth of the individual. The human mind is sensitive to all sorts of social and physical influences. It is likely to be corrupted if it is not jealously guarded "Say : I seek refuge in the Lord of mankind." (CXIV : 1, 4 -5). The prayers and dhikr tend to intensify the self and help it maintain its unity. One has to exercise constant vigilance for his spiritual transformation through a sustained adherence to repeated dhikr and prayers. He is indeed successful who causeth it (soul) to grow, And he is indeed a failure who stunteth it (soul)." (XCI : 9, 10).

THE FOUNDERS OF MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT

The world to-day can easily be divided into three areas, each having a peculiar philosophy of its own. There is, firstly, the Anglo-American world with analytic philosophy as its most prized philosophical enterprise; secondly, there is the European Continent with Existentialism as its most fruitful Philosophy and lastly, there is the Communist world with Marxism as its most dominant contribution to the contemporary philosophic thought. The countries of the third world are at the cross-roads of philosophic confusion, labouring to discover their intellectual roots and looking at these philosophies with a deep sense of alienation. In the world of Islam, there is a definite movement for the revival and reconstruction of Islamic thought. The movement is clearly reflected in the writings of Abduhu, Jamal-ud-Din Afghani, Iqbal, Usman Amin and Syed Hussein Nasr to mention only a few modern Muslim thinkers. Some new disciplines like philosophy of science, of religion, of biological, mathematical and social Sciences have emerged as a result of the impact of these philosophies. The surprising thing about the three major philosophies is their antagonism to each other and their unwillingness to concede elements of truth which each of these philosophies contain. There appears to be a certain cramp, a certain element of dogmatism, which colours the thinking of philosophers belonging to various camps and which won't permit them to philosophise in a spirit which is

characteristic of philosophy herself. In the field of ethics relativism has replaced absolutism and moral rules and practices are being conceived as a matter of social conditioning. What Nietzsche called Master and Slave morality has more vigorously been delineated in the Marxian view that morality like other social institutions is nothing but a superstructure dependent upon the economic structure of society. Those who assume the objective reality of "eternal principles" of goodness, righteousness and justice fail to recognize that there is no such reality since the material order which generates these ideas is ever-changing. 'Those who hold on to old ideas do not realize that there is no longer any reality corresponding to them and their desire to reverse the order of things to fit these ideas makes them "reactionaries" (Samuel Enoch Stumpf, *Socrates to Sartre*, p. 435). To quote Marx, 'The sum total of the productive relations constitute the economic structure of society—the real foundation on which rise legal and political super-structures . . . (and which) determine the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life.' An existentialist also denies objectivity of values. It is my act of choice which bestows values on things or courses of action that I choose. I am condemned to choose without there being any yardstick or criterion to guide or govern my choice. Yet I have to face and shoulder respc bility for the choices that I make. The meta-ethical theories do not improve upon the existing situation. A discussion of second-order ethical statements leaves your moral rules and practices, as a matter of social conditioning. Your ethical reasoning is meaningful so long as you stick to the way of life that you have chosen.

Thus we find that in the 20th century the problems which the philosophers now discuss differ greatly from the problems with which Modern Thought made its beginning in the 16/17th century. The spirit of free inquiry which permeates modern thought brought to a victorious close the long conflict between Philosophy and scholasticism, a

conflict which highlights the Medieval period. An emphasis on methodology, a zeal for analysis, riddance from *a priori* assumptions of theology and increasing faith in the competence of reason, both deductive and inductive, to understand nature, constitute the hall-mark of modern thought. The great names which helped the development of ideas are primarily Continental rationalists and British empiricists who within their distinct frame of reference set the stage for the emergence of 20th century thought. To clear human mind of the fog and mist of scholasticism, a new beginning, without any *a priori* theological assumptions, was made both by Descartes, the first of the Continental rationalists, and by Hobbs and Locke, the architects of British empiricism. While Descartes begins with doubting to reach the indubitable, Locke starts with denial of innate ideas and makes experience the source of all knowledge. Descartes' doubting leads him to assert the existence of the thinker *(cogito, ergo sum)*. Locke's premises get to their logical conclusion in Hume's denial of material and soul substances. In the Philosophy of Kant a reconciliation is affected between the two streams of thought initiated independently by Descartes and Locke in as much as Kant agrees with the empiricists that all knowledge begins with experience but parts company with them in saying that it does not, however, arise out of experience. His forms of intuition and pure concepts of understanding constitute the mechanism which thought imposes upon the material supplied by experience. All knowledge has to conform to the forms of intuition and categories of understanding. The structure of thought transforms the material supplied through the senses. Our knowledge thus remains confined to phenomena, and the noumenal world, i.e. the real world, transcends thought. i.e. is unknowable. Hegel played havoc with the Kantian unknowable thing-in-itself and laid emphasis on the identity of thought and being or what is also termed as the identity of the opposites. Hegel's objective idealism was based on this thesis.

Hegel discovered in thought and nature the working of an Absolute, the Idea, which by an inner logical necessity expressed itself through dialectics of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. Hegel's discovery of the dialectical method paved way for Marx's famous doctrine of dialectical materialism.

The philosophers whose thought has contributed most to the emergence of the 20th century philosophical movements are, in my opinion, Descartes, Hume, Kant and Hegel. Let us consider briefly the ideas which these thinkers contributed to the growth of human consciousness.

DESCARTES

Descartes is a methodologist, a mathematician, a devotee of deductive method, keen to discover self-evident, distinct and clear principles, from which he could deduce, with mathematical certainty, all that one need to know about God, man and nature. His dualism of mind and matter, the gulf between the 'I' and the world, mechanical explanation of nature and human freedom are some of the subjects he introduced to govern the direction and content of modern thought.

While the rationalists, assuming the *a priori* character of first principles, tried to build up deductive metaphysics, which is so prominent in the systems of Spinoza and Hegel, the empiricists laid the foundation of modern sciences by denying the presence of innate principles in human understanding and confining knowledge to the realm of experience. It is this analysis of experience together with Bacon's use of inductive method which led to the rise and rapid growth of natural, positive sciences. Husserl found in Descartes a great hint to develop phenomenology. Descartes escapes extreme subjectivism by relying on veracity of God—a theological assumption, which his premise of clear and distinct principle did not guarantee. Descartes creates a gulf between the thinking ego and the world and finds it diffi-

cult to bridge the same. He brings in God and His veracity to move from thinking ego to the world. Husserl avoids that mistake by making the transcendental turn, i.e. proceeds to make an analysis only of the ego and its thoughts and perceptions. The transcendental turn involves seeing that our experiences are directly of the world. There is no dichotomy between the self having experiences and the world underlying those experiences. There is only a polarity between them. The 'I' is very much in the world, given out there and not to be conceived in isolation, as detached from the world, as Descartes had supposed, Descartes' thought thus provided the growth of rationalism and also is responsible for the rise of phenomenology which had marked impact on Heidegger and Sartre—the two great thinkers of the 20th century.

Descartes' distinction between primary and secondary qualities, which Locke had endorsed, paved the way for subjective idealism of Berkeley. Primary qualities were supposed to inhere in the substance while secondary qualities were the effects things produced in the perceiving mind. Berkeley reduced all qualities to secondary qualities and made the existence of things dependent on their being perceived. In Kant all qualities were relegated to the phenomenal world and the thing-in-itself was declared unknowable. Even for Locke the substance was the support of qualities, which in fact was never experienced. Kant declared the thing-in-itself unknowable but made out a reasoned case for that. The forms of intuition and the categories of understanding precluded the possibility of any knowledge of the thing-in-itself for the formal structure of thought could not be by-passed to get knowledge of reality or the thing-in-itself.

We thus find Descartes' influence traceable to 20th century thought through the intermediaries—the British empiricists and the Continental rationalists.

HUME

David Hume is another thinker the echo of whose thought rings in the pronouncements of the Logical Positivists and the Analytical Philosophers. His *Enquiry* constitutes a charter of philosophical analysis. True to his empiricism he guided himself by philosophical analysis to astounding conclusions which he upheld firmly. About matters of fact or empirical propositions he rightly emphasised the need to trace them back to impressions, the original source of our empirical knowledge, failing which they would lose cognitive significance. Hume's analysis of causality explained the probable and tentative nature of empirical knowledge. He raised the problem of induction, the justification of going from observed to unobserved cases, and it has since then remained a burning issue in all subsequent philosophical thought. He eliminated metaphysics and limited knowledge to simple and complex ideas, all derivable from impressions. As to the existence of external world, Hume admitted that we could not know the causes of our impressions. We have only impressions but do not know how they are caused.

Twentieth century empiricists are not interested in the question of materials of knowledge. They concentrate on the empirical basis of knowledge and the related semantic problems. "All descriptive symbols should be definable in terms of other symbols, except that ultimately one must come to expressions which are definable ostensively only." The programme of the empiricists is in line with the broad framework suggested by Hume.

KANT

Kant grappled with the question of knowledge and strangely enough concluded that knowledge of Reality was not possible. We had such a structure of thought that it was not possible to get to the thing-in-itself although he

asserted that the thing-in-itself existed and caused sensations in us. The unknowable thing-in-itself was known to exist and was also known to cause sensations in us. Our knowledge was simply confined to appearances, to phenomena. He further showed that 'human' understanding lost itself in contradictions when it ventured beyond the bounds of possible experience. Kant thus raised the question : what were the conditions under which knowledge was possible? In other words, his question was : what can be known? and to this his answer was that only phenomena could be known by minds geared like ours. Kant asserted the impossibility of metaphysics because of the nature of what could be known.

The elimination of metaphysics has been taken up from a different angle by the Vienna circle in the twentieth century. For the members of the Vienna circle the basis for the elimination of metaphysics depends upon the nature of what can be significantly said. There is a close affinity in the conclusion which Kant arrived at and between what the Logical Positivists assert about metaphysics. Both voted against metaphysics but on different grounds. Kant's rejection was based on his analysis of the structure of human thought, while Logical Positivists were moved by the requirements of semantics.

HEGEL

Hegel rejected Kant's notion of the unknowable thing-in-itself as a self-contradictory concept. With Kant, cetegories are subjective epistemeological principles and do not apply to reality. Yet Kant had applied the categories of existence and cause to the unknowable thing-in-itself. In Hegel, Kantian categories get transformed into "objective ontological entities" having been independent of any particular mind. This leads to objective Idealism. Hegel's originality lies in showing in detail how the categories are deduced one from

the other–a task which Kant had left unattended–and also how the world is logically deduced from these categories.

Hegel showed the objectivity of the categories by the principle of the identity of knowing and being. The subject and object are in fact identical. They are identical because they are but two different aspects of one reality. All knowledge is conceptual and from this we infer that the object itself is no more than a congeries of universals. The identity of subject and object implies the identity of the opposites. The deduction of categories, one from the other, Hegel showed by his famous method–the dialectical method. Together the categories constitute the Absolute or the Idea. The Absolute expresses itself timelessly through a triple rhythm–thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis, the first category being always affirmative, the second its opposite. The second is deduced from the first. The first category contains its own opposite and is identical with it. The two are reconciled in the third. The dialectical movement is the logical self-unfolding of thought. The thought process and the world process are, for Hegel, identical. This implies that the dialectic process is not confined to the subjective intelligence of various individuals but is also realized in the structure of the objective universe. It further follows that the successive stage of the process could be detected in physical nature and in history in the same order in which they occur in 'logic' (Stace, W.T., Philosophy of Hegel). This, however, has been shown not to be the case by the subsequent advances of various sciences.

Karl Marx appropriated the Hegelian method but he interpreted it as a development of material forces–Dialectical Materialism. Economic and material forces are the underlying causes of human events. A dominant class has always ruled the State in accordance with its own interests and exploited other classes. By an immanent dialectic, primitive communism gave way in succession to slavery, feudalism and capitalism. The latter is replaced by socialism, which later on

turns into communism or dictatorship of the proletariat. The process leads to a classless society in which wealth will be owned in common and distributed to individuals in accordance with their needs.

Hegel's objective idealism underwent a metamorphosis in the hands of Karl Marx. Marx perceived the great role of material forces in the growth and development of history. The dialectical process has to be accelerated by the agents of revolution. He thus observed that the philosophers hitherto had been only interpreting the world while the real task for them was to change the world.

Marxism is a living Philosophy with a number of countries and nations in the world to-day. Some thinkers regard it as the destiny of the third world.

To Hegel again we owe, to a marked extent, the emergence of existentialism, the twentieth century Philosophy of the Continent. Like Spinoza, Hegel had reduced the individual to a mere cog in the great complex—the Absolute. Over-dose of reason which you find in Hegel (Real is rational and rational is real) paved way for the projection of the irrational, the vital force which sustains life. The irrational is not opposite of rational. It is rather complementary to rational. The highly abstract system of Hegel leaves individual in a hopeless maze of categories. The situations that he faces do not get any cognition in the system of Hegel. The timeless Absolute, the Immutable and the non-spatial Idea has no connection with the down-to-earth existence which an individual lives from birth till death. The logical necessity with which the Idea unfolds itself in nature and history leaves no room for individual choice and freedom. Yet by an act of choice I fashion my self and emerge as the creator of my destiny. Hegel's philosophy conceives the universe as a closed system. Yet here am I, who by an act of choice, mould myself and also reshape the contours of life. I am not a finished product, in it. I am the possibilities of my being. My being, my self, in a way, transcends my past and

present. I lie more in the future than in the past. In exercising my existential choice I create my self.

Such a line of reasoning is in sharp contrast with what you come across in the system of Hegel. Hegel thus helped in the emergence of both Marxism and existentialism.

With the people of the third world philosophical problems have to be conceived in the context of their historical situation. The end of colonialism and the attaining of political freedom brought them face to face with a situation described forcefully by Frantz Fanon as "Black Skin, white Masks". Political freedom appears to have no charm in the face of economic dependence. The problems of the third world which baffle them are those of alienation, culture and identity, problems suggested by the historical situation in which these countries find themselves. "The Black skin and white Masks" situation has created a crisis of identity for the people of the third world. Such a crisis is created when a class or a group of people belonging to a certain milieu become aware of the changing values and the dogmatism to which they stick. I have my moorings in a number of dogmas that I have adopted. A dogma for me is a belief based upon *a priori* assumptions. When Galileo offered clergymen to look at the planet Mars through his telescope to observe moons of the red planet, they rejected the offer because of their *a priori* assumption that there could be no moons revolving around Mars. The clergymen were not permitted by their dogmatism to look through the telescope to confirm or reject their belief. My dogmatism expresses itself in my uncritical acceptance of beliefs and attitudes and the mores of my society, the practices of my peers and the world-view they advocate. My social being is anchored on the bed rock of these beliefs and attitudes which I have imbibed from my milieu. It is my awareness of the hollowness of these beliefs and attitudes which creates a crisis in me and when this process is shared by other members it creates a social problem of very great magnitude. As an individual I can shake

off my dogmatism and seek contemporaneity with any great person in the past and thus seek personal satisfaction and discover some acceptable basis of my being. But that is not easily possible for a community. The problem of identity has assumed a special concern for the people of the third world, for, with the attaining of freedom, they have become aware of the alien character of social and moral values which the white masters had indoctrinated in them. An example will make the point clear. Suppose you rear a sheep. You take her to the fields for your morning walk, feed her with your own hands, occasionally pat her and give her a bath. In short you condition her to yourself in such a way that at your slight movement she makes the appropriate response. When the sheep has lived with you for a couple of months and is fully conditioned to the way of life you have introduced her to, you decide to slaughter the sheep. Let us suppose that when you are about to finish her she suddenly acquires full awareness of your entire scheme. She is shaken to the core. The master, the friend, the guide, is revealed as an exploiter, a cheat and an enemy. Her attitude towards the things recommended by the master changes, Her stay with the master turns out to be her greatest misfortune. It is this awareness of the hollowness of the claims of the master, of his dos and don'ts which creates a crisis for the enlightened sheep. Members of the third world lived under the yoke of colonialism like the sheep with the master. The freedom struggle launched by them was a dim awareness of their rights and privileges, of their historic past and its achievements, which under the colonial rule they had been trained to disown and look down upon. The sheep lived happily so long as she was not aware of her fate. This ignorance did not rescue her from her fate. She was in a way committed to be exploited. The vast majority of the people of the third world are like the sheep not yet fully aware of their great heritage. It is only the intellectuals who have dim awareness of the dangers which are sapping the very roots

of their identity. Who am I? is the one question which they are trying to place in clear focus.

Thus for the people of the third world philosophical problems are vastly different from the problems which, for instance, are great issues for the Anglo-American world. It is their historical situation which determines the scope of philosophical activity for them.

ON CONTRADICTORY TERMS

Are Contradictory Terms Collectively Exhaustive?

There is an area of application of a term and within that area the distinctions of contrary and contradictory opposition become meaningful. The old concept that contradictory terms are collectively exhaustive in respect of the entire choir of heaven and earth—is incorrect, for it ignores a basic linguistic fact, viz. the area of application of a term. Colour terms, for example, are meaningful in respect of objects which are sensed through eyes, sound terms for expriences received through ears, etc. Red table or black cat is a meaningful phrase but yellow ideas or murmuring paintings or white smell make no sense. Thus when the logicians talk of contradictory terms and regard them as collectively exhaustive without any consideration of area of application of the term, they commit a mistake, which has not been noticed but which nevertheless is very much there. Take, for example, the contradictory terms blue and non-blue. All the books on logic will regard the contradictory terms taken collectively as exhausting the entire panorama of thought and existence. All objects of experience, whatever be the channel of experience, are covered by the two terms. This is not, however, the case. If yellow ideas is a meaningless phrase so is non-yellow ideas. The reason for this is that the logic of colour words requires the operation of colour terms within a certain area

of application and the contradictory colour-terms will exhaust only the entire area of application of the terms. The contrary colour terms will not exclude the middle. A thing may not be red or green; it may be yellow.

The use of 'Not' and 'Non' have a logic of their own. 'Not' has sometimes a limited operative function whereas 'non' has a class reference. Consider the following sentences. Is it red? No, it is not. And again, it has no non-X characteristics. 'Not' works sometimes as a contrary opposite while non as a prefix is exhaustive of a class, but is limited to the class. If we ignore this aspect in the logic of 'non' we commit a fallacy, which could be termed as the fallacy of limited reference. That is, what is operative in a limited reference, is exhaustive of the class but only of the class concerned. It cannot be taken to cover the entire panorama of thought and existence.

If the observations made above are to be contested then we land ourselves in a strange predicament. We shall have to admit that the contradictory of a meaningless phrase has sense, i.e. is cognitively significant; yellow ideas is a meaningless phrase because colour terms are not applicable to ideas. But if we accept the phrase 'non-yellow', the contradictory of yellow as containing non-yellow idea, the mistake of the logicians is made explicit. Yellow and non-yellow are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive but the application of this pair of contradictories is limited to the area of application of colour terms and cannot be extended beyond that, for the simple reason that terms lose all sense and significance when they are used outside the area of their application. Terms have their areas of application and the contradictory terms taken collectively are exhaustive of the entire area of application but are limited to the area.

Since a term has an area of its application, the use of contradictory opposition will lose all significance if the positive member in a certain pair of contradictory opposites, e.g. A and non-A, is taken in the Parmenedean or Spinozean

sense. For Parmenides, Being contained non-being. It was all-inclusive. Hence the occasion for the use of contradictory opposite did not arise for him. For Spinoza, substance was the only reality. There could not be any non-substance nor could it be conceived. The worid of many was simply the infinite modes of the same reality, the same substance. Contradictory opposition ceases to operate when a Parmenedes or a Spinoza talks of Being or Substance. Again, for the sufis who believe in *Wahdat-ul-Wujud,* there is only one reality which has to be taken in its entirety. Hence contradictory terms had no area of application for these sufis.

Consider the statement : Unicorns are either green or non-green. The contradictory terms if collectively exhaustive should leave no middle possibility. But in the present instance there are no unicorns to which green or non-green adjective could be applied. Unicorns are imaginary, only fictions of the mind. To say that green unicorns constitute a null class and its contradictory non-green unicorns also constitute a null class will devoid the use of null class of any cognitive significance. To say if there is a unicorn it will be either green or non-green does not follow from the logically necessary proposition that colours are extended. The converse of "colours are extended" is "some extended objects are coloured" and not "every extended object is coloured." The predicate of an affirmative proposition is not distributed and hence when we get its converse the predicate which in the converse becomes subject will remain undistributed.

Again, when you say: "Horses are either white or non-white" you are exhausting only the colour characteristics of horses. There are numerous other adjectives which are applicable to horses but to which the colour adjectives do not relate. The old logicians claim that non-white includes all characteristics other than white colour characteristics, viz. of running fast, of good breed, faithful, human, Godlike, intelligent, in short adjectives other than being white. It is indeed funny, to say the least, when you say that horses are

either white or non-white you are simply confining your talk to the colour characteristic of the horses. Other characteristics which the logicians place under non-white are never meant by you. White and non-white when applied to horses are simply exhaustive of the colour characteristics of horses. Now consider this sentence: 'This horse is either white or black'. White and black are contrary opposites and the possibility of a horse having some other colour always exists. White and black, the contrary colour terms, are not exhaustive of the colour characteristics of horses but white and non-white are exhaustive of colour characteristics but when we use colour terms we are confining ourselves to colour characteristics and to these only. Thus contradictory colour terms are confined to colour characteristics and are exhaustive within this frame of reference. It was this necessity of the logic of terms that led the early Muslim thinkers to say that terms of ordinary discourse do not describe God. The terms have a reference to their areas of application and since God could not be conceived as limiting itself to any finite area the early Muslim theologians were cautious when they tried to apply different terms to God. The Ash 'arites, e.g. insisted that various terms used to designate God be taken without asking how and without drawing any comparison.

KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF

A few years ago, a student who had been attending quite regularly, a series of lectures on the Philosophy of Hegel, asked me what relevance had Hegel's system to life outside the classroom. It is true that *philosophical problems are not factual,* yet some indirect reference to facts is involved in as much as we make a distinction between truth and validity and talk of an argument being *true* and not simply *valid.* Any system which purports to explain reality should have some relation to the world as experienced. British empiricism, he went on to assert, is opposed to continental rationalism and despite the universal element and character of Philosophy, the members of the two schools cannot sit together and resolve their dispute. It appears that philosophical inquiry is carried out within the limits imposed by a certain frame of reference and persons engaged in this exercise are oblivious of the limitations and dogmatism inherent in their approach. Empiricism makes experience the starting point of all knowledge while rationalism makes deduction from clear and distinct principles, the deductive model, the key to all genuine knowledge. British empiricism has a relevance to British traditions and culture, while German idealism fits in with their own way of looking at life. Philosophical activity is pursued, at least the study of history of philosophy *appears* to suggest, not in isolation from the traditions and historical epoch of a people but is rather ingrained in it. This alone explains why a number of different philosophies continue to flourish simultaneously.

The young scholar had raised a fundamental question on the status of philosophy and its claim to critical scrutiny of all its premises, its freedom from the limitations of space and time and exigencies of history and culture. He had thought of history of philosophy, after Leazerovit, as an intellectual museum where exhibits from different thinkers were on display, each claiming validity without questioning its underlying frame of reference on which it rested. Every contributor to the museum added his own exhibit without removing the earlier ones. In science, on the other hand, issues which are settled go into the archive and are cited but not discussed **again**, except where some modifications are necessitated by later discoveries and advancement in knowledge. As Waismann puts it: "No philosophical argument ends with a Q. E. D. However forceful, it never forces. There is no bullying in philosophy neither with the stick of logic nor with the stick of language."[2]

Anthony Flew, in his An Introduction to Western Philosophy, concedes partially this point but does not accept it as indicative of no progress in philosophy. The soundness of a philosophical argument is independent of the fact whether any person agrees with it or not and the mere fact that a certain person or a group of persons do not accept a certain piece of philosophical reasoning does not invalidate that reasoning. To make the fact of disagreement a ground for stagnation or no progress in philosophy is to commit the fallacy which involves "a changing of the subject, from an original issue of whether what has been said is true or supported by good reasons, to the quite different and irrelevant question of whether everyone can be *convinced* that this is indeed so." He labels it but-there-is-always-someone-who-will-never-agree DIVERSION. Philosophical knowledge is not to lose its validity by the mere intractability of some peoples' beliefs. True, but what if the disputants are not ordinary persons but competent professional philosophers. Flew grants that Waismann's objection picks out a characteristic

of philosophical arguments but does not rule out the possibility of philosophical knowledge and progress in philosophy. He then goes on to argue that if the premises of a valid deductive argument are asserted, the conclusion will have to be accepted except at the cost of contradiction of yourself. But if the argument is valid and its conclusion doubted, that simply points to the falsity of at least one of the premises.

Philosophical disagreement is not merely a procedural matter, it has a content aspect which is vital to it. Consider, for instance, philosophical analysis of the most elusive term 'Good'. From Socrates through Plato, Aristotle, Epicureans, Stoics, Hobbs, Shaftesbury, Spinoza, Hume, Kant, Hegel down to the contemporary moralists, emotivists included, no one single treatment, by any philosopher, can be taken as the last word in the matter. These disagreements exist within one and the same philosophical tradition. But there are as many traditions as are the divergent philosophies. The young scholar had hinted that the philosophical activity that should engage the minds of thinkers in the developing countries or more popularly called 3rd world countries, should concentrate on problems which they face in their national life and try to resolve the confusions from which they suffer. The emerging nations face questions of identity, culture, ideology, 'national character and integrations', 'foundations of religious beliefs', 'faith and knowledge' and a host of related issues which are vital to their historical awareness. Philosophies, peculiar to Anglo-American world and the socialist countries, may all be very inspiring and instructive despite being diametrically opposed, yet they relate intrinsically to their cultural traditions. Iqbal had perhaps this aspect of philosophy in mind when he said:

جو فلسفہ لکھا نہ گیا خونِ جگر سے   یا مردہ ہے یا نزع کی حالت میں گرفتار

(It is either dead or is dying a philosophy which had not been written in ones' life blood).

Ideas have indeed great impact on human mind but any imported stuff does not find roots in a people unless it is assimilated and soaks in. When Iqbal lived, emphasis on cognitively significant statements was just being taken up in great earnestness. Iqbal had felt it and had smelt the impact of this movement on the language of religion. He had hinted at the limitations of this approach in the following lines:

الفاظ کے پیچوں میں اُلجھتے نہیں دانا   غوّاص کو مطلب ہے گہر سے نہ صدف سے

(Wisemen do not get entangled in language traps. A diver is interested in the precious stone and *not* its shell).

Philosophers in Pakistan have not lived up to expectations of youth in two ways. The intellectual mess and the confusion that lies at the basis of our problems has not been attended to and no movement has been initiated to provide sound intellectual basis to cultural and ideological issues which haunt our educated youth. The complaint made by the young scholar has a genuine basis. And secondly, we have made no serious effort to enrich the tradition of *'Philosophy of Religion'* which is our proud legacy (a legacy which descends from Sheikh Ahmad Sarhindi through Shah Wali Ullah, Syed Ahmad Khan & Iqbal), and a task which Iqbal had proposed to the new generation of thinkers in his Introduction to the Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam. In what follows, I propose to assess the situation as it exists in the world of philosophy today alongwith the challenge that it poses to religiously oriented society.

Philosophy, as it is understood, at present, in the Anglo-American world, is analytical and is chiefly concerned with argument. Philosophical problems are not factual but only logical and conceptual. Since the logical and conceptual issue must have its verbal aspect, a philosopher's professional interest in language is limited correspondingly to its logical and conceptual aspects.

This position has been arrived at after a break with the time-old traditions of philosophy, after giving up involvement in perennial problems of philosophy, problems with which metaphysics is replete. This change has come through after an elucidation of the conditions under which statements attain cognitive significance. Russell, Wittgenstein, members of Vienna Circle. A.J. Ayre, Ryle have all contributed their share in shaping the present trend in Anglo-American philosophy. As is well known to students of philosophy, the logical positivists confined meaningful discourse to two types of statement – the analytic or tautologous and synthetic statements. Analytic statements (if in subject-predicate form but tautologies if the constituents of a proposition are propositions) make explicit what is contained in the very meaning of the words in which they are expressed. Their verification is not sought *in experience*. For example, the statement "if this coat is red, it is coloured" is a tautology. Anyone who knows the meaning of 'red' and 'colour' can just see it for himself that the statement is true. Negation of analytic statement or tautology leads to contradiction. Synthetic statements are empirical statements and their truth/falsehood is established through verification. "Iron rusts when exposed to oxygen" is a synthetic statement. It gives information and is verifiable. Synthetic statement is factually meaningful even if it is not actually verifiable but is verifiable in principle. Actual verification may not be possible of a number of statements which are assumed as true. For example, Egyptians built pyramids in 5000 B. C. or the core of the earth is molten metal. We cannot go back in history to verify historical statements nor have we technological skill to get to the earth's core. The criterion of actual verification is too restrictive. It may exclude propositions as meaningless which the scientists accept as true. The positivists realised this and modified the criterion to verification in principle. Historical events relating to remote past were verifiable when they actually took place. So, they are verifiable in principle

and hence factually meaningful. Similarly, if we could get to the earth's core, we could verify the statement about earth's core. We would know what to look for if we get there.

Verification is the test of factual meaningfulness. The positivists used this division of statements as a tool to rule metaphysical, ethical and theological statements out of court. They made verification the test of meaningfulness. If it is not possible to specify observations that could verify a statement, it would be meaningless. A false statement has a status; it makes an assertion although observations do not verify the asserted facts. But if there is a statement which cannot be verified or which is not verifiable in principle, it has only an appearance of a statement but makes no assertion. It is a pseudo-synthetic statement because it is compatible with any state of affairs and is neither true nor false but factually meaningless.

But there were difficulties in the new formulation of the principle because statements about open-ended classes (all crows are black) were not verifiable in principle as they involved reference to future and we cannot, logically cannot, exclude the possibility of contrary evidence emerging at some future date. The same holds true of all scientific generalisations. Karl Popper modified the principle to read 'A statement is factually meaningful if and only if there are observations that could, in principle, falsify it'. But this modified version is as restrictive as the first one because the universal part (all) of a statement is not verifiable in principle and the particular part (some) is not falsifiable. The statement 'there is at least one unicorn' is not falsifiable because there is a logical possibility that some animal may in future turn out to be a unicorn. The demand for *conclusive verification* (all) or *conclusive falsification* (some) cannot be met. Faced with this difficulty, the positivists modified their position by substituting verification and falsification with the test of confirmation – 'a statement is factually meaningful if and only if there are, in principle, observations that would count

as evidence for its truth and, observations that would count against it'. These observations do not establish conclusively the truth of a statement;they *only confirm it.*

This modified version of the criterion was *too permissive* to eliminate metaphysical or theological statements. The theologians argued that existence of life in its veried forms and the conditions on which it depends, point to the presence of an infinite mind which makes life possible. If the existence of electrons (which are not observable) is confirmed from certain observations, the existence of God too can be confirmed from observing the intricacies of human organs and their working. Basil Mitchell, by referring to his Parable of the Partisan and the Stranger, tries to show that the logic of confirmation is permissive enough to render theological statements factually meaningful. For theological statements, the *evidence cannot* be conclusive because it is not possible to quantify the test, i.e. how much evidence negative or positive would permit you to confirm or disconfirm a theological statement.

Wittgenstein's 'use theory of meaning' dealt a severe blow to the positivists, division of meaningful sentences into the pre-fabricated moulds of mathematics and physics. Meanings are far more complicated than can be indicated by the terms analytic and synthetic. 'The meaning of a word is its use in the language'. This provided theologians ground to insist that the meaning of theological term 'God' can only be determined by its use in religious and theological language. It is arbitrary and dogmatic to say that it has no cognitive meaning unless it conforms to the pattern of mathematical symbols or symbols accepted in physics.

Wittgenstein had tremendous influence on philosophical empiricists and religious thinkers. The latter regarded Wittgenstein's 'meaning as use' as a conclusive answer to the challenge of the positivists. It also helped empiricists to come out of the ruts of analytic and synthetic statements. Basil Mitchell held that philosophical analysts will not "rule out

theological statements from the start on the ground that they are meaningless" but would raise questions on the logic of theological statements, i.e. what sorts of arguments or observations tend to confirm or refute them.

John Wisdom urged that theological disputes are not "idle disputes." These are not disputes about facts but yet are not idle disputes. Wisdom referred to the legal and aesthetic models of arguments. In a law court, in some cases, the counsels do not dispute on facts, the conflict centres on the arrangement and presentation of facts. In judgements of Full Bench, some times the judges do not agree. In such cases, they do not differ on the facts of the case, they differ in the way they see the facts. Similarly, in case of beauty, experts may differ as to the aesthetic excellence of a piece of art. Here again, the disputants do not disagree on fact, they differ on matters relating to patterns and perspectives connected with the facts. Same is the case with theological arguments. Referring to the Parable of the Invisible Gardener, Wisdom shows that the disputants do not dispute on facts. Their dispute is about their response to the garden as a whole. One regards it as tended and the other as untended. Theological statements can have empirical meaning in a broad sense without being verifiable in a clearcut way. Theology and metaphysics are 'legitimate language games' with their own distinctive assumptions and rules.

In early fifties, the debate on the cognitive meaningfulness of religious language (theological statements) shifted to the issue of theology and falsification. Antony Flew urged that since theological statements are compatible with any state of affairs, they are factually meaningless. If the theologians are not prepared to concede the falsity of a theological statement in the presence of empirical evidence, the cognitive meaning of the statement loses all significance. For example, the statement 'God loves us' is incompatible with the presence of suffering in the world. The theologians, instead of accepting that the statement is

false, qualify the statement to an extent that the assertion is completely dissipated. They emphasize, for example, the mystery of divine transcendence. Again, they hold that we do not have the entire sweep of history, from beginning to end, before us. Our knowledge is confined to a limited area. If we had the whole span of history before us, we could realize that God loves every human being even though a child is suffering from inoperable cancer. Flew objects to such a piece of reasoning. This amounts to saying that theological statements are compatible with any state of affairs whatever. That would render them pseudo-synthetic and, therefore, factually meaningless.

Hare answers Flew by referring to 'blik.' Bliks are 'mental sets' which express the basic assumptions through which we experience the world. A blik is not verified or falsified by evidence. It is rather used to assess the evidence. Even a scientist entertains blik when he assumes that everything can be explained by scientific method. Hare explains blik by referring to the blik of a student which can be expressed in the following proposition. 'All members of the faculty are trying to kill me.' The student interprets alike the friendly and hostile behaviour of his teachers in the light of his blik. No amount of evidence to the contrary helps him to give up his blik. Hare states "It was Hume who taught us that our whole commerce with the world depends upon our blik about the world; and that the differences between bliks about the world cannot be settled by observations of what happens in the world". [Theology and Falsification in New Essays in Philosophical Theology, edited by A. Flew and Macintyre, pp. 100f.] The faith of the scientist comprises his blik about the world. [In Islam, the two sects of Shias and Sunnis have their bliks and assess facts in the light of their bliks and thus fail to resolve their differences].

The issue of factual meaningfulness of the language of religion is thus not thrown overboard by the criteria of verification or falsification. Religious statements are not at

par with scientific statements; yet they have meaning within their own setting. The question of intelligibility of religious language can best be understood by considering the operational definition of intelligibility. If a large number of people behaved as if they understood, then the language cannot but be considered intelligible to them. Those who use religious language, can decide whether the language is performing its functions or not. If it is poorly performing its function, then obviously they will try to change it in a way that would make it more effective for their purpose. The question of existence of God within the circle of faith, as asserted by John Hick, does not arise at all. We have not to consider this question as though it were classifiable with question concerning the existence of physical objects. This would amount to missing the entire claim of religion. The question of God's existence arises for those who are outside the circle of faith. And here, too, the legitimate question would be 'Do I have reasons to believe that persons within the circle of faith suffer from some delusion in asserting the existence of God?'

FUNCTION OF PHILOSOPHY

I hold that the function of philosophy is to seek an understanding of man and his world, to disclose the significant possibilities of human experience and to project a vision of life and values. This vision is generated through imagination but is not made out of the imaginary stuff. It is in close contact with the world of fact that philosophic vision discloses the significant or realizable possibilities of experience, of collective human experience. To affect social change directly is not the task of a philosopher in modern sense of the term. A philosopher is essentially a man of vision and not a man of action. It is true that he is a child of his time, that he does not live in a social vacuum, but he is primarily a seeker after truth. Even John Dewey, who, true to his instrumentalism, is a great champion of reconstruction, refuses to assign such a role to the philosopher. In introduction to the enlarged edition of his "Reconstruction in Philosophy" he observes, "It has been charged that the view here taken of the work and subject-matter of philosophy commits those who accept it to identification of philosophy with the work of those men called "reformers" – whether with praise or with disparagement. In a verbal sense reform and re-construction are close together. But the re-construction or re-form here presented is strictly one of theory, of the type that is so comprehensive in scope as to constitute Philosophy——One may hope surely that the theoretical

enterprise herein presented will bear practical issue and for good. But that achievement is the work of human beings as human, not of them in any special professional capacity". (p. XII). Further I contend that philosophic vision is not to be confused with what Professor Blanshard describes as "the unprincipled indulgence of curiosity". Philosophy is not an exercise in sterile exhibition of curiosity. It is an inquiry determined by an intellectual end, the end being an understanding of man and his world. In what follows I have contended (a) that ideas do influence social change, (b) that among the Greeks some schools of Philosophy did lay emphasis on social change as the task of the philosopher—but the reason for that was the lack of specialization in various fields, (c) that the field of Philosophy has been narrowed down due to the rise of sciences and that Philosophy has been forced to surrender its areas and (d) that Philosophy is not a competitor with science in certainty. Its function is to provide a vision—a vision of life and values, of possibilities of experience.

II

That ideas do influence social changes can hardly be denied. Just a look at the world-history will furnish strong evidence that some great social revolutions have been greatly influenced by philosophers. Political philosophy of John Locke played a great role in the American Revolution. In "Origins of the American Revolution", J.C. Miller observes: "If any one man can be said to have dominated that political philosophy of the American Revolution, it is John Locke. American political thinking was largely an exegesis upon Locke : and patriots quoted him with as much reverence as communists quote Marx today. Indeed, it is not too much to say, that during the era of the American Revolution, the 'party line' was John Locke". That the American revolution was in itself a great social and political change and further

led to great upheavals in the socio-political patterns of people in different continents is a fact which can be readily assented to. Further, it is well known how Rousseau was regarded, in the words of Saintsbury "with something like idolatory by the men of the revolution". The French Revolution had been inspired by the philosophical ideas of Rousseau. John Morley says of Rousseau ". . . . " it was his work more than that of any other one man that France arose from the deadly decay which had laid hold of her whole social and political system, and found that irresistible energy which warded off dissolution within and partition from without". Again in the twentieth century Iqbal's political philosophy lies at the root of the great social and political revolution which resulted in the partition of the Indian sub-continent. The Quaid -e- Azam's Two Nation Theory was based on Iqbal's thesis that the identity of a people is determined by their religious and cultural affinity rather than by their racial or geographical unity. Iqbal denounced the Western concept of nationalism in unequivocal terms both in his poetry and prose writings and within a decade after Iqbal's death the state of Pakistan was formed on religious, historical and cultural basis despite the lack of linguistic and racial unity of the people and the want of geographical contINGuity between the two provinces of Pakistan. Thus if we could rely on history the evidence is that philosophers do influence social changes. Examples of such social changes in the ancient world are not lacking. The subject of this symposium, however, pertains not to the indirect influence of ideas on social changes but rather one which seeks to limit the scope of philosophic activity to a direct one of affecting social changes. Before the advent of modern period little headway had been made in specialization in various fields, with the result that both interpretation and change constituted the function of philosophy. This is true of the Pythagoreans, the Stoics and the Neo-Platonists. Students of Philosophy very well remember how Socrates

laid emphasis on improving the morals of the youth by insisting on his famous maxim—knowledge is virtue. Right type of knowledge was a pre-requistite for right living. This was partly an attempt to meet the challenge of the Sophists who had in a way recommended that the task of the philosopher was not to interpret the world but to change it. The sophists were led to such a view on realizing the futility of answering the cosmological problems merely on the basis of a priori reasoning. Man, the individual man, was made the measure of all things, and this maxim was made the principle of socio-political changes in the Athenian society. Plato rightly perceived the political and moral anarchism contained in the doctrine of the sophists and took upon himself the task of redeeming Philosophy from skepticism. A balanced life in the shadowy world could be lived by a just man and only a just state could provide conditions for the rational soul to thrive. His experiment to find an ideal state failed but that was hardly Plato's function as a philosopher. In the mediaeval period, Philosophy was harnessed to theology and free thought was almost stifled. The courts of Inquisition could not tolerate differences of opinion on religious matters much less to permit the growth of independent thinking. With the Muslim Philosophers the task of seeking harmony between Philosophy and religion had been of paramount importance. Starting from al-Kindi down to Iqbal almost all Muslim thinkers have shown great eagerness to provide a rational justification of the tenets of Islam. Their metaphysical systems exhibit a marked Islamic bias. Has religion exercised, on the thought of these thinkers, a sort of cramp or has it served as a foil to their systems is a debatable point. Al-Ghazali, it is true, broke away from this tradition of the philosophers but what he expounded was a sort of mystical metaphysics and a spiritual medicine for the ills of the soul.

III

Modern period has been marked by a series of retreats that Philosophy has been forced to make. The fields that once belonged to Philosophy have been surrendered to other disciplines. The connotation of philosopher has been narrowed down. It now includes the logician, the linguist, the epistemologist and those who theorise about what is called "the essential nature" of the universe.The philosopher in the old and wider sense includes the social and political theorist and even the natural scientist. This has been necessitated by the rise of sciences. Philosophizing both for the rationalists and the empiricists in modern period was an exercise in introspection. "cogito ergo sum" of Descartes is as much the result of psychological analysis as is Locke's assertion that all knowledge comes to us through experience. Kant's later statement that "although all our knowledge begins with experience it does not follow that it arises out of experience" is an inference from the introspected self. Thus whether the philosophers talked about the Substance or about the origin of knowledge their philosophic activity was an exercise in introspection. Hegel's Absolute Idea, the Blind Will of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche's Will to Power all depend for their nature and character on analysis of consciousness of the finite individual. Philosophers found themselves in quandary when at the turn of the century psychology forged ahead as an independent positive experimental science. Philosophy had to withdraw itself and leave the field of consciousness to psychology.

The problem of ontology with which traditional Philosophy is concerned derives its significance from the assumption that reality is eternal, beyond time and space, perfect hence changeless. The task of the philosopher was to develop his rational faculty and have a synoptic picture of the whole. Muslim Philosophers, especially those who were under the influence of Greeks, were much concerned with such a

function of Philosophy. Their doctrine of Intellect worked on this hypothesis. Even the Sufis showed a marked tendency to develop a cognitive-cum-contemplative attitude towards Reality. Ghalib voiced this feeling when he said "I hanker after a leisure which gives me an opportunity to sit for long contemplating the Beloved".

It is against such an attitude of philosophers that Carl Marx observed: "Until now philosophers have only interpreted the world differently, the point is to change it". Again, John Dewey regarded such a conception of the function of philosophy as a "a source of the growing popular disesteem and disturst of its pretensions". Iqbal in a poem addressed to a young Sayed who is much impressed by the glamour of Philosophy says :

The flame of thy love is without heat.
Listen, it is a soul awakening point,
Pure reason remains deprived of vision
Philosophy is a going away from life.
The dumb melodies of thought
Are a knell to the urge of action.

This reaction, I think, is primarily directed against the exaggerated claims of absolute idealism of Hegel and Bradley. Iqbal stands for philosophy of action, preaches voluntarism in which reason appears as a close ally of will. He is dead set against the concept of a fixed unalterable universe in which man is merely a bewildered spectator, a seeker and not a creator.

Russell's work on mathematical logic and Ludwig Wittgenstein's emphasis on the need of paying deliberate attention to what can and what cannot be said eliminated metaphysics. The function of Philosophy became reduced to one of linguistic analysis, of making clear the conditions which make an utterance significant or meaningful. From this point of view the task of the philosopher is to frame questions with no pretensions to finding any solution to those questions. Philosophy is not a science nor a governess

of sciences as was thought by earlier thinkers. The new champions of this old discipline rejoiced in pointing out that metaphysical problems as entertained by philosophers in the past were mere pseudo-problems. The task of the philosopher is to show if a certain statement is significant or not. He is also to assist experts in other fields in clarification of their notions or in pointing out that metaphysical problems in the past were insoluble simply because they were language muddles ; traditional metaphysics was only 'bad grammar' and perhaps the present day philosophical analysis is nothing but "good grammar". The field of philosophy has been made both narrow and dry. The goal of philosophic activity from this point of view is complete symbolic formalization. And if this happens, the only competent persons to philosophise will be mathematical logicians or logisticians. And they may withdraw from the class of philosophers as the psychologists have done. If this happens, the field of philosophic activity shall have to be demarked anew. But one may pause and just ask: "Is Philosophy merely "good grammar" and nothing more?"

Is the prospect bright if Philosophy is released from, what John Dewey calls, "its burden of sterile metaphysics and sterile epistemology" and is made to concentrate on the task of reconstruction. The function of reflective thought, for Dewey, was control, "the control of nature nad society in the interest of human progress". Philosophic ideas are "instruments for directing our activities, plans or programmes of action". The truth of ideas is their success, their falsity their failure. Instrumentalism of Dewey may be anything but is not true philosophy. Social utility is no criterion of philosophic worth of an idea. Berkeley's reduction of matter to ideas had socially speaking an unhealthy effect on Dr. Johnson who was forced to kick away the ideas. Even socially useful ideas are in the beginning unacceptable to the group which resists change in any form. The operative values have a great hold on the emotional life of a group and it takes

a group a long time to see the reasonableness of the new ideas. 'Philosophy harnessed to a social programme' says Professor Brandshard, 'is not really Philosophy at all, since it has surrendered its freedom of logical movement.' Can we say that this reconstruction could be philosophically carried on in the realm of morals. But here we have sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists and economists who may despite our interference in their areas and may secede from our group. They have already seceded and have their own reliable methods for conducting research and inquiry into values and the problems of culture.

When all this is said and done and Philosophy is driven out from her fields, there is no cause to despondency. There is one function which Philosophy can profitably perform. It can guide the social sciences by projecting new visions of possibilities of experience of life and values. Existentialism though nihilistic is rich in vision. When an existentialist emphasises anguish, dread, contingent character of individual existence, he directs our attention to some very potent facts of human situation. His emphasis on authentic existence is an attempt to restore the individual his status as the moulder of his destiny. An existentialist tries to release the individual from the tyranny and burden of conventions and traditions. Sartre's statement "Man is condemned to be free" is a great vision of the possibilities of the being of an individual. He is not to be a useful cog in a very lively social machine as the Marxist philosophers would conceive him but a free agent capable of creating a new world.

Philosophy does not compete with science in certainty. "Great in vision, poor in proof, Philosophy at its highest has been", observed William Pepperell Montague. It is, I think, a correct appraisal of philosophical inquiry. Iqbal's greatness lies in his ego philosophy. His emphasis on the "Rising note of egohood" in the universe is an absorbing vision of the biological evolution of man. His Mard-e-Momin, perfect man, is the goal of humanity. The perfect man is

to appear. He will create a society of perfect individuals. As a philosophical hypothesis it is of very great value. But if it is taken as a verifiable thesis it labours under serious defects. Philosophy, as I have said, does not aim at certainty. It suggests possible truths. Could Eugenics—a movement in genetics "which aims to improve the genetic endowment of human population by scientifically directed selection"— —worked out a programme for making the appearance of Iqbal's perfect man possible? Eugenics may not succeed but Philosophy has done its job. Physics of today is metaphysics of yesterday. May we hope that metaphysics of today be science of tomorrow.